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OVERLOOKING TORT CLAIMANTS’ BEST 





The asbestos crisis has spawned the development of extraordinary new 
remedies.  One of the most dramatic and controversial is known as a “non-
debtor release,” a bankruptcy order extinguishing claims against a party who 
has not itself filed for bankruptcy.  Also known as a “third-party release,” this 
form of relief first found acceptance in early asbestos insolvencies.  Since that 
time, Congress has passed a statute—§ 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code—that 
expressly authorizes non-debtor releases in asbestos reorganizations.  Powerful 
remedies are subject to abuse, and third-party releases are no exception.  In this 
article, I argue that bankruptcy courts and litigants have overlooked critical 
limits on non-debtor releases—limits contained in both § 524(g) and other 
provisions of the Code.  The most important restriction is this: Under the best 
interest of creditors test set forth in § 1129(a)(7) of the Code, it is permissible to 
extinguish the liabilities of a third party over the objection of claimants only 
when the plan of reorganization promises payment in full on the released claims. 
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“A strong disease requyreth a stronge medicine.”
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The asbestos crisis has bedeviled our legal system for over thirty years.  It is 
now the “longest-running mass tort litigation in U.S. history.”
2
  The “avalanche 
of asbestos lawsuits” has overwhelmed the civil courts.
3
  More than seventy 
firms have declared bankruptcy as a result of asbestos liability.
4
  Countless 
plaintiffs have been denied full compensation on their claims.
5
  And courts and 
legislatures have been unable to develop a comprehensive answer to the problem. 
                                                                                                                         
 
1 DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, PROVERBS OR ADAGIES WITH NEWE ADDICIONS GATHERED OUT OF THE 
CHILIADES OF ERASMUS (photo. reprint 1969) (1539). 
2 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION vii (2005), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG162/ [hereinafter RAND].  The RAND 
report is a truly outstanding document.  I recommend it to anyone interested in asbestos litigation, 
specifically, and mass tort litigation, generally. 
3 See In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2004) (“For decades, the state and 
federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits.”). 
4 See RAND, supra note 2, at 109-10 (estimating that seventy-three asbestos defendants have filed 
for bankruptcy through the summer of 2004); id. at 152-53 (listing the seventy-three companies); 
Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss: Courts May Be Starting to Get a Grip on Asbestos 
Litigation, 92 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 26, 29 (“To date, an estimated [eighty-five] companies have 
filed for bankruptcy claiming asbestos liabilities as the cause.”). 
5 See RAND, supra note 2, at 114-15 (noting that many bankrupt asbestos defendants have not been 
able to pay asbestos plaintiffs in full through their reorganizations).  For more on this point, see 
infra notes 469-72 and accompanying text. 




Although a global resolution remains out of reach, experimentation with 
piecemeal remedies has proceeded since the early stages of the litigation.  Courts 
have developed new procedures to deal with the size and complexity of asbestos 
cases.  Moreover, legislatures have enacted a range of statutes to address various 
aspects of the asbestos quandary. 
One of the most dramatic remedies to emerge from the crisis is known as a 
“non-debtor release.”
6
  Similar in effect to the discharge granted to bankrupt 
debtors,
7
 a non-debtor release is a bankruptcy order extinguishing the liabilities 
of a party who has not itself filed for bankruptcy.
8
  Also known as a “third-party 
release,” such a release is typically justified on the ground that the benefiting 
non-debtor is making a financial contribution to the debtor‟s estate—a 
contribution that is necessary for the success of the debtor‟s reorganization.
9
 
Non-debtor releases first received judicial approval in the reorganization of 
the Johns-Manville Corporation, one of the earliest asbestos insolvencies brought 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
10
  The Manville case lent considerable 
legitimacy to third-party releases.
11
  Shortly thereafter, increasing numbers of 
debtors began adding such provisions to their plans of reorganization, including 
parties driven into bankruptcy as a result of non-asbestos liabilities.
12
  And many 
courts granted the requested relief, generally finding the authority to issue third-
party releases in § 105(a) of the Code,
13
 the primary source of the bankruptcy 
courts‟ general equitable powers.  However, other courts adopted a contrary 
view, typically ruling that non-debtor releases are prohibited by § 524(e) of the 
Code; that statute provides that discharging the debtor from a debt does not 
impact any liability of a third party for the discharged debt.
14
 
The legality of third-party releases remains controversial in non-asbestos 
cases,
15
 but their legitimacy in the asbestos context is now well established.  In 
1994, Congress added § 524(g)
16
 to the Bankruptcy Code.
17
  This statute grants 
                                                                                                                         
 
6 See In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 820 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Non-debtor releases 
are extraordinary and should be reserved for unusual circumstances.”); Joshua M. Silverstein, 
Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor 
Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 68 (2006) (explaining that 
non-debtor releases “are a drastic form of relief”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 523-24, 727, 944, 1141(d), 1328 (2006). 
8 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
9 See, e.g., In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) 
(finding that without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that enabled the 
debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full). 
10 See RAND, supra note 2, at 110-11. 
11 The Manville bankruptcy is discussed in Part III, infra. 
12 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 88 B.R. 742, 754-55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (mass tort case 
involving the Dalkon Shield holding that courts may grant non-debtor releases pursuant to their 
“equitable and inherent” power under the Bankruptcy Code), aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). 
13 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
14 Id. § 524(e). 
15 See infra Part IV.A.2 (summarizing the split in the courts); Part IV.B (addressing some special 
features of the split concerning insurance). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006). 




courts extensive additional powers in reorganizations initiated by debtors because 
of asbestos liabilities.
18
  Included in the list of powers is the authority to grant a 
non-debtor release to certain parties related to the debtor who are alleged to be 
responsible for the debtor‟s asbestos obligations.
19
 
Since the adoption of § 524(g), numerous courts have issued third-party 
releases in asbestos cases.
20
  But many of these courts have cited both § 524(g) 
and § 105(a) as authority for such releases, perhaps because the precise scope of 
§ 524(g) is unclear, creating a danger that a given release falls beyond its scope.
21
 
In this article, I contend that critical limitations on non-debtor releases, 
whether the release is granted under § 524(g) or § 105(a), are not being addressed 
by the courts in asbestos bankruptcies.  The most important of these limitations is 
that, under the best interests of creditors test,
22
 it is only permissible to extinguish 
the liabilities of a third party over the objection of claimants when the plan of 
reorganization promises payment in full on the released claims.  Because so few 
judicial opinions confirming reorganization plans in asbestos insolvencies have 
considered this requirement, numerous tort plaintiffs have been deprived of an 
alternative source of compensation without receiving the mandated assurance of 
full payment. 
One reason that courts are overlooking applicable safeguards may be that 
asbestos claimants are not fully aware of such protections, and thus they are 
waiving their rights, either by voting for the plan, or by failing to object to 
confirmation.  If so, this article is all the more necessary because it will serve to 
educate both courts and litigants about the legal principles that govern asbestos 
non-debtor releases. 
The best research indicates that the asbestos crisis will not abate until the 
middle of this century.
23
  Through 2002, 730,000 persons had brought claims for 
asbestos injuries.
24
  But “[t]ens of millions of Americans” were exposed to the 
substance.
25
  Thus, while the pace of filings has decreased from the highs of the 
                                                                                                                         
17 Section 524(g) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 
108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
18 See infra Part V. 
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4). 
20 See infra Part VI. 
21 See infra Parts V.C., VI.B. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (requiring that dissenting creditors in a Chapter 11 reorganization receive 
at least as much they would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7). 
23 RAND, supra note 2, at 17-18 (citing studies that predict continued cancer deaths resulting from 
asbestos up through 2049); see also Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate 
Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1925 (2002) (after setting forth 
some sobering statistics, the author concludes that “it is readily apparent that the end of asbestos 
litigation is decades away”). 
24 RAND, supra note 2, at xxxiv, 2, 70-71; see also Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial 
Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
991, 992 (2005) (“Since each plaintiff sues approximately sixty to seventy different defendants and 
bankruptcy trusts, the total number of claims probably exceeds 50,000,000.”). 
25 RAND, supra note 2, at 2.  Expert testimony at one hearing indicated that 25 million Americans 
came into contact with asbestos-containing products and that 12 million of those people were still 
alive in 1998.  See In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 257 B.R. 184, 196 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). 




late 1990s and early 2000s,
26
 some experts estimate that more than half of the 
total claims have yet to be asserted.
27
 
The more recent waves of litigation have driven an increasing number of 
defendants into bankruptcy.
28
  This trend is expected to persist.
29
  Section 524(g) 
will thus continue to play a crucial role in addressing asbestos liabilities.
30
  And 
non-debtor releases, issued under both that statute and § 105(a), are certain to be 
a regular feature of asbestos bankruptcies.
31
  Accordingly, the need for careful 
exploration of the powers granted by § 524(g) is pressing.  Most of the 
scholarship on the statute, however, has focused on other parts of the law.
32
  This 
                                                                                                                         
 
26 See RAND, supra note 2, at xxxiv, 72-73 (noting that the rate of filings increased significantly in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s); Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 593-95 (2007) (documenting a decrease in claims filed in 2004 and 2005). 
27 RAND, supra note 2, at 105-06; see also id. at xxvi (noting that, as of the end of 2002, while 
“[e]stimates . . . vary, . . . at most, only about three-quarters of . . . claimants have come forward”); 
Brickman, supra note 24, at 992 (“[T]he latest estimates are that 1,000,000 new claimants will 
emerge over the next forty-five years.”).  According to one well-respected estimate, over 120,000 
cancer deaths resulting from asbestos had not yet occurred as of 2005.  See RAND, supra note 2, at 
15. 
28 See RAND, supra note 2, at 109-10 (of the estimated seventy-three asbestos bankruptcies 
through the summer of 2004, thirty-seven were commenced in 2000 or later). 
29 See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 266 (2006) 
(predicting “substantial additions” to the list of asbestos bankruptcies if Congress fails to pass 
comprehensive reform legislation); Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 26, at 603 (predicting that 
changes in asbestos litigation will motivate “more and more companies . . . to seek the resolution . . 
. that bankruptcy provides”).  For a recent asbestos bankruptcy filing, see Prepackaged Plan of 
Reorganization of T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
In re T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 08-14692 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 24, 2008). 
30 Katherine Porter, Recent Issues in Asbestos Bankruptcies, NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L., Oct. 
2004 Part I § H, at 224 (“The scope and security of the protection [offered by the statute] have 
rendered § 524(g) the favored method for resolving asbestos liability.”). 
31 Cf. Susan Power Johnston & Katherine Porter, Extension of Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy 
Code to Nondebtor Parents, Affiliates, and Transaction Parties, 59 BUS. LAW. 503, 512 (2004) 
(“The most remarkable, and desirable, power of § 524(g) is the statute‟s authorization of a broad 
channeling injunction that offers protection to a broad group of parties in interest, in addition to 
protecting the debtor.”); see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(observing that ABB Limited, the ultimate parent of the debtor, moved the debtor into bankruptcy 
to “cleanse” both the debtor and two non-bankrupt affiliates of asbestos liabilities). 
32 See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos 
Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841 (2008) (offering various criticisms of the 
operation of 524(g) with a particular focus on the deprivation of future claimants‟ rights); William 
P. Shelley et al., The Need for Transparency Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos 
Trusts, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 3 257 (2008) (arguing that a lack of transparency in 
the operating procedures of asbestos litigation trusts has enabled some plaintiffs to obtain double 
recovery on their claims, unfairly burdening defendants); Mark D. Plevin et al., The Future Claims 
Representative in Prepackaged Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and 
Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 272 (2006) 
[hereinafter Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative] (arguing that, by allowing debtors and 
present claimants to appoint future claims representatives, courts have denied future claimants 




article begins the necessary exploration of § 524(g)‟s non-debtor release 
provisions.
33
  It also addresses asbestos third-party releases granted under § 
105(a). 
Part II briefly reviews the asbestos-related tort litigation.  Part III provides 
an overview of the Manville bankruptcy, perhaps the most significant event in 
the history of the asbestos litigation crisis.  Part IV contains a detailed survey of 
the law governing third-party releases in non-asbestos cases.  Part V outlines § 
524(g) and the case law implementing the act. 
Part VI contains the main argument of this Article.  In it, I identify and 
explain the critical protections overlooked by courts and litigants alike, 
protections that should be addressed before a non-debtor release is granted in an 
asbestos case.  The most crucial protection is that tort claimants have a legal right 
to demand payment in full under the reorganization plan on any extinguished 
claims against third parties.  Finally, the Conclusion offers some closing remarks. 
                                                                                                                         
proper and independent representation in bankruptcy cases); Brickman, supra note 24, at 1000-01 
n.34 (arguing that instead of structuring § 524(g) litigation trusts to “effectively distinguish” valid 
and invalid tort claims, trusts are structured “to favor the interests of the lawyers controlling the 
trusts‟ creation by, for example, paying their claims earlier and at higher levels than claims that 
arise later in the process without regard to merit or causation”); Katherine M. Anand, Note, 
Demanding Due Process: The Constitutionality of the § 524 Channeling Injunction and Trust 
Mechanisms that Effectively Discharge Asbestos Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1187, 1199-1211, 1222 (2005) (concluding that § 524(g) is unconstitutional because 
it deprives future claimants of procedural due process by permitting a court to discharge future 
claims without giving the claimants an adequate opportunity to participate in the case). 
  Much of the criticism applicable to courts‟ implementation of § 524(g), flows from the 
non-judicial and expedited procedures used in pre-packaged bankruptcies.  A “pre-packaged” 
reorganization is one in which “plan negotiations, distribution of disclosure statements, and voting 
all take place before the bankruptcy case is filed.”  Mark D. Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos 
Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883, 888 (2003) [hereinafter Plevin et al., 
Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies].  In such cases, the debtor usually files its disclosure 
statement and plan of reorganization along with its Chapter 11 petition.  Id.  Asbestos debtors often 
use the “pre-pack structure.”  See id. at 889-907 (summarizing three asbestos pre-packs).  Plevin 
and his co-authors argue that because plan negotiations in such cases generally take place in secret, 
the future claims representative is unable to effectively act on behalf of the future claimants, and 
conflicts of interest infect the process.  See id. at 907-08.  As a result, various provisions of § 
524(g) and other parts of the Code are violated.  See, e.g., id. at 907-08 (explaining that because the 
negotiations take place in secret, plaintiffs‟ lawyers who know about the negotiation are able to 
obtain favorable treatment for their clients vis-à-vis other asbestos claimants); id. at 913-16 
(explaining that, in pre-packs, similarly situated tort claimants “generally do not receive similar 
treatment”); see also Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-
Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 441 (2004) (presenting numerous 
criticisms of “pre-packaged” asbestos bankruptcies, including conflicts of interest, improper 
conversion of present claims into future claims, improper classification of claims, and 
discriminatory treatment of claims); id. at 446 (contending that “the rapid pace at which [asbestos] 
bankruptcies are conducted” has lead to the sacrifice of “the procedural and substantive 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code”); RAND, supra note 2, at 119 (noting that pre-packs can 
reduce the length of asbestos bankruptcies “to as little as three to six months”). 
33 It should be noted that two essays have discussed the non-debtor release provisions of § 524(g).  
See Porter, supra note 30, at 219-40; see Johnston & Porter, supra note 31, at 503-26. 




II.  THE ASBESTOS TORT LITIGATION 
Asbestos is a strong, durable, fireproof, heat-resistant material.
34
  It is also 
“abundant and inexpensive to mine and process.”
35
  As a result, asbestos was 
used in numerous commercial and residential settings up through the 1970s.
36
  
Products that contained asbestos included building insulation,
37
 construction 
materials, and automotive parts such as brake linings.
38
 
Unfortunately, asbestos is extremely dangerous.  It gives off fibers that can 
permanently lodge in a person‟s lungs if inhaled.
39
  These particles can cause a 
variety of lung ailments, such as lung cancer (including malignant 
mesothelioma), asbestosis, and pleural plaque (which is a “harmful buildup that 
lines the lungs”).
40
  While these illnesses vary in seriousness, all can be deadly.
41
  
Asbestos is also linked to numerous diseases unrelated to the lungs.
42
 
Asbestos has a very long latency period.  A person usually does not become 
ill until twenty to forty years after his or her first exposure.
43
  Moreover, while 
persons who directly handled asbestos are the ones most often impacted, many 
have been infected, and sometimes even killed, by inhaling fibers carried on the 
clothing of family members.
44
 
While the hazardous nature of asbestos has been known for thousands of 
years,
45
 it was not until the publication of Dr. Irving Selikoff‟s breakthrough 
medical research in the 1960s that litigation started to take off.
46
  The pace of 
filings accelerated further after the 1973 Borel v. Fibreboard decision,
47
 in which 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that asbestos manufacturers were strictly liable to persons 
injured because of exposure to their product.
48
  These cases brought to light 
evidence that manufacturers were aware of the dangers of asbestos as far back as 
the 1930s but did not disclose the risks.
49
 
                                                                                                                         
 
34 RAND, supra note 2, at 11; Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement 
Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 588 (1996). 
35 RAND, supra note 2, at 11. 
36 Id. 
37 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 588. 
38 Stengel, supra note 29, at 226. 
39 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 588. 
40 Id. at 588-89. 
41 Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 740 (Bankr. E. & 
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
42 RAND, supra note 2, at xix.  For a good overview of the health impacts of asbestos, see id. at 12-
14. 
43 Id. at 15 (“Typically, [twenty] to [forty] years elapse between the first exposure to asbestos and 
disease manifestation.”). 
44 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 589. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 592. 
47 RAND, supra note 2, at 1; Stengel, supra note 29, at 230 (explaining that asbestos litigation saw 
a “virtual explosion” after Borel). 
48 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
49 RAND, supra note 2, at 22. 




Asbestos litigation soon began to overwhelm the legal system.
50
  First, the 
total number of cases introduced complex aggregation and joinder issues.
51
  
Second, asbestos litigation is “extremely complicated.”
52
  For example, the long 
latency period and widespread use of asbestos raised difficult questions of 
causation and proof, as well as challenging procedural issues regarding statute of 
limitations and collateral estoppel.
53
 
These challenges forced the courts to develop “unusual or imaginative 
solutions”
54
 ranging from new docket practices and case management 
techniques,
55
 to the increased usage of special masters and expert advisors to 
juries.
56
  One commentator concludes that the judges presiding over asbestos 
cases frequently transformed their role from “passive administrator of justice” to 
“active participant in the litigation.”
57
  In addition to the courts, state legislatures 
adopted new laws to address aspects of the litigation.
58
 
While these legal developments brought about some positive results, the 
asbestos crisis is far from over.
59
  And it has changed in shape over time.  During 
the first phase of the litigation, most claims flowed from industries where 
working conditions exposed employees to high concentrations of asbestos 
fibers—including asbestos mining and manufacturing, construction, the railroads, 
and shipping.
60
  Ultimately, the crush of lawsuits compelled numerous 
defendants operating in these fields to declare bankruptcy.
61
  The plaintiffs then 
shifted their focus to more peripheral companies
62
 operating in other fields of 
                                                                                                                         
 
50 Id. at 28 (noting that courts “struggled to manage asbestos caseloads”). 
51 See RAND, supra note 2, at 28, 43-44; Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 594 n.60. 
52 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 594. 
53 Id. at 594-95 & n.60.  It should also be noted that asbestos litigation is incredibly expensive.  See 
generally, RAND, supra note 2, at 92-106 (noting, inter alia, that the total costs of the asbestos 
litigation was roughly seventy billion dollars through 2002, and that forty billion dollars went to 
litigation costs; the amount actually paid to claimants was only thirty billion dollars).  Some experts 
predict that the total economic cost of asbestos personal injury claims will be $265 billion.  See 
RAND, supra note 2, at 105. 
54 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 590; accord RAND, supra note 2, at xx (“Trial judges developed 
innovative procedures in the 1980s to manage large asbestos caseloads.”). 
55 See, e.g., RAND, supra note 2, at 28-30 (summarizing “case aggregation” techniques 
implemented by courts, such as global case management orders, multi-party settlement 
negotiations, pre-trial and trial consolidations, and transferring all cases in a given jurisdiction to a 
single court, among other techniques). 
56 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 590 n.33, 595. 
57 Id. at 590-91. 
58 See, e.g., RAND, supra note 2, at 25 (discussing changes to statutes of limitations to assist 
plaintiffs who do not discover their injuries until years after exposure). 
59 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
60 RAND, supra note 2, at 76. 
61 See RAND, supra note 2, at 48 (“As filings surged, many of the asbestos product manufacturers 
that plaintiff attorneys had traditionally targeted as lead defendants filed for bankruptcy.”); see also 
id. at 111 (listing the companies in the initial wave of asbestos bankruptcies, which includes key 
players such as Johns-Manville, UNR, and Celotex). 
62 Id. at xxiii. 






  Many of these firms had only a tangential connection to asbestos.
64
  
Through 2002, at least 8400 distinct parties had been named as defendants in 
asbestos lawsuits,
65
 and the alleged tortfeasors come from a broad spectrum of 
U.S. industries, though the litigation has been heaviest in a select few.
66
 
Another change was the dramatic increase in the number of lawsuits filed 
by parties who are “unimpaired”—i.e., their medical condition does not inhibit 
their capacity to perform everyday activities, though they have suffered legally 
cognizable injuries.
67
  Plaintiffs with claims of this type appear to be an 
increasing portion of new actions.
68
 
These changes have driven courts to develop further procedural innovations 
such as deferred and expedited dockets.
69
  And state legislatures have once again 
passed laws in an attempt to address the situation, including new venue rules to 
restrict forum shopping and mass consolidations
70
 and “medical criteria 
legislation” that “require plaintiffs to provide evidence at the outset of the case 
that they have a physical impairment due to asbestos . . . exposure.”
71
 
Throughout the history of the asbestos crisis, courts and legislators have 
made several attempts to implement a global resolution.  The courts focused on 
the usage of settlement class actions.  But these efforts were stymied by the 
                                                                                                                         
 
63 Id. at 76-77. 
64 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Rivlin & Jamaica D. Potts, Not So Fast: The Sealed Air Asbestos Settlement 
and Methods of Risk Management in the Acquisition of Companies with Asbestos Liabilities, 11 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 626, 626-28 (2003) (summarizing how Sealed Air Corporation, a company 
that never manufactured or used asbestos-containing materials in its products, got drawn into the 
asbestos litigation).  
65 RAND, supra note 2, at 79. 
66 Id. at 81-84. 
67 Id. at xxv, 7-8. 
68 Id. at xxv, 75-76; Barliant, supra note 32, at 443 (“Recent studies indicate that up to ninety 
percent of current asbestos claims are filed by unimpaired claimants.”). 
69 RAND, supra note 2, at xxi (discussing “deferred dockets,” a system under which plaintiffs who 
are not “functionally impaired but who do have a legally cognizable injury,” can file an action to 
avoid the statute of limitations bar, but the action is not actually litigated until the plaintiff develops 
more serious symptoms); id. (discussing “expedited dockets,” which are dockets that permit 
plaintiffs with more serious injuries to litigate their claims first). 
70 Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 26, at 569-83. 
71 Id. at 566-67. 




Supreme Court decisions in the Amchem and Ortiz cases.
72
  And Congress has 
been unable to enact a comprehensive statutory solution.
73
 
Given these failures, bankruptcy remains a critical forum for the resolution 
of asbestos liability.
74
  And corporate debtors will continue using the bankruptcy 
system to shield related non-debtors from asbestos lawsuits.  The first case in 
which an appellate court approved of such protection was the bankruptcy of 
Johns-Manville.  Part III reviews that case in detail. 
III.  THE JOHNS-MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY 
A.  Pre-confirmation Proceedings 
The Johns-Manville Corporation was the world‟s largest producer of 
asbestos and one of the leading manufacturers of asbestos products.
75
  As a result 
of the scientific studies of asbestos published in the 1960s, an increasing number 
of product liability lawsuits were filed against the company throughout that 
decade and the 1970s.
76
  By the early 1980s, Manville was a defendant in 
                                                                                                                         
 
72 See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 
(1999); RAND, supra note 2, at xx-xxi (summarizing the failed attempts to address asbestos 
litigation via settlement class actions (“When the settlement was rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Amchem Products v. Windsor, and when the Court subsequently rejected a similar class 
settlement of asbestos claims against another major defendant in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., efforts 
to achieve a global resolution of asbestos litigation through class action litigation collapsed.”  
(internal citations omitted))); see also id. at xx (“To date, notwithstanding extensive efforts over 
time, neither the parties nor the courts have arrived at a comprehensive settlement of asbestos 
claims.”). 
73 See Stengel, supra note 29, at 241 & nn.83-86 (identifying various congressional proposals and 
observing that “so far these efforts have not resulted in a solution”); Neil, supra note 4, at 28 
(noting that many practitioners involved in asbestos litigation doubt that national legislation 
resolving the crisis will ever be passed). 
74 See Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 272 (“Section 524(g) arguably 
provides the only current mechanism by which a company free itself from” from the drag of 
asbestos liability, “providing even healthy companies with unusual incentives to enter bankruptcy 
to take advantage of this benefit.”); Fred S. Hodara & Robert J. Stark, Protecting Distributions for 
Commercial Creditors in Asbestos-Related Chapter 11 Cases, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 383, 388 
(2001) (“Following Windsor and Ortiz, Chapter 11 appears to be the only viable legal procedure for 
global resolution of a company‟s mass asbestos-related exposure.”); cf. RAND, supra note 2, at xx 
(observing that one of “the most significant developments” in the first half of this decade was “the 
increased use of bankruptcy reorganization to develop administrative processes for resolving 
current and future claims.”). 
75 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).  
For a brief but excellent history of Manville and its litigation troubles, see generally Macchiarola, 
supra note 34, at 591-96. 
76 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639. 




approximately 12,500 lawsuits brought by over 16,000 plaintiffs.
77
  And parties 
were filing new claims at a rate of 425 per month.
78
 
Nonetheless, Manville had sufficient financial resources to meet its existing 
obligations to current tort claimants and commercial creditors.
79
  The company‟s 
primary concern was future liabilities.
80
  Manville‟s internal epidemiological 
studies indicated that persons exposed to the company‟s asbestos would 
ultimately file approximately 50,000 to 100,000 additional claims.
81
  All 
together, Manville estimated it faced approximately two-billion dollars in 
potential liability.
82
  In short, the company was a “financially besieged enterprise 
in desperate need of reorganization of its crushing real debt, both present and 
future.”
83




The Manville bankruptcy was one of the most complicated in history,
85
 due 
largely to the scope and nature of the debtor‟s tort liability.  The company hoped 
to resolve all of its asbestos obligations through Chapter 11.
86
  This meant that 
the bankruptcy process had to address “future asbestos health claimants.”
87
  
These claimants were persons “who had been exposed to Manville‟s asbestos 
prior to the August 1982 petition date but had not yet shown any signs of 
disease.”
88
  Because they were not ill during the pendency of the case, none of 
these parties filed claims in the bankruptcy.
89
  Their identities were thus 




79 See id. (“From the outset of the reorganization, all concerned recognized that the impetus for 
Manville‟s action was not a present inability to meet debts.”). 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). 
843Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988). 
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988). 
85 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624.  As the Bankruptcy Court elaborated: 
Indeed, this case is also one of the most hard fought in reorganization annals.  It has 
been estimated that there have been some 900 applications or motions, over 1000 
orders, approximately 55 adversary proceedings, over 40 appeals (not including writs 
addressed to the U.S. Supreme Court), 300 odd hearings and thousands of pages of 
court transcripts. 
Id. 
86 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“From the inception of 
this case, it has been obvious to all concerned that the very purpose of the initiation of these 
proceedings is to deal in some fashion with claimants exposed to the ravages of asbestos dust who 
have not as of the filing date manifested symptoms of asbestos disease.”), aff‟d, 52 B.R. 940 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
87 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 






  Moreover, the Asbestos Health Committee appointed to represent 
creditors suffering personal injury was only willing to represent present 
claimants—persons who had already developed an asbestos-related disease.
91
  
Finally, the case law was deeply divided over whether future claimants even 
possessed “claims” cognizable in bankruptcy proceedings.
92
  Historically, 
bankruptcy was not available to discharge “future obligations to unidentified 




Judge Lifland (the presiding bankruptcy judge) resolved the procedural 
problem of future claimant participation in the formulation of the debtor‟s plan of 
reorganization by appointing a legal representative for those parties.
94
  The court 
reasoned that even if the future claimants did not have bankruptcy “claims,” they 
were at least “parties in interest” under § 1109(b) and thus were entitled to be 
heard in the case.
95
  The substantive issue—how to address the future claimants‟ 
right to tort damages—was left for the plan of reorganization. 
B.  THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION 
1.  The Litigation Trusts 
Manville‟s plan of reorganization needed to provide relief for current 
asbestos victims “without exhausting the resources necessary to care for 
tomorrow‟s.”
96
  At the same time, it had to address the rights of the debtor‟s 
general creditors and shareholders.
97
  The ultimate plan was the “product of more 
than four years of effort to grapple with a social, economic and legal crisis of 
national importance within the statutory framework of [C]hapter 11.”
98
  And it 
                                                                                                                         
 
90 Id. 
91 See Manville Corp. v. The Equity Sec. Holders‟ Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 
842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev‟d, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986). 
92 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (reviewing case 
law), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).  The Code defines 
“claim” to mean, inter alia, a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
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supra note 32, at 276 n.11 (summarizing the split). 
93 Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 277. 
94 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff‟d, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
95 Id. at 748-49, aff‟d, 52 B.R. at 943.  Section 1109(b) provides that a “party in interest . . . may 
raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.”  11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). 
96 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
97 Id. 
98 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). 




was marked by the usage of extraordinary remedies necessary to address the 
mass tort at the heart of the proceeding.
99
 
The centerpiece of Manville‟s reorganization plan was the creation of two 
trusts—the “Asbestos Health Trust”
100
 and the “Property Damage Trust”
101
—
with the responsibility for liquidating and satisfying all asbestos-related claims 
against the debtor, including future claims.
102
  The reorganization plan placed 
those with asbestos property damage claims in Class Three.
103
  Present asbestos 
health claims were put in Class Four.
104
  Future asbestos health claimants were 
not included in any traditional plan class; instead, they were separately grouped 
under the heading “other asbestos obligations.”
105
  The AH Trust was established 
for parties suffering from asbestos-related diseases
106
—i.e., parties holding either 
Class Four claims or other asbestos obligations.  Under the terms of this Trust, a 
claimant suffering personal injury caused by Manville‟s asbestos first had to 
engage in settlement negotiations with representatives of the Trust.
107
  If the 
parties failed to resolve the dispute, the claimant could elect mediation, binding 
arbitration, or tort litigation in civil court.
108
  The claimant was permitted to 
collect in full any compensatory damages awarded via these proceedings.
109
  The 
PD Trust was similarly structured, but with the purpose of resolving asbestos-
related property claims
110
—i.e., Class Three claims. 
Manville initially funded the AH Trust with $815 million in previously-held 
cash, receivables, and insurance proceeds from settlements with its liability 
insurance carriers.
111
  The plan also obligated Manville to pay the AH Trust $75 
million per year for twenty-four years post-reorganization, commencing three 
years after the Trust‟s creation.
112
  Together, these funding arrangements would 
ultimately provide the AH Trust with over $2.5 billion.
113
 
                                                                                                                         
 
99 The bankruptcy court described the plan as “of necessity, both creative and pragmatic.”  Id. 
100 The “AH Trust.” 
101 The “PD Trust.” 
102 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 
1988) (describing the AH Trust as the “cornerstone” of the plan); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 
B.R. at 621-22 (outlining the key features of the two Trusts).  The Trusts were “[o]ne of the most 
innovative and unique features of the Manville Plan of Reorganization.”  Id. at 621. 
103 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640 n.1.  Parties in this class included “schools, 
colleges, hospitals, government bodies, and other persons and entities.”  State Gov‟t Creditors 
Comm. v. McKay (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 920 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1990). 
104 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640 n.1. 
105 Id. 
106 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 621. 
107 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 622. 
111 Id. at 621. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 




The reorganization plan also mandated that the AH Trust “own or have 
access to up to eighty-percent of Manville‟s common stock.”
114
  And the Trust 
possessed the right to receive up to twenty percent of the reorganized debtor‟s 
profits, beginning four years after the Trust‟s inception, and continuing 
indefinitely, until all asbestos health claims were satisfied.
115
 
The PD Trust received $125 million and a portion of the insurance 
settlement proceeds.
116
  In addition, the PD Trust was entitled to receive any 




2.  The Channeling Injunction 
Under the plan, Manville‟s post-bankruptcy operations were a critical 
source of funding for the AH and PD Trusts.  The success of the Trusts was 
dependent upon maximizing and preserving the reorganized debtor‟s value as a 
going concern.
118
  Accordingly, Manville needed protection from the prospect of 
continued tort litigation after the company emerged from Chapter 11 so that it 





 was not, by itself, sufficient to achieve that end because it 
was unclear whether future asbestos claimants held “claims” that were 
dischargeable in the bankruptcy.
121
  Accordingly, the plan provided that the 
Bankruptcy Court would issue an injunction to “supplement” the effect of the 




116 Id. at 622. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (“The imperative rather, is to ensure . . . the continuing viability of the reorganized 
corporation, which will fund the Trust, whatever the number and amount of claims happen to be.”); 
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The 
purpose of the Trust is to provide a means of satisfying Manville‟s ongoing personal injury liability 
while allowing Manville to maximize its value by continuing as an ongoing concern.”). 
119 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640. 
120 Under § 1141(d), the confirmation of a plan of reorganization discharges a corporate debtor 
from all of its pre-confirmation debts (with limited exceptions).  11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), (3) & (6) 
(2006).  Section 524 sets forth the precise impact of a discharge.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) 
(the discharge serves as injunction barring all attempts to collect on any debt “as a personal liability 
of the debtor”); id. at § 524(e) (the discharge “does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or 
the property of any other entity for, such debt”). 
121 As noted previously, the case law was divided on whether future claimants hold bankruptcy 
“claims.”  See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.  Confirmation of a reorganization plan 
only “discharges the debtor from any debt.”  11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006).  And a debt is 
defined as “liability on a claim.”  Id. § 101(12).  Therefore, if the future claimants did not hold 
“claims,” Manville‟s potential liability to them would not be discharged.  See also id. § 
1141(d)(1)(A) (“[C]onfirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before 
the date of such confirmation” (emphasis added)). 






  That injunction bars any person from asserting “Claims, Interests or 
Other Asbestos Obligations . . . against the Debtor or its subsidiaries or any 
settling insurance company.”
123
  Parties with future claims are covered via the 
term “Other Asbestos Obligations.”
124
  Present and future asbestos claimants are 
thus limited to recovery from the Trusts.
125
  As Judge Lifland explained, “the 
injunction, effectively channels all asbestos related claims and obligations away 
from the reorganized entity and targets [them] towards the AH and PD Trusts for 
resolution.”
126
  The channeling injunction was designed to ensure that the future 
claimants would be treated the same as present claimants under the plan even 
though they were not allowed full creditor status.
127
  Both sets of parties were 
entitled to a complete recovery from the Trusts,
128
 but were restricted from suing 
Manville and the settling insurance carriers. 
3.  Plan Approval and Confirmation 
The promise of recovery in full to asbestos claimants was not a guarantee.  
As part of its ruling on “feasibility,”
129
 the bankruptcy court found that Manville 
established “by convincing evidence” that it would be able to meet its obligations 
under the plan.
130
  But, full recovery for asbestos claimants was ultimately 
                                                                                                                         
 
122 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). 
123 Id. (quoting the plan) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640. 
. 
125 See id. (“The Injunction provides that asbestos health claimants may proceed only against the 
Trust to satisfy their claims and may not sue Manville, its other operating entities, and certain other 
specified parties, including Manville‟s insurers.”). 
126 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624. 
127 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640.  As with the bankruptcy court‟s conclusion that § 
1109(b) permitted appointment of a future claims representative, see supra notes 94-95 and 
accompanying text, channeling the future claims to the Trusts via the supplemental injunction 
obviated the need to resolve whether the future claimants in fact held dischargeable bankruptcy 
claims.  See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 628 (explaining that other asbestos obligations 
would not be discharged, simply “subject to the [i]njunction”). 
128
 Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 602 (“The Trust was bound by the Plan to . . . pay 100 percent of 
the victims‟ claims.”). 
129 A bankruptcy court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a plan of reorganization is 
“feasible,” Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P‟ship v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas Props. 
II Ltd. P‟ship), 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001), that confirmation “is not likely to be followed by 
the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor,” 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(11) (2006). 
130 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 634-35.  Judge Lifland continued: 
Furthermore, the Debtor‟s reasonable and credible projections of future earnings have 
established that the reorganized corporation is unlikely to face future proceedings 
under this title . . . .  The evidence submitted by the Debtor as previously noted, 
provides a reasonable estimation, based upon known present claimants and reasonable 




“subject to the Trust‟s being sufficiently funded.”
131
  Despite this contingency, 




Certain objectors challenged the legality of the channeling injunction,
133
 but 
they were overruled by Judge Lifland.
134
  He found a statutory basis for the 
injunction in the general equitable powers granted by § 105(a),
135
 and the 
channeling authority conferred by § 363.
136
  The court explained that the 
injunction best protected the rights of the asbestos claimants by creating a body 
of funds from which all could recover.
137
  Without the injunction, the parties 
would engage in “piece-meal dismemberment” of the debtor‟s estate, which 
would harm the beneficiaries of the injunction.
138
 
C.  The MacArthur Insurance Litigation 
The channeling injunction enjoining the asbestos plaintiffs from suing 
Manville and its liability insurance companies was not reviewed on appeal.  The 
Second Circuit held that the objectors lacked standing to challenge the 
injunction.
139
  But the appellate court did assess a related ruling. 
As explained in the previous section, both the AH and PD Trusts were 
funded, in part, by the proceeds of Manville‟s settlement with its insurance 
carriers.
140
  At the outset, Manville‟s insurers took the position that the 
company‟s insurance policies did not cover asbestos liability.
141
  This forced the 
debtor to engage in “incredibly complex” litigation with the carriers over the 
scope of the policies.
142
  Given the prospects for recovery and the likely delays, 
Manville attempted to settle the disputes with the hope of generating the proceeds 
                                                                                                                         
extrapolations from past experience and epidemiological data, of the number and 
amount of asbestos-related claims that the AH Trust will be required to satisfy. 
Id. at 635.  The second circuit affirmed, concluding that these findings were “not clearly 
erroneous.”  In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 650; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 
B.R. at 633-34 (where the bankruptcy court noted, as part of its best interests of creditors analysis, 
that asbestos health and property damage claimants would receive payment in full on their tort 
claims). 
131 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 642.  Additionally, the promise of full recovery applied 
only to compensatory damages.  Punitive damages were disallowed under the plan.  In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 627-28. 
132 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 621.  Nearly nintey-six percent of the asbestos health 
claimants voting approved the Plan.  In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 641. 
133 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624. 
134
 Id. 
135 Id. at 625.  For more on § 105(a), see infra note 191. 
136 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 625.  For additional detail regarding § 363(f), see infra 
notes 158-63, 334-45, and accompanying text. 
137 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 626. 
138 Id. 
139 Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1988). 
140 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
141 Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 405 (1989). 
142 Id. at 405-07. 




necessary to fund the reorganization.
143




The settlements with the insurers were a “cornerstone” of Manville‟s plan 
of reorganization.
145
  Under these agreements, the insurance companies paid the 
debtor $770 million and, in exchange, were “relieved of all obligations related to 
the disputed policies.”
146
  To effectuate the settlements, the bankruptcy court 
“enjoined all suits against the insurers” concerning the policies.
147
  It also ordered 
that any claims subject to the injunction would attach only to the proceeds of the 
settlements.
148
  The insurers demanded this protection because certain tort 




A distributor of Manville‟s products, MacArthur, objected to the settlement 
and the supporting injunction.
150
  MacArthur argued that it was a co-insured 
under the settled policies pursuant to a vendor endorsement that entitled 
Manville‟s distributors to “insurance coverage for liability resulting from their 
sale of Manville‟s products.”
151
  Several plaintiffs had recently sued MacArthur 
for such sales activity.
152
  Thus, the company contended, it was entitled to 
indemnification from the settling insurers under the policies and the channeling 
injunction was an illegal discharge that improperly extinguished its contractual 
rights.
153
  The Bankruptcy Court overruled the objection
154
 and the Second 
Circuit affirmed. 
The appellate court explained that the injunction did “not offer the umbrella 
protection of a discharge in bankruptcy.”
155
  Instead, it precluded “only those 
suits against the settling insurers that arise out of or relate to Manville‟s 
insurance policies.”
156
  Moreover, MacArthur‟s claims were “not extinguished; 




As authority for the channeling injunction, the Second Circuit pointed to § 
363(f).
158
  That statute permits, in some circumstances, the sale of estate property 
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“free and clear” of a third party‟s interest, such as a lien.
159
  The third party‟s 
rights are typically transferred—i.e., “channeled”—to the proceeds of the sale.
160
  
The court reasoned that because Manville‟s policies belonged to the estate,
161
 § 
363(f) allowed the bankruptcy court to dispose of the insurance policies through 
the settlement and channel MacArthur‟s claims to the settlement payments.
162
  
The injunction  expressly barring MacArthur and others from suing the insurance 
companies was “necessary to effectuate the Court‟s channeling authority . . . .  
The authority to issue the injunction is thus a corollary to the power to dispose of 
assets free and clear and to channel claims to the proceeds.”
163
 
The Second Circuit found additional authority for the injunction in § 
105(a).
164
  It observed that this statute “has been construed liberally to enjoin 
suits that might impede the reorganization process.”
165
  And the bankruptcy court 
found that direct actions against Manville‟s insurers “would adversely affect 
property of the estate and would interfere with reorganization.”
166
 
The Second Circuit admitted that the insurance settlement and the 
accompanying injunction were “not precisely the same as the traditional sale of 
real property free and clear of liens followed by a channeling of the liens to the 
proceeds of the sale.”
167
  The insurance policies were not actually sold and 
MacArthur‟s claim was distinct from a lien on property.
168
  But “the underlying 
principle of preserving the debtor‟s estate for the creditors and funneling claims 
to one proceeding in the bankruptcy court remains the same.”
169
  Because the 
                                                                                                                         
 
159 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).  See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06 (15th ed. rev. 
2005). 
160 The holder of the interest is entitled to adequate protection.  11 U.S.C. § 363(e).  “The most 
common form of adequate protection is to have the lien or other interest attach to the proceeds of 
the sale.”  3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06[9].  And “[i]t has long been recognized that when a 
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Corp., 837 F.2d at 94. 
161 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93 (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)).  
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U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
165 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 94.  When a debtor actually sells an asset under § 363(f), the bankruptcy court may issue 
an injunction barring a creditor from attempting to enforce a preexisting lien on the property.  Fogel 
v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000). 
168 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94. 
169 Id. 




settlement was “essential . . . to a workable reorganization, it falls well within the 
bankruptcy court‟s equitable powers.”
170
 
IV.  NON-DEBTOR RELEASES AFTER THE MANVILLE 
BANKRUPTCY 
The Manville reorganization has had a dramatic impact on American tort 
and bankruptcy law.
171
  As the first “mass tort bankruptcy,”
172
 Johns-Manville 
signaled that Chapter 11 is an effective tool for addressing enterprise-threatening 
liability.  And in the aftermath of the case, bankruptcy became a critical avenue 
for the resolution of mass torts.
173
 
The case also significantly legitimized the extraordinary remedial devices 
used in the reorganization—including the appointment of a future claims 
representative, the establishment of a litigation trust to liquidate present and 
future tort claims, and the issuance of a channeling injunction which bars future 
claimants from suing the reorganized debtor and permits them to recover solely 
from the trust.  For example, debtors facing mass tort claims now typically 
establish a litigation trust to manage these obligations.
174
  And future claims 
representatives have become a common feature in such bankruptcies.
175
  In short, 
Johns-Manville established a legal framework that numerous subsequent mass 
tort reorganizations have followed.
176
 
                                                                                                                         
 
170 Id. 
171 Cf. Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 597 (“Johns-Manville‟s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding 
was a threshold event in the disposition of mass tort cases.”). 
172 Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 72 (2000) (referring to Johns-Manville as “the first of the mass tort 
bankruptcy cases”). 
173 See id. at 44 & n.2 (explaining that bankruptcy and settlement class actions are the two legal 
avenues for addressing mass tort liability); Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex 
Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1997) (noting that “the bankruptcy court is quickly becoming the forum for 
resolution of many of the largest and most complex mass litigations.”).  As noted in Part II, supra 
note 72 and accompanying text, the utility of settlement class actions was substantially undercut by 
the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
174 JEFF FERRIEL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 854 (2nd ed. 2007) (“Since 
its use in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, cases involving mass tort claims have usually relied on a 
trust for the settlement of present and future claims.”); see, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow 
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing some 
features of a “Settlement Facility” created to resolve the debtor‟s mass tort liability arising from the 
production of silicone breast implants). 
175 See Tung, supra note 172, at 44 (explaining that the future claims representative is “at the 
center” of the bankruptcy approach to resolving mass torts). 
176 See RAND, supra note 2, at 110-11 (observing that the Manville case “created the model for 
resolving asbestos personal injury litigation under the protection of bankruptcy”); J. Maxwell 
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand 
that Relief be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 52 n.285 




In addition to these developments, the Manville bankruptcy “pave[d] the 
way” for non-debtor releases.
177
  Recall that the channeling injunction in that 
case did more than prohibit holders of future claims from suing the reorganized 
debtor.  It barred present and future tort claimants from suing independent third 
parties—namely, Manville‟s liability insurers.
178
  Moreover, the bankruptcy court 
also enjoined MacArthur, an additional insured under Manville‟s policies, from 
asserting its contract rights against the carriers.
179
  Since Manville, bankruptcy 
orders extinguishing the liability of non-bankrupt third parties have become 
“increasingly common” in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
180
  In the following two 
sub-parts, I review non-debtor releases generally and then address some special 
issues that arise when a non-debtor release extinguishes rights relating to 
insurance policies, as happened in Johns-Manville. 
A.  Non-Debtor Releases In General 
1.  Non-Debtor Releases Defined 
In this Article, the terms “non-debtor release” and “third-party release” 
refer to the extinguishing of a creditor‟s claims against a non-debtor over the 
creditor‟s objection.  Such releases come in three basic forms: (1) a section in a 
Chapter 11 plan providing that certain claims against third parties are 
“released”;
181
 (2) a permanent injunction in a Chapter 11 plan, or otherwise 
                                                                                                                         
(1995) (asserting that the Johns-Manville Trust pioneered the approach of establishing a trust to pay 
future claimants); see, e.g., Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 
268, 271-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (summarizing a Chapter 11 plan that substantially mirrored 
Manville‟s in its treatment of asbestos tort claims); H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (explaining that UNR “has resolved its chapter 11 reorganization 
with a similar trust/injunction arrangement”). 
177 Brubaker, supra note 173, at 962 n.3; accord Silverstein, supra note 6, at 54. 
178 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
179 See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d 
Cir. 1988). 
180 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 18 (collecting authorities); accord In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 
B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“In the last few years, debtors more frequently are seeking 
to expand the scope of the discharge to include the release of claims against non-debtor third parties 
and insiders.”); Brubaker, supra note 173, at 961 (observing that non-debtor releases are receiving 
“growing judicial acceptance” and that they “have regularly appeared in reorganization plans”); 
Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court 
Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 BUS. LAW. 913, 943 (1992) (noting “a trend among 
debtors to provide releases for nondebtors in reorganization plans”); Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out 
of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (observing that “the custom of attempting to include releases of nondebtor 
parties has become more and more prevalent”). 
181 See, e.g., Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1987) (plan contained a 
provision expressly releasing a creditor‟s claim against a guarantor of the debtor); In re Digital 
Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 4 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (plan provided that the debtor‟s principal was 
released from all claims relating to the debtor). 




issued by the court, forever prohibiting a creditor from prosecuting its claims 
against a non-debtor;
182
 or (3) both a release and a permanent injunction barring 
the creditor from attempting to collect from the released party on the 
extinguished claim.
183
  The injunctions in the Johns-Manville case enjoining 
MacArthur and the tort claimants from suing the debtor‟s insurance carriers fell 
into the second category.  But each type of release has the same basic impact.
184
 
Non-debtor releases vary in scope.  Some bar a single cause of action held 
by an individual.
185
  Others purport to extinguish all of a non-debtor‟s 
liabilities.
186
  However, third-party releases typically fall somewhere between 
these two extremes, eliminating all claims against a non-debtor (1) concerning a 
particular mass tort,
187
 or (2) relating to the debtor.
188
 
                                                                                                                         
 
182 See, e.g., Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. The First Nat‟l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re 
W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (prior to confirmation of the plan, 
the bankruptcy court entered a permanent injunction enjoining a creditor of the debtor from 
prosecuting its claim against a non-debtor), modified, Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 622 
(9th Cir. 1989) (prior to confirmation of the plan, the debtor sought a permanent injunction 
enjoining a creditor from pursuing a state court lawsuit against guarantors of the debtor‟s obligation 
to the creditor). 
183 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 475 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (plan both released 
certain claims against Dow Corning‟s shareholders and enjoined holders of the released claims 
from attempting to recover against the shareholders), rev‟d in part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In 
re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 729, 731 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (plan contained both 
a release of all claims against the debtor‟s co-venturers, a former part-owner of the debtor, and an 
insurance company that was related to the debtor, and a permanent injunction barring prosecution 
of the released claims). 
184 Like a release, a permanent injunction effectively extinguishes the creditor‟s claim because the 
creditor is forever barred from attempting to recover from the non-debtor.  See In re W. Real Estate 
Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 600 (“By permanently enjoining [the creditor‟s] action[s] against [the non-
debtor], the bankruptcy court, in essence, discharged [the non-debtor‟s] liability. . . .”); Meltzer, 
supra note 180, at 4 n.7 (explaining that permanent injunctions and releases have the same effect 
and thus that the terms will be used interchangeably in the article); Kate Inman, Note, All Debts Are 
Off?—Can the Bankruptcy Process Be Used to Release the Debts of Nondebtor Parties, 49 FLA. L. 
REV. 631, 633 n.7 (1997) (“A permanent injunction preventing a creditor from suing a third party 
is, in effect, a discharge of the third party‟s liability.”). 
185 In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 598 (bankruptcy court permanently enjoined the 
debtor‟s attorney from executing upon a lien against the debtor‟s bank); In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 
885 F.2d at 622 (debtor sought a permanent injunction prohibiting a creditor from enforcing a state 
court judgment against the debtor‟s shareholder-guarantors). 
186 See, e.g., Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1995) (provision in the debtor‟s plan granted a “global release” of all claims to, inter alia, the 
debtor‟s children and a business he owned); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1997) (Chapter 11 plan stated that “[p]ursuant to § 1141 of the Code, confirmation of this 
Plan shall also discharge all claims against Debtor‟s equity Interest holders or Affiliates”). 
187 The release in In re Dow Corning Corp. prohibits all women injured by Dow Corning‟s silicone 
breast implants from suing the company‟s shareholders for their injuries.  255 B.R. at 475; see also 
In re Sybaris Clubs, Int‟l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (provision in the 
proposed plan of reorganization contained a permanent injunction barring “all persons” from 




2.  The Circuit Split Regarding the Legal Validity of Non-Debtor Releases 
The federal courts have long been divided over the propriety of non-debtor 
releases.
189
  Other than § 524(g), the Code does not expressly permit the issuance 
of such releases.
190
  However, “pro-release” courts contend that the general 




 allow for this type of 
relief.
193
  Disagreeing, most “anti-release” courts have concluded that non-debtor 
releases violate § 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the 
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any 
other entity for, such debt.”
194
  They read this language, and the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                         
prosecuting any action against the debtor‟s insiders, a shareholder, and several affiliated entities 
relating to the sale of notes and debentures issued by the debtor). 
188 The release requested in In re Digital Impact, Inc. would have barred anyone from suing the 
debtor‟s principal for any claims related to the debtor.  223 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998); see 
also Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, 
Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (release in the plan of reorganization purported to 
extinguish all claims against various corporate insiders related to the debtor or its subsidiaries). 
189 Compare Hat-Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago Palms Joint 
Venture), 39 B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases), 
with In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 754-55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that courts may grant 
non-debtor releases pursuant to their “equitable and inherent” power under the Bankruptcy Code), 
aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).  For a full survey of the split in the courts, see generally 
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 44-90. 
190 Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656 
(6th Cir. 2002); Silverstein, supra note 6, at 17. 
191 Section 105(a) is the primary source of the bankruptcy court‟s general equitable powers.  See 
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 88 (1991) (“In addition, the bankruptcy court retains its 
broad equitable power to „issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of [the Code.]‟” (quoting § 105(a)); Omni Mfg., Inc. v. Smith (In re 
Smith), 21 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (“From . . . section [105(a)] emanate the general equitable 
powers of bankruptcy courts.”); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing 
that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 
105.01, at 105-5 to 105-6 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 105 . . . is an omnibus provision phrased in 
such general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration of a 
bankruptcy case.”).  The statute provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 
105(a) (2006). 
192 Section 1123(b)(6) permits a chapter 11 plan to “include any . . . appropriate provision not 
inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6). 
193 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 656-58 (explaining that non-debtor releases are 
permissible pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6)); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 
(In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Menard-
Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989), for the proposition 
that bankruptcy courts may enjoin litigation against a non-debtor); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 
at 701 (holding that bankruptcy courts may grant a non-debtor release under § 105(a)); see also 
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 60-61 nn.275 & 276 (containing an extensive list of federal courts and 
commentators adopting this view); id. at 59-61 (more fully outlining the pro-release authorities‟ §§ 
105(a) and 1123(b)(6) reasoning). 
194 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2006). 




policies underlying it, to prohibit third-party releases.
195
  Pro-release courts have 
responded by arguing that § 524(e) does not expressly address releases; therefore, 
the statute is no bar to such relief.
196
  A second group of anti-release authorities 
                                                                                                                         
 
195 See, e.g., Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 
746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Section 524[(e)] prohibits the discharge of debts of non-debtors,” and 
thus § 105(a) may not be used to grant non-debtor releases); Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. First 
Nat‟l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601-02 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibits any permanent injunction “extended post-confirmation . 
. . that effectively relieves the nondebtor from its own liability to the creditor” and thus § 105(a) 
may not be used to provide such relief); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. 
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Section 524(e) . . . limits the court‟s 
equitable power under section 105 to order the discharge of the liabilities of nondebtors.”); see also 
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 47-49 n.194 (containing an extensive list of federal courts and 
commentators adopting this view); id. at 44-50 (describing in greater detail the anti-release 
authorities‟ § 524(e) argument).  It is well-established that § 105(a) may not be used in a manner 
that is inconsistent with another section of the Bankruptcy Code.  Noonan v. Sec‟y of Health and 
Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The bankruptcy 
court may not utilize section 105(a) if another, more particularized Code provision . . . impedes the 
requested exercise of equitable power.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7 (15th 
ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of 
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”). 
196 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657 (“[Section 524(e)] explains the effect of a 
debtor‟s discharge.  It does not prohibit the release of a non-debtor.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 
255 B.R. 445, 477-78 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“On its face, § 524(e) does not set forth a per se rule 
prohibiting permanent injunctions as to non-debtors. . . .  [The statute] does not expressly prohibit 
third-party injunctions . . . .”), rev‟d in part, aff‟d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In 
re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (“To the extent 
that § 524(e) does not explicitly prohibit the court from issuing a permanent injunction, the 
language is clear . . . .”); see also Silverstein, supra note 6, at 61-62 n.278 (collecting judicial and 
secondary authorities); id. at 61-63 (explaining more fully the pro-release courts‟ position regarding 
524(e)); id. at 122-28 (siding with the pro-release authorities and concluding that § 524(e) does not 
prohibit non-debtor releases). 
  A few anti-release authorities have argued that §§ 524(a) and (g) (as opposed to 524(e)) 
bar non-debtor releases.  Regarding § 524(a), compare In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d at 622, 
626 (ruling that the discharge injunction of § 524(a) “displaces” any authority bankruptcy courts 
possess under § 105(a) to enjoin the assertion of claims against third parties), and Peter M. Boyle, 
Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of Third-Party Discharge in Bankruptcy, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 428-29, 437 (1992) (generally adopting the Ninth Circuit‟s argument), with 
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 128-31 (presenting this argument more fully, and then explaining why 
it is invalid).  Regarding § 524(g), compare In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 n.6 (“A recent 
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code buttresses our conclusion that § 524(e) does not permit 
bankruptcy courts to release claims against non-debtors.”), and In re Salem Suede, Inc., 219 B.R. 
922, 937 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (§ 524(g) “suggests that § 524(e) precludes the issuance” of 
channeling non-debtor releases), with Silverstein, supra note 6, at 50-51 n.204 (rejecting this 
argument because, inter alia, Congress expressly stated that the enactment of § 524(g) was to have 
no impact on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue third-party releases), and Ralph Brubaker, 
Unwrapping Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies (Part I): Non-Debtor “Releases” and Permanent 
Injunctions, 25 No. 1 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1, 7 (2005) [hereinafter Brubaker, BANKR. LAW LETTER] 




contend that even if § 524(e) is not an obstacle, §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) simply 
do not grant sufficient equitable power to permit the release of claims against 
non-debtors.
197




While the pro-release authorities agree that non-debtor releases are 
permissible, they have used a number of different tests to determine whether a 
given release is authorized.
199
  The now-dominant standard was set forth in In re 
Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc.
200
  It has five elements.  First, there must 
be “an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party, usually an 
indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a 
suit against the debtor or will deplete assets of the estate.”
201
  Second, the third 
                                                                                                                         
(same), Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 111(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4117 
(uncodified) (“Nothing in [524(g)] . . . shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede any other 
authority the court has to issue injunctions in connection with an order confirming a plan of 
reorganization.”), and 140 CONG. REC. H10765 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Brooks) 
(explaining that § 111(b) “make[s] clear that the special rule being devised for the asbestos claim 
trust/injunction mechanism is not intended to alter any authority bankruptcy courts may already 
have to issue injunctions in connection with a plan [of] reorganization.”). 
197 The bulk of these authorities have adopted the position that § 105(a) may only be used to 
enforce other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code; it does not permit orders implementing general 
bankruptcy policies such as the policy favoring reorganization over liquidation.  Accordingly, since 
no Code section permits non-debtor releases, § 105(a) cannot be used to grant that form of relief.  
See, e.g., In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 4-5, 14 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (adopting this 
reasoning); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that 
because § 105(a) must be used in conjunction with other Code provisions, the statute does not give 
bankruptcy courts the power to issue non-debtor releases) rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 
2000), rev‟d in part, aff‟d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Sybaris Clubs, 
Int‟l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 155-56, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (same); see also Silverstein, supra 
note 6, at 51-52 (setting forth in more detail the anti-release courts‟ argument with respect to §§ 
105(a) and 1123(b)(6)); id. at 106-119 (explaining why the anti-release courts‟ argument is 
invalid). 
  Other authorities have suggested that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) may not be used to 
contravene substantive non-bankruptcy law, something non-debtor releases clearly do.  Brubaker, 
supra note 173, at 1017 n.209 (“[S]upplementary implementation sections such as § 1123(b)(6) 
merely beg the question whether non-debtor releases are in fact „appropriate‟ provisions of a plan.  
That question inevitably requires consideration of the fact that non-debtor releases directly 
contravene nonbankruptcy law that would impose liability on the released non-debtors.”); see also 
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 131 (“[T]hird-party releases . . . eliminate liability that non-debtors 
would otherwise face under federal and state law.”); id. at 131-136 (setting forth this argument in 
significant detail, and then contending that it is invalid). 
  For a final anti-release argument based on §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), see infra note 229. 
198 See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 19-20, 106-36. 
199 Id. at 71 (“[P]ro-release courts have used various standards to assess the legitimacy of non-
debtor releases.”); id. at 64-71 (describing the various tests proposed by courts and commentators). 
200 In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); Silverstein, 
supra note 6, at 64 (explaining that the Master Mortgage test is used by a “majority of pro-release 
courts use in assessing whether to grant a non-debtor release”). 
201 In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. at 935 (emphasis added). 




party must contribute substantial assets to the reorganization.
202
  Third, the 
release must be “essential to reorganization.  Without the [release], there is little 
likelihood of success.”
203
  For example, in the absence of a release, non-debtors 
may refuse to contribute assets that are “necessary” for the debtor‟s 
reorganization.
204
  Fourth, a “substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the 
release], specifically, the impacted class, or classes has „overwhelmingly‟ voted 
to accept the proposed plan treatment.”
205
  Fifth, the plan provides for “payment 
of all, or substantially all, of the claims of the class or classes affected by the 
[non-debtor release].”
206
  In In re Dow Corning Corp., the Sixth Circuit added a 
sixth factor: all dissenting creditors whose claims are extinguished by the release 
must be paid in full under the plan.
207
  Pro-release authorities have generally 
approved of this addition.
208
 
In my prior article, I argued for a modified version of the Master Mortgage 
test involving four elements.
209
  First, an “identity of interest” is necessary to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction over the claims eliminated by the release.
210
  
Second, the release must be “essential to the reorganization” to justify invoking 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6).
211
  This standard will usually be satisfied by 
demonstrating that contributions from third parties are necessary to the debtor‟s 
reorganization and are contingent upon the third parties receiving a release.
212
  
But it can be met in other ways.
213
  Thus, the second Master Mortgage element—
“substantial contribution”—is not required.
214
  In addition, the second element of 
                                                                                                                         
 
202 Id.  
203 Id. (emphasis added). 
204 Id. at 938 (without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that enabled 
the debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full). 
205 Id. at 935 (emphasis added).  In Master Mortgage, 94.8% and 93.4% of the two classes affected 
by the release voted for the plan.  Id. at 938. 
206 Id. at 935 (emphasis added). 
207 Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
208 See, e.g., In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. 758, 761 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (“Dow Corning has 
perhaps the clearest articulation of some of the circumstances in which such a provision can be 
approved.”) (adopting the Master Mortgage test with the Dow Corning addition); In re Transit 
Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 817-18 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (also adopting the Master Mortgage 
test with the Dow Corning addition). 
209 See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72-78.  I shall refer to this as the “Modified Master Mortgage” 
test or elements. 
210 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72; see also id. at 20-21 n.38 & 78-79 n.357 (explaining some 
jurisdictional issues regarding non-debtor releases); Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over claims that “could conceivably 
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy” (emphasis omitted)). 
211 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72. 
212 Id. at 72-73. 
213 Id. at 73 (“Alternatively, critical employees of the debtor might refuse to continue working in 
the absence of a release, making it impossible for the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy and 
resume its operations.”). 
214 Id. 




my test mandates that the debtor in fact be reorganizing rather than liquidating.
215
  
Third, because it is not “fair and equitable” to “cram down” a plan containing a 
non-debtor release, the class of creditors impacted by the release must have 
“accepted” the plan under § 1126(c).
216
  This is another change from Master 
Mortgage because § 1126(c) provides a different standard (among voting 
creditors, at least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number 




Fourth and last, payment-in-full for dissenting creditors whose claims are 
extinguished by the non-debtor release is required by the best interests of 
creditors test.
218
  Under that test, a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may only be 
confirmed if it provides each dissenting, impaired creditor at least as much as the 
claimant would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7.
219
  Non-debtor 
releases are impermissible in Chapter 7 cases.
220
  In such a proceeding, a creditor 
may thus recover any deficiency from a solvent co-obligor if the liquidation 
distribution does not completely satisfy the creditor‟s claim.
221
  Accordingly, 
since the dissenting creditor would receive payment in full on its claim in a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy from the debtor, the co-obligor, or a combination of the 
two, the dissenting creditor must receive full payment under the debtor‟s Chapter 
11 plan if the codebtor receives a release.
222
  The same analysis applies if the 
                                                                                                                         
 
215 Id. at 73-74. 
216 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 74-75; 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (defining class “acceptance”); id. 
§ 1129(b) (establishing that a plan of reorganization may be confirmed over the objection of a 
dissenting class—i.e., “crammed down”—if the plan is “fair and equitable” and “does not 
discriminate unfairly”).  Claimants impacted by a non-debtor release must be placed in a distinct 
class (or classes, if the release extinguishes different types of claims).  Including them in a class 
with other claimants “undermines the Bankruptcy Code‟s classification and treatment scheme” set 
forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4) (2006).  Brubaker, supra note 173, at 983; see also id. at 
981-986 (arguing that third-party releases frequently corrupt the integrity of class formation and 
treatment because courts do not take the extinguished non-debtor claims into account in analyzing 
whether the plan of reorganization satisfies §§ 1122(a) and 1123(a)(4)); id. at 990-91 (third-party 
releases weaken the “cram down” protections set forth in § 1129(b) by “infect[ing] the soundness 
of the classification system”). 
217 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (“A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has 
been accepted by creditors . . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in 
number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such 
plan.”), with In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) 
(“[A] substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the release], specifically, the impacted class, or 
classes, has „overwhelmingly‟ voted to accept the proposed plan treatment.” (emphasis added)). 
218 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 76-78. 
219 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (15th ed. 
rev. 2004); id. ¶ 1129.03[7][e], at 1129-56 (describing § 1129(a)(7) as restating “the „best interests 
of creditors‟ test”). 
220 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 73-74 & 76 n.350.  But cf. id. at 74 n.338 (collecting authorities 
granting releases in Chapter 11 liquidations). 
221 Id. at 76 & n.350. 
222 Id. at 77 & n.351. 




debtor and the third party are not co-debtors—i.e., where the debtor has no 
personal liability for the claim against the third party.  Clearly, the creditor would 
receive compensation in full on such a claim from the non-debtor if the debtor 
liquidated.  Thus, when a debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan purports to extinguish an 
independent claim against a third party, the best interests test mandates payment 
in full for the claimholder.
223
 
The best interests of creditors test does not apply to creditors voting to 
accept the plan.
224
  Moreover, a release of claims held by such creditors is 
voluntary and thus legitimate, whether the creditors receive full satisfaction on 
their claim or not.
225
  That is why a plan need not provide payment in full to “all, 
or substantially all” creditors impacted by a non-debtor release, as mandated by 
the Master Mortgage test.
226
  Instead, only dissenting creditors must be paid in 
full.  As a practical matter, however, it is likely that creditors subject to a third-
party release would demand equal treatment and object to any plan of 
reorganization that paid only some of them in full, dooming the release under 
Element Three—creditor consent.  Therefore, plans with non-debtor releases 




Critically, full payment need not be guaranteed to satisfy the best interests 
test.  A plan of reorganization is confirmable as long as the plan is “feasible”—
confirmation “is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for 
further financial reorganization, of the debtor.”
 228
  If the plan obligates the debtor 
to satisfy the creditor‟s claim, and the court finds that the plan is feasible, the 
court may confirm it with the non-debtor release.  And upon any default, the 
creditor must bear the loss because its claim against the third party is gone.
229
 
                                                                                                                         
 
223 Id. at 77 n.351. 
224 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
225 See infra notes 232-233 and accompanying text. 
226 See In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). 
227 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 78. 
228 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).  This subparagraph of § 1129(a) is known as the “feasibility 
requirement.”  Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P‟ship (In re T-H New Orleans 
Ltd. P‟ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997). 
229 This point has lead some anti-release authorities to conclude that even if a non-debtor release is 
part of a Chapter 11 plan that promises payment in full on the extinguished claim, the release is 
inequitable and thus beyond the power conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) because it places the 
risk of plan failure on the creditor rather than the non-debtor.  Again, if the debtor defaults on its 
plan obligations—a significant risk—and there is a third-party release, the creditor cannot recover 
any remaining shortage from the released non-debtor.  However, if the plan merely contains a 
“provisional injunction”—a temporary, post-confirmation injunction that expires if the debtor does 
not satisfy its duty to pay the creditor in full—then the risk of plan failure is allocated to the non-
debtor.  In such a case, the creditor retains its right to sue the previously-shielded third party for 
any deficiency.  The anti-release authorities thus conclude that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) grant, at 
most, the power to issue provisional injunctions.  See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 
743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999), rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff‟d in pertinent part, 280 
F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).  See generally Silverstein, supra note 6, at 80-86 (presenting this 
argument more fully); id. at 119-22 (explaining why the argument is invalid). 




Third-party releases that are part of reorganization plans promising payment 
in full on the barred claims are often referred to as “channeling releases.”
230
  
Under both the Master Mortgage test, as amended by the Sixth Circuit, and my 
modified version of the test, channeling releases are the only permissible type of 
non-debtor release.  Releases in plans that do not provide for payment in full—
known as “actual releases”
231
—are prohibited. 
It is crucial to emphasize that, although the authorities are split on the 
propriety of channeling releases, they share a mutual condemnation of actual 
releases.  The non-debtor release jurisprudence, bolstered by the arguments of 
commentators, firmly establishes that third-party releases are either (1) 
sanctioned only if a feasible plan of reorganization promises full payment on the 
extinguished claims, or (2) entirely invalid.  
3.  Distinguishing Non-Debtor Releases From Other Types of Relief 
Because a “non-debtor release” extinguishes a creditor‟s claims against a 
non-debtor over the creditor‟s objection, the term does not refer to: (1) 
temporary limits on lawsuits against non-debtors (either pre- or post-
confirmation); (2) releases of claims that are property of the debtor‟s estate; or 
(3) releases granted consensually by a creditor.  Each of these types of relief is 
distinct from a third-party release. 
Going in reverse order, the legitimacy of voluntary releases—e.g., 
reorganization provisions stating that creditors can obtain additional payment 





  Similarly, the Code expressly permits the compromise of 
                                                                                                                         
 
230 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 24. 
231 Id. 
232 See, e.g., In re Resorts, Int‟l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 460 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) (plan contained 
provisions enabling creditors to release all claims against several non-debtors in exchange for 
additional compensation); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) 
(same). 
233 See In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that consensual 
non-debtor releases do not violate § 524(e) and are permissible under the Code); In re Cent. Jersey 
Airport Servs., Inc., 282 B.R. 176, 182-83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (holding that a voluntary release 
does not implicate § 524(e)); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 14-15 (N.D. Okla. 1998) 
(holding that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to grant involuntary non-debtor releases, but 
may issue voluntary third-party releases where such provisions comply with general principles of 
contract law); In re Resorts, Int‟l, Inc., 145 B.R. at 467-68 (permitting voluntary non-debtor 
releases to be included in the debtor‟s plan because such releases are “purely contractual between 
the parties to the release” and thus do not run afoul of § 524(e)); see also Silverstein, supra note 6, 
25-26, 26 n.58 (collecting authorities).  The courts are split on how consent to a non-debtor release 
must be shown.  According to some, voting in favor of a plan is insufficient to manifest assent; the 
creditor must expressly sign off on the release.  See, e.g., In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 
497, 507 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997).  Other courts think a mere vote in favor of a reorganization plan is 
sufficient.   See, e.g., In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d at 1045-47 (holding that a vote for 
confirmation of the plan is sufficient to indicate acceptance of a voluntary non-debtor release); In 
re After Six, Inc., No. 93-11150DAS, 1994 WL 45471, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1994) 




claims belonging to the estate.
234
  It is thus well-established that bankruptcy 
courts may override creditor and shareholder rights to assert estate causes of 
action after the debtor has settled the claims.
235
  Pre-confirmation, temporary 
restrictions on lawsuits against non-debtors—known as “non-debtor stays”—are 
also generally permissible, if a showing of necessity is made.
236
 
Post-confirmation temporary restrictions, while more controversial than 
voluntary releases, settlements of estate claims, and non-debtor stays,
237
 are also 
distinguishable from third-party releases because they do not eliminate the 
creditor‟s rights.  Known as “provisional injunctions,”
238
 these post-confirmation 
limitations merely (i) suspend the creditor‟s claim for a specific period of time,
239
 
or (ii) condition the creditor‟s right to sue the third party on the debtor‟s failure to 
pay the creditor in full through the plan of reorganization.
240
  Accordingly, unlike 
                                                                                                                         
(approving of provisions releasing a large number of non-debtors from all claims held by those 
voting for the plan).  For a thorough discussion of consensual non-debtor releases, see generally 
Meltzer, supra note 180, at 33-39. 
234 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2006) (“[A] plan may . . . provide for . . . the settlement or 
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate . . . .”). 
235 A good example is shareholder derivative lawsuits.  Shareholder derivative claims are actually 
property of the debtor‟s estate rather than property of the debtor‟s shareholders.  Sobchack v. Am. 
Nat‟l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1994); 
In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed by 92 B.R. 38 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).  Accordingly, bankruptcy courts may extinguish shareholders‟ rights to assert 
such claims.  In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 17 F.3d at 602-04 (affirming an order of the bankruptcy 
court enjoining the debtor‟s preferred stockholders from suing certain managers of the debtor for 
breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference because the claims were derivative, belonged to 
the estate, and thus were extinguished as part of a settlement between the debtor and the managers); 
In re Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 304 B.R. 395, 418 n.26 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004) (distinguishing 
authorities holding that § 524(e) proscribes the involuntary release of a creditor‟s claims against a 
non-debtor because the release in the debtor‟s plan of reorganization only extinguished claims 
belonging to the estate); see also In re Energy Coop., Inc., 886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The 
power of the court under [§ 105(a)] . . . includes the power to issue an injunction enjoining third 
parties from pursuing actions which are the exclusive property of the debtor estate and are 
dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement.”); In re General Homes Corp., 134 B.R. 853, 861 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (implying that § 524(e) does not bar releases of derivative claims because 
§ 1123(b)(3)(A) expressly allows for the extinguishing of such claims). 
236 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 32-33.  Non-debtor stays are typically granted when a creditor‟s 
lawsuit against a third party would interfere with the debtor‟s reorganization.  Id. 
237 See id. at 85-86 n.387 (collecting authorities that are split over the power of bankruptcy courts to 
issue “provisional injunctions”). 
238 Id. at 29; see also In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (using 
the term “provisional injunction” in reference to a hypothetical post-confirmation temporary 
injunction that would restrain a creditor from pursuing a non-debtor only until the assets available 
under the plan are exhausted), rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev‟d in part, 280 F.3d 
648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002). 
239 See, e.g., In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610, 612, 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (the 
plan of reorganization restrained creditors from taking legal action against any co-obligors of the 
debtor for five years). 
240 See, e.g., In re MAC Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *8 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (the debtor‟s plan of reorganization included an injunction and a release 




channeling releases, provisional injunctions do not place the risk of plan failure 
on the creditor; the creditor‟s claims are preserved (though suspended) until 
payment in full is received.  If the debtor defaults, the creditor may pursue the 
previously shielded third party.
241
 
Non-debtor releases must also be distinguished from “exculpation” clauses 
and injunctions.  Non-debtor releases enjoin contract, tort, and statutory claims 
based on pre-petition conduct of the debtor and/or the benefitting non-debtors.
242
  
Exculpation provisions extinguish causes of action flowing from post-petition 
activities involving the administration of the bankruptcy case—e.g., the filing, 
negotiation, and confirmation of the reorganization plan.
243
  Non-debtor releases 
and exculpation clauses raise different issues.
244
  Indeed, many of the parties 




                                                                                                                         
barring a creditor from prosecuting the debtor‟s shareholders as long as the debtor complied with 
the plan, under which the creditor was to be paid in full; any deviation from the plan terminated the 
injunction and voided the release to the extent a deficiency remained). 
241 See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 30.  For a summary of an argument against non-debtor releases 
based on a comparison with provisional injunctions, see supra note 229. 
242 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653-55 (release extinguished rights of tort 
claimants against debtor and its shareholders for their pre-petition involvement with silicone breast 
implants). 
243 See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 263 & n.290 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(plan included a section entitled “Exculpation” (1) providing that the debtor, its management, the 
creditors‟ committees, and numerous other parties “shall not be liable . . . for any Cause of Action 
arising . . . from actions or omissions in connection with . . . these Chapter 11 Cases, this Plan, the 
Disclosure Statement,” and multiple other pieces of the bankruptcy case, and (2) enjoining “all 
parties in interest from asserting” such cause of action); In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. 758, 762 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (plan contained a provision stating that the debtor, creditors‟ committee, 
lenders, and these parties‟ directors, officers and other advisors “would be exculpated” from claims 
by any party of interest in the bankruptcy flowing from an act or omission “„arising out of the 
Debtors‟ Chapter 11 Cases, negotiation and filing of this Plan, filing the Chapter 11 Cases, the 
pursuit of confirmation of this Plan, . . . except for their willful misconduct and gross negligence.‟” 
(quoting the plan of reorganization)). 
244 See In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 368 B.R. at 267 (noting that “without question it has long 
been the custom in the bankruptcy community to make distinctions between releases involving pre- 
and post-petition conduct”); In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. at 760-64 (separately addressing and 
applying different legal standards to the non-debtor releases and exculpation clauses in the debtor‟s 
plan of reorganization).  But see Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm 
Commc‟ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 647-48, 655-58 (7th Cir. 2008) (analyzing an exculpation clause as 
though it were a non-debtor release).  I think the Airadigm court was wrong to proceed as it did. 
245 Section 1103, which sets forth the duties of official creditor committees in bankruptcy and their 
members, see 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (c) (2006), “has been interpreted to imply both a fiduciary duty 
to committee constituents and a limited grant of immunity to committee members.”  In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting authorities).  “This immunity covers 
committee members for actions within the scope of their duties.”  Id; accord 7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1103.05[4][a] (15th ed. rev. 2006) (“A member of an official committee has a 
qualified immunity from legal action for matters relating to the performance of the committee‟s 
duties.”).  But it does not extend to “willful misconduct or ultra vires acts.”  In re PWS Holding 
Corp., 228 F.3d at 246; see also Murphy v. Weathers, No. 7:07-CV-00027-HL, 2008 WL 4426080, 




B.  Non-Debtor Releases Involving Insurance 
The channeling injunctions in the Johns-Manville case extinguished any 
rights held by the tort claimants and MacArthur against Manville‟s insurance 
carriers.  Non-debtor releases of this type, which are not uncommon,
246
  raise 
unique issues because of complexities in the treatment of insurance under both 
state law and the Bankruptcy Code.  This sub-part reviews those issues.
247
 
1.  The Non-Bankruptcy Rights of Co-Insureds and Tort Claimants in a 
Debtor’s Insurance Policy 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the primary 
insured.
248
  “Additional insureds” are persons, other than the primary insured, 
listed in the policy by name or category as covered insureds.
249
  Corporations 
bankrupted by mass torts frequently own liability policies that provide coverage 
to multiple additional insureds, including non-debtor affiliates, directors, officers, 
and shareholders.
250
  Additional insureds are third-party beneficiaries of the 
                                                                                                                         
at *5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2008) (explaining that exculpation clauses limited to negligent conduct 
by the protected parties merely restate the appropriate standard of liability under the bankruptcy 
code) (collecting authorities). 
246 See, e.g., Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (after debtor 
settled with its liability insurance carriers and the bankruptcy court approved the settlement, the 
bankruptcy court issued an injunction barring all third parties from suing the insurers for claims 
seeking additional coverage under the settled policies); In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533, 
535-36, 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (approving in principle of third-party release of debtor‟s 
insurers, which barred claims of debtor‟s tort creditors against the carriers, but denying the relief 
because the release was requested as part of a broader motion that was otherwise invalid), aff‟d, 
No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 
214, 243-47 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that the court possessed the power to grant the debtor‟s 
liability carriers a third-party release, extinguishing the rights of debtor‟s tort claimants against the 
insurers); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 272, 276-79 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same); infra notes 329, 332, 335 (discussing additional cases involving 
insurance non-debtor releases); see also Brubaker, supra note 173, at 961 (noting that “many” non-
debtor releases “are approved in the context of an insurer‟s settlement of a coverage dispute with 
the debtor‟s estate”). 
247 In my prior article on non-debtor releases, I presumed that insurance releases were always 
distinguishable from other types of releases.  See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 27-28.  Additional 
research has altered my view, as will be apparent below. 
248 Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 751 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Wis. 2008) (“An 
insurance policy functions as a contract between the insured and the insurer.”); 45 C.J.S. Insurance 
§ 584 (2007) (“The general rule is that an insurance policy is a personal contract between the 
insurer and the named insured.”). 
249 House v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 540 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that 
an additional insured is “any person who is an insured under the policy in addition to the named 
insured” and that “this includes not only persons who may be indicated by name to be an insured, 
but also any person who is a member of a class which is specifically indicated to be an insured 
under the policy.”); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 597 (2007) (same). 
250 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[3] at 541-63 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“The insurance 
carriers typically have written policies of insurance covering the debtors, nondebtor affiliates and 






  As such, they possess contract rights under the insurance 
policy that are enforceable directly against the carrier.
252
 
Once an insurer pays an amount equivalent to the limits set forth in an 
insurance policy, its obligations under the policy are discharged.
253
  If a carrier 
turns over less than the full policy limit, however, it is only released to the extent 
of the payment made.
254
  Accordingly, absent language in the policy to the 
                                                                                                                         
divested predecessor entities, among others.”); 1 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY 
INSURANCE § 3.06[3][a] (2007) (“In addition to the named insured, the standard CGL [Commercial 
General Liability] policy also extends coverage to other individuals.”). 
251 Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 
1, 55-56 (2004) (“Additional insureds are intended third-party beneficiaries of the policies to which 
they are added.”); Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional Problems of Additional Insureds, 33 TORT 
& INS. L.J. 945, 947 (1998) (“Because only the insurer and named insured are parties to the 
insurance contract, additional insureds necessarily are third-party beneficiaries.”); see, e.g., Herd v. 
Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (holding that where two individuals 
were listed as additional insureds, the insurance policy “clearly and directly expressed . . . intent” 
that they benefit from the policy, and thus the individuals were third-party beneficiaries). 
252 See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (explaining 
that MacArthur in Johns-Manville and the debtor‟s co-insured parent company in this case held 
legal or equitable interests in the insurance policies at issue “with the right to make direct claims on 
the insurers if the conditions of the policies are satisfied”), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992); 
Cmty. Bank of Homestead v. Am. States Ins. Co., 524 So. 2d 1154, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
(“[C]overage to the bank as an „additional insured‟ . . . afforded the bank the right to maintain an 
independent action as an intended third-party beneficiary.”).  Loss payees on insurance contracts, 
another type of third-party beneficiary, have similar rights.  See  Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc. v. 
Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc.), 165 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1993) (“Certainly, a loss payee may bring action against an insurer on the contract of insurance 
as a third party beneficiary.”); GMAC v. The Windsor Group, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (because insurance policy loss payees are third-party beneficiaries, they are entitled to 
enforce the policy against the insurer; if a party has the right to enforce a contract—either as a party 
to the agreement or a third-party beneficiary—the party “has a legally protectable interest”).  See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (a third-party beneficiary “may 
enforce the duty” owed to it by the promisor under an agreement). 
253 Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Studer, 555 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978-79 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (depositing 
policy limits with court via interpleader action extinguished carriers indemnification and defense 
obligations under the policy to the primary and additional insureds) (applying Illinois and Indiana 
law); Hosp. for Joint Diseases v. Hertz Corp., 803 N.Y.S.2d 670, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
(“[W]here . . . an insurer has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the 
contract of insurance cease.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 4 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. 
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 61:9 (1996) (“When the insurer makes payment of the 
proceeds of insurance to the person who by the policy is the proper recipient, such payment is a 
discharge of the liability of the insurer.”) (collecting authorities).  It should be noted, however, that 
a majority of courts hold that the duty to defend is not always discharged merely by paying the 
policy limit of a commercial general liability policy.  See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 876-80 (2002). 
254 See supra note 253 (the authorities cited therein implicitly support this conclusion); see also 
46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1986 (2007) (“As a general rule, when the insurer makes payment of the 
proceeds of insurance to the person who by the policy is the proper recipient, such a payment is a 
discharge of the liability of the insurer, where the entire amount due is paid.  In the case of a partial 




contrary, a compromise between one insured and the insurer cannot extinguish 
the rights of other insureds to pursue the carrier for any difference between the 
policy limits and the settlement amount.
255
  This conclusion reflects the general 
principle that a promisor and promisee may not alter a third-party beneficiary‟s 
rights without the latter‟s consent once those rights have vested.
256
  A similar rule 
regarding settlements applies to loss payees,
257
 who are also third-party 
beneficiaries of an insurance agreement.
258
 
                                                                                                                         
payment to the person designated by the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability to the extent 
of the amount paid.” (emphasis added)). 
255 See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 979-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding 
that because the debtor and its carriers reached a settlement for less than the policy limits, FWC, a 
non-debtor co-insured, still held rights under the policies, and non-bankruptcy law did not permit 
the court to extinguish those rights) (“When FWC purchased the policies it assumed the risk that 
the policies might be exhausted by claims made by the additional insureds, not that its rights would 
be extinguished by a separate agreement between one of the additional insureds and the insurer.”), 
aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Michael Sean Quinn & Brian S. Martin, Insurance and 
Bankruptcy, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 1025, 1079-80 (2001) (“[A] subsidiary that has gone into 
bankruptcy may not compromise the rights under the policy of a co-insured parent[.]”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 cmt. e (1981) (“In general the power of promisor 
and promisee to vary the duty to a beneficiary under other types of insurance policies is understood 
to be subject to a similar limitation: when an insured loss occurs, the power to vary the terms of the 
policy with respect to that loss is terminated.”); id. § 311 cmt. e, illus. 5 (“A contracts with B for 
liability insurance covering any person operating A‟s automobile with A‟s permission.  C incurs 
liability covered by the policy.  Thereafter A and B agree to rescind the policy.  The attempted 
rescission does not affect the rights of C or the person to whom he is liable.”); 46A C.J.S. 
Insurance § 1882 (2007) (“A settlement with respect to one item of loss does not preclude recovery 
on the policy with respect to other items.  Similarly, a settlement and release with respect to one 
claim does not preclude recovery on the policy with respect to other claims.”). 
256 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.8, at 673 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[a]ll courts 
agree” with this proposition).  The authorities differ on the moment of vesting, and have adopted 
three distinct views: vesting occurs (1) when the contract is formed, (2) when the beneficiary 
assents to the contract, or (3) when the beneficiary relies upon the contract.  Id. § 10.8, at 673.  But 
the promisor and promisee are free to override these default rules by expressly identifying the 
moment of vesting in their agreement.  Id. § 10.8, at 675. 
257 See Perfect Invs., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd‟s, London, 782 P.2d 932, 934 (Okla. 1989) 
(holding that a settlement between an insurer and insured cannot defeat a loss payee‟s rights against 
the insurer, unless the loss payee consents); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1884 (2007) (“A loss payee‟s 
right to proceed against the insurance company may not be defeated by a settlement between the 
insured and the insurance company made without the knowledge and consent of the loss payee.”). 
258 See supra note 252.  Additional insureds and loss payees are often (though not always) subject 
to the carrier‟s defenses against the insured.  See, e.g., Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Am. 
Nat‟l Fire Ins. Co. (In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc.), 165 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1993) (“[T]hird party beneficiaries are . . . subject to the same defenses as the promisor could assert 
if the promisee were suing on the contract.” (citations omitted)) (applying the rule to an insurance 
contract and the loss payee thereunder).  This principle is frequently articulated by describing the 
third-party beneficiary‟s rights as “derivative.”  See, e.g., 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 597 (2007) (“The 
rights of any third party to an insurance contract are derivative rights, however, and can rise to no 
greater dignity than the rights of the insured under the contract.”).  But the principle has no bearing 
here.  The authority of a promisor and promisee to modify a contract involving a third-party 
beneficiary (such as a settlement for less than the policy limits between an insurer and the named 




In Johns-Manville, MacArthur was an additional insured.
259
  Like other 
such insureds, it possessed “a right directly against the insurers to seek 
indemnification for product liability based on Manville products,”
260
 as long as 
the policy limits were not exhausted.  However, there was some suggestion that 
Manville‟s insurers had already paid the full policy limits pursuant to their 
settlements with the debtor.
261
  If that was the case, then MacArthur owned no 
rights against Manville‟s carriers,
262
 and the channeling injunction barring 
MacArthur from suing the insurers did not extinguish anything.
263
  If the policy 
limits were not consumed, however, then the injunction did constitute a non-




                                                                                                                         
insured that purports to eliminate the rights of additional insureds) is governed by a different set of 
rules from those that address which defenses are assertable by a promisor against a third-party 
beneficiary.  Compare FARNSWORTH § 10.8 (“Vulnerability of Beneficiary to Discharge or 
Modification”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981) (“Variation of a Duty to 
a Beneficiary”), with FARNSWORTH § 10.9 (“Vulnerability of Beneficiary to Defenses and Claims”), 
and RESTATEMENT § 309 (“Defenses Against the Beneficiary.”). 
259 MacArthur was added to the policy via a vendor endorsement, MacArthur Co. v. Johns-
Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988), making it an 
additional insured, Merced County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 284 Cal. Rptr. 680, 686 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) (“An additional insured added by endorsement is a third-party beneficiary of the 
insurance contract[. . . .]”).  See also Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 408 (“MacArthur was, in effect, a 
co-insured under Manville policies, entitled to indemnification for liability resulting from the sale 
of Manville products.”). 
260 Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 408; see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 978 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (explaining that MacArthur had a legal or equitable interest in Manville‟s 
policies), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
261 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90-91 (“It is disputed whether Manville‟s policy 
limits have been exhausted.”); id. at 93 (“In the present case, such a dispute exists because 
Manville claims that the product liability limits on the policies to which the vendor endorsements 
attach have been exhausted.  The Bankruptcy Judge appears to have substantially accepted 
Manville‟s contention, as he found that MacArthur‟s interest in the settled policies was „highly 
speculative.‟”). 
262 Id. at 90 (“The endorsements are subject to the payment limits and other restrictions of the 
underlying policies; thus, if the product liability aggregate limits in the underlying Manville 
policies have been exhausted, the insurer has no independent obligation to pay distributors on 
product liability claims.”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 412 (explaining that if Manville used all of 
the available insurance proceeds, MacArthur would have nothing to pursue); see also In re Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. at 980 (observing that if the debtor had already exhausted the 
insurance, the co-insured non-debtor “may have no further rights under the policies”); Carter v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App. 2000) (“[S]ettlements that result in 
the exhaustion of policy limits excuse further performance by the insurer on behalf of the other 
insureds.”). 
263 Actually, MacArthur potentially still held “bad faith” claims against the carriers.  See State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 348 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (noting that an insurer 
may be liable for bad faith in some circumstances even though the policy limits have been 
exhausted). 
264 In its discussion of the bankruptcy court‟s jurisdiction over MacArthur‟s claims against the 
carriers, the Second Circuit concluded that MacArthur‟s contractual rights were “no different” from 




The situation with respect to a debtor‟s tort claimants is more complex.  
Tort claimants are unsecured creditors.
265
  Such creditors hold no interest in any 
specific piece of the debtor‟s property prior to obtaining a judgment and 
attaching a lien via post-judgment process.
266
  This principle is applicable to 
liability insurance.  The general rule is that, absent policy language or a statutory 
provision to the contrary, injured parties hold no interest in their tortfeasor‟s 




                                                                                                                         
the tort rights “of the asbestos victims who have already been barred from asserting direct actions 
against the insurers.”  In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 92.  For jurisdictional purposes, the 
court was correct.  Bankruptcy courts possess jurisdiction over all claims that “could conceivably 
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”  Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 
984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][B], at 3-22 to 3-23 & 
n.85 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (noting that the Pacor Test “has been adopted by most circuit courts”).  
And, as the Second Circuit correctly explained, both MacArthur and the tort creditors sought “to 
collect out of the proceeds of Manville‟s insurance policies on the basis of Manville‟s conduct.”  In 
re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 92-93 (emphasis added).  MacArthur‟s and the asbestos 
plaintiffs‟ claims would thus “effect” the estate, providing the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction 
over them.  See id. at 93 (“In both cases, plaintiffs‟ claims are inseparable from Manville‟s own 
insurance coverage and are consequently well within the Bankruptcy Court‟s jurisdiction over 
Manville‟s assets.”).  But this jurisdictional analysis does not establish any parallel between 
MacArthur‟s and the asbestos claimants‟ rights under state substantive law.  Nor is it relevant to 
whether MacArthur‟s or the tort plaintiffs‟ claims constituted or flowed from interests in estate 
property, an issue discussed infra at Part IV.B.2. 
265 See In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc., 371 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); Edward J. 
Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759, 1760 (2004). 
266 Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 
B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (“General unsecured claimants including tort claimants, 
have no specific interest in a debtor‟s property.”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of 
Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1023 (2004) 
(“Under nonbankruptcy law, unsecured creditors have no property interest in their debtor‟s assets 
until such time as they receive a judicial lien, normally following judgment and, as to personal 
property, the exercise of judicial remedies against the debtor‟s assets.”). 
267 1 LONG, supra note 250, § 1.06[3][a], at 1-34.2 (“The modern rule is that, in the absence of a 
contractual or statutory provision allowing a direct action, the claimant has no right to a direct 
action against the insurer.”); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1942 (2007) (“As a general rule, in the 
absence of policy or statutory provisions to the contrary, one who suffers an injury which comes 
within the provisions of a liability insurance policy is not in privity of contract with the insurance 
company, and cannot reach the proceeds of the policy for the payment of his or her claim by an 
action directly against the insurance company.”); 22 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES‟ APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE 2d § 142.1[B][1], at 480 (2003) (explaining that tort claimants are “remitted” to 
standard post-judgment remedies, such as garnishment, if there is no direct action statute and the 
claimant is not a third-party beneficiary under the insurance policy); see, e.g., Trancik v. USAA 
Ins. Co., 581 S.E.2d 858, 861 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that an injured third party is an 
“incidental beneficiary” and thus “does not have a contractual relationship with the insurer and 
cannot maintain an action against the insurer for breach of the insurance contract”); All Around 
Transp., Inc. v. Cont‟l W. Ins. Co., 931 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) ((1) explaining the 
general rule, (2) noting that Colorado has no general direct action statute and that the injured party 
was not a third-party beneficiary under the insurance policy, (3) holding that the injured party thus 
had no direct action rights against the carrier even though it had obtained a judgment against the 




If a liability insurance policy provides that persons injured by the insured 
are third-party beneficiaries, the situation is different.  In that circumstance, the 
harmed parties are in privity of contract with the carrier and may sue the insurer 
directly,
268
 as long as they comply with any conditions set forth in the policy.
269
 
Additionally, many jurisdictions have enacted “direct-action” statutes that 
permit tort claimants to sue the tortfeasor‟s carrier directly.
270
  “Usually these 
statutes require the injured party to obtain a final judgment against the insured 
before proceeding directly against the insurer.”
271
  Some of these laws permit a 
direct suit as soon as the final judgment is entered.
272
  Others require either that 
the judgment remain unpaid for a certain period of time
273
 or the existence of a 
writ of execution that was returned unsatisfied.
274
  I shall refer to all such laws 
                                                                                                                         
insured, and (4) observing that the injured judgment creditor could use the general garnishment 
laws to enforce the judgment against the insurer). 
  There are a number of exceptions to this general rule.  Perhaps the most important 
involves compulsory insurance.  See In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 239 n.18 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (explaining that Michigan regards injured persons to be third-party beneficiaries of 
compulsory liability insurance, such as automobile insurance); Crisp Reg‟l Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver, 
621 S.E.2d 554, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]ith the exception of certain instances where liability 
insurance coverage is legislatively mandated,” tort claimants are generally not third-party 
beneficiaries of liability insurance policies. (emphasis added)); 7A LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. 
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 104:45 (1997) (noting that a person injured in a car accident 
is a “legal beneficiary” of the tortfeasor‟s “[c]ompulsory motor vehicle insurance.”). 
268 7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:7 (“The absence of privity is no bar to a 
direct action against a liability insurer where there is a statute or contract clause giving the injured 
person a direct action right.” (emphasis added)); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1942 (2007) (“Where the 
insurance contract, by reason of policy provisions for the benefit of the injured person, is construed 
as a third-party beneficiary contract, the injured person has the usual rights of a third-party 
beneficiary to maintain an action against the insurance company.”) (collecting authorities); see, 
e.g., Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 B.R. 969, 975-76 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (consignor, injured as a result of consignee-insured‟s conduct, possessed a direct 
right of action against the consignee‟s carrier under the consignee‟s insurance policy); Desmond v. 
Am. Ins. Co. 786 S.W.2d 144, 146-47 (Mo. Ct App. 1989) (noting that some liability insurance 
policies contain provisions that grant injured persons third-party beneficiary status and finding that 
the policy in this case included such a provision). 
269 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (“The injured person can recover only under the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and must comply with the policy provisions conferring the right.”); see, 
e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rahn, 641 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App. 1982) (explaining that an injured 
person was required to comply with the conditions of its tortfeasor‟s insurance policy before 
bringing a direct action against the carrier). 
270 22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 504; 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 
1944 (2007).  For a good overview of direct action statutes, see generally 22 APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3, at 502-520. 
271 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 504.  See generally id. §§ 
142.1[D], at 484-85, 142.3[A][1], at 504-506 (identifying numerous examples of such statutes). 
272 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2) (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (2008). 
273 E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(2) (McKinney 2007); ALA. CODE § 27-32-2 (LexisNexis 2007). 
274 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3006 (West 2002); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 
(West 2008). 




that condition a direct suit on the existence of a judgment as “post-judgment 
statutes.” 
Some direct action laws permit suit against the insurer prior to the entry of a 
judgment against the tortfeasor.
275
  A few even permit a direct action without the 
filing of a lawsuit against the insured.
276
  I shall refer to all such laws as “pre-
judgment statutes.” 
Direct actions laws, whether of the post-judgment or pre-judgment variety, 
also typically state that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured does not 
release or alter the liability of the carrier.
277
 
While some features of direct action statutes are relatively straight-forward, 
courts in pre-judgment and post-judgment states are divided over (1) whether 
such laws confer a property interest in liability insurance, (2) the nature of any 
interest conferred, and (3) when the interest arises.
278
  Moreover, it is difficult to 




                                                                                                                         
 
275 22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 505 (“Note that some states 
permit the injured party to maintain an action against the tortfeasor‟s insurer at an earlier stage of 
the proceedings against the tortfeasor.”). 
276 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West 2006) (“Any bond or policy of insurance covering 
liability to others for negligence makes the insurer liable, up to the amounts stated in the bond or 
policy, to the persons entitled to recover against the insured for the death of any person or for injury 
to persons or property, irrespective of whether the liability is presently established or is contingent 
and to become fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured.”); Estate of Otto v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 751 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Wis. 2008) (“[T]he insured is not a necessary 
party to the action brought against its insurer.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1) (2009); see 
also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[3], at 541-63 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“In addition, some 
allegedly injured persons may have direct action rights against the insurance carrier, even, in some 
cases, bypassing the debtor-insured.”). 
277 For examples of post-judgment provisions containing such language, see CAL. INS. CODE § 
11580(b)(1) (West 2005); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(1) (McKinney 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
500.3006 (West 2002); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-13-
7(a) (West 1999).  For examples of pre-judgment laws containing such language, see WIS. STAT. § 
632.22 (West 2006) and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(A) (2009).  Virtually every state would 
have adopted legislation like this “had not insurers revised the standard policy forms used for 
liability insurance to provide coverage without regard to an insured‟s solvency.”  ROBERT E. 
KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 378 (1988). 
278 See generally 7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:31 (“The right of a claimant 
under a direct action statute has been variously described.  In some instances, the designation of the 
nature of the right is not particularly significant while, in others, the implications which could be 
drawn from the particular classification of the claimant‟s right are of the utmost significance.”). 
279 See id. § 104:2, at 104-12 to 104-13 (“In the absence of a clear authorizing statute, readers are 
warned that the analysis of what rights the third party may have against the insurer tends to become 
tangled in the interwoven strands of various collateral theories, the language and underpinnings of 
which are themselves often arcane.”).  Some of the divergences in the authorities likely flow from 
variations in statutory language.  See generally id. § 104:13 (“The statutory schemes of various 
jurisdictions differ, and practitioners must be certain to review the particular statute of the 
jurisdiction at issue in order draw definitive conclusions.”). 




Authorities in states with pre-judgment statutes generally understand such 
laws to grant tort claimants a property interest in their tortfeasor‟s liability 
insurance well before any judgment is obtained against the insured.  In Louisiana, 
for example, the entire public is considered a third-party beneficiary of liability 
insurance policies
280
 with rights that vest “at the time of the tort.”
281
  And the 
direct action provision contains language that expressly supports this 
understanding.
282
  In Wisconsin, while tort claimants are apparently not third-
party beneficiaries,
283
 they do obtain a vested interest in the tortfeasor‟s insurance 
once a covered injury occurs.
284
  Consistent with these principles, decisions 
applying both Louisiana and Wisconsin law have stated that liability insurance 
proceeds are reserved for tort claimants—including pre-judgment claimants; they 
are not available to general unsecured creditors.
285
 
                                                                                                                         
 
280 See Litton v. Ford Motor Co., 554 So. 2d 99, 103 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (“Under the well-
established jurisprudence, the general public as a class is also a third party beneficiary of liability 
insurance coverage.”). 
281 See Hayes v. New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries, 805 So. 2d 320, 323 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“The Direct Action Statute vests the injured party with rights at the time of the tort to institute an 
action directly against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy.”). 
282 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(D) (2009) (“It is also the intent of this Section that all 
liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons and 
their survivors or heirs to whom the insured is liable[.]”) (emphasis added).  But cf. Descant v. 
Adm‟rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 639 So. 2d 246, 249 (La. 1994) (describing the Louisiana direct 
action statute as granting “merely . . . a procedural right of action against the insurer”). 
283 See Mercado v. Mitchell, 264 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Wis. 1978) (“In the absence of express 
provisions in the policy or statutory provisions which can be read into the policy, a standard 
liability policy does not make the injured party a third-party beneficiary.”); Hammock v. Koderl, 
No. 98-0956-FT, 1998 WL 596401, at ***1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 10 1998) (same).  But see 
Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 273 (Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (explaining that direct action statutes, among other laws, are “predicated on the theory 
that the third-party victim is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract”). 
284 See Society Ins. v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 659 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“Our 
supreme court clearly indicated that the rights of the parties become fixed when the loss occurs.”). 
285 See Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 327, 
329 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the pre-judgment tort 
claimant if the policy is valid, but if coverage is lacking then the tort claimant “will join the general 
creditor queue”) (tort claimant filed action against the carrier under Louisiana‟s direct action 
statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1) (2009)); Hometown Bank v. Acuity Ins., 748 N.W.2d 
203, 206-07 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that even if an injured person sued the insured in the 
future and the loss was covered by the carrier, a non-tort judgment creditor of the insured could not 
garnish the proceeds of the insurance policy because the insurer “would not owe any money to [the 
insured], but to the injured party”).  Some Louisiana authorities consider insurers to be co-liable 
with the insured to the tort claimant.  See, e.g., Wimberly v. Brown, 973 So. 2d 75, 78 (La. Ct. App. 
2007) (“Further, an insurer is solidarily liable with its insured.”); Yarbrough v. Fed. Land Bank 
Ass‟n of Jackson, 616 So. 2d 1327, 1335 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“An obligation is solidary when each 
obligor is liable for the whole performance of the obligation.”).  This also strongly suggests that 
insurance proceeds are preserved for injured persons with claims covered by the policies because 
only the beneficiaries of a guaranty may recover against the guarantor. 




Courts in post-judgment jurisdictions are more deeply divided.  Some have 
interpreted their direct action laws as providing injured persons with third-party 
beneficiary status under the insurance policy once a judgment is obtained against 
the insured.
286
  Tort claimants without a final judgment are distinguished and 
apparently have no property interest in the tortfeasor‟s liability insurance.
287
  
Decisions in other states—states that have not fully articulated the status of post-




                                                                                                                         
 
286 See, e.g., Harper v. Wausau Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“[O]nce a 
party has a final judgment against the insured, the claimant becomes a third party beneficiary of the 
insurance policy and may enforce the terms which flow to its benefit pursuant to” Cal. Ins. Code 
section 11580 (West 2005), California‟s direct action statute.) (collecting California authorities); 
Hand v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[J]udgment creditors 
granted a right of action by the [direct action] statute have been repeatedly and definitely held to be 
third party beneficiaries of the policy.”); see also 22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 
267, § 142.1[F], at 491-92 (“Thus, in those states, once a injured party has a final judgment against 
an insured, the injured party becomes a third party beneficiary of the portions of the policy that 
flow to his or her benefit.”).  Florida also has a post-judgment direct action statute and it implies 
that injured persons become third-party beneficiaries upon obtaining a judgment against the 
insured.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4136(2) (West 2005) (“No person who is not an insured . . . 
shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first 
obtaining a settlement or verdict against a person who is an insured.”); see also Canadian Home 
Ins. Co. v. Norris, 471 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that upon obtaining a 
final judgment, the plaintiff vests a “third-party interest” in the insurance policy and may then file a 
direct action against the carrier under section 627.4136(4)). 
287 See Hand, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (“[B]y virtue of section 11580, a judgment creditor of an 
insured enjoys third party beneficiary status and rights under the policy, and in this respect stands 
distinct from those „third party claimants‟ who have not achieved that status.”); Fortman v. Safeco 
Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 117, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“The judgment requirement prevents 
claimants' actions unless they first perfect their third-party beneficiary status by securing a 
judgment against the insured tortfeasor.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4136(2) (West 2005) (“No 
person who is not an insured . . . shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party 
beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a settlement or verdict against a person who is an 
insured.” (emphasis added)). 
288 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 240 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (applying 
Michigan law) (“In short, prior to obtaining and enforcing a judgment, an injured person merely 
has an expectation of recovery that is contingent upon the occurrence of future events, and such 
expectation does not rise to the level of a vested property right.”) (holding that tort claimants 
without a judgment against the debtor did not have a property interest in the debtor‟s liability 
insurance); see also La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 
832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1987) (“One having a pending, unadjudicated tort claim against 
another does not—whether or not the claimant is bankrupt—thereby have a property interest in 
liability insurance proceeds payable to the defendant. . . .” (offering the quoted language as a 
general principle, rather than interpreting any particular direct action statute)); 7A COUCH ON 
INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:32 (contending that direct action statutes do not transform a 
tort claimant from “a mere general creditor” into a secured creditor, but only citing cases from the 
1930s). 




If an injured person lacks a property interest in its tortfeasor‟s policy, then 
his rights are probably the same as those of any other unsecured creditor.  Under 
this conclusion, liability insurance proceeds should not be segregated for tort 
claimants.  Rather, they should be distributed to the full body of unsecured 
creditors via the bankruptcy priority scheme.
289
 
Other post-judgment states take a different view.  Courts applying Alabama 
law, for example, have interpreted the local direct action statute
290
 to provide tort 
claimants with the equivalent of a lien on the tortfeasor‟s insurance once they 
suffer harm.
291
  Similarly, the Second Circuit read New York‟s direct action law 
                                                                                                                         
 
289 See Charles A. Beckham, Jr., It‟s All an Unsecured Claim to Me: The Tortious Interference of 
Bankruptcy Law with Liability Insurance Proceeds, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779, 798 (1991) (“The 
Bankruptcy Code does not contain a separate priority scheme for the distribution of insurance 
proceeds.  Any distribution of insurance proceeds directly to a tort claimant would be repugnant to 
the stated intentions of the Bankruptcy Code.”); see also WILLIAM L. NORTON, III & ROGER G. 
JONES, NORTON CREDITORS‟ RIGHTS HANDBOOK § 20:4 (West 2008) (suggesting that whether tort 
claimants have priority over other unsecured creditors in insurance proceeds is an open question); 
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 398 (“[I]f the insurance proceeds are viewed as property of the estate, 
then arguably the proceeds should be distributed among creditors in the same manner as other 
property of the estate.”).  Two commentators have cited Soliz v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co. (In re 
Soliz), 77 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. 
No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), rather than the Code), as supporting this conclusion.  See 
Beckham, supra, at 796-97; Edward F. Donohue, Impact of Bankruptcy on Insured Malpractice 
Claims, 3 NO. 2 LEG. MALPRACTICE REP. 11, 12 (1992).  In that case, the trustee settled with the 
debtor‟s alleged liability insurer.  In re Soliz, 77 B.R. at 94.  The court ultimately held that the 
money paid by the carrier pursuant to the settlement was property of the estate, “distributable to all 
creditors in accordance with the applicable Bankruptcy Act provisions,” rather than to the tort 
claimants injured by the debtor.  Id. at 94-95, 97.  However, the payment from the insurer settled, 
inter alia, a number of contract causes of action “unrelated to the claims of the Tort Claimants.”  
Id. at 95, 97.  And the court distinguished a case cited by the tort claimants on the ground that it 
concerned “a liability policy, not a contract right dispute as in the instant case.”  Id. at 97.  The 
court appears to have treated the settlement payment not as liability insurance proceeds, but as 
breach of contract damages.  Thus, Soliz is questionable authority for the proposition that tort 
claimants have no priority in liability insurance over unsecured creditors. 
290 ALA. CODE §§ 27-32-1, 27-32-2 (LexisNexis 2007). 
291 See, e.g., Maness v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 979, 981 (Ala. 1982) 
(“Under Alabama Law, the injured party acquires a vested interest (secondary) in the nature of a 
hypothecation of the insured‟s rights under the policy.”), not followed on other grounds, Woodall v. 
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 658 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1995); Nat‟l Surety Corp. v. Sanders, 301 So. 2d 93, 95 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (same); BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 759 (8th ed. 2004) (“Hypothecate.  To 
pledge (property) as security or collateral for a debt, without delivery of title or possession.”).  
While injured persons may not actually sue insurance companies until after they have obtained a 
judgment against the insured, Maness, 416 So. 2d at 981-82, “the right of the judgment creditor 
relates back to the time when his right action arose,” Fleming v. Pan Am. Fire and Cas. Co., 495 
F.2d 535, 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added) (holding that a settlement between insurer and 
insured taking place after the plaintiff‟s injury, but prior to a final judgment in the underlying 
action, did not defeat the plaintiff‟s vested interest in the insurance policy); see also ALA. CODE § 
27-32-1 (providing that “whenever a loss occurs on account of a casualty covered by such contract 
of insurance, the liability of the insurer shall become absolute” (emphasis added)). 




to grant a pre-judgment tort claimant an interest in the liability insurance of its 
tortfeasor superior to that of the tortfeasor‟s bankruptcy estate.
292
  The court 
explained that the statute created “in effect a trust fund of the insurance proceeds 
for the benefit of the injured person”
293
 and “was designed by the New York 
legislature to ensure that injured persons with unsatisfied claims against a 




A number of other courts and commentators have reached conclusions 
consistent with the Alabama and New York authorities without citing any 
particular direct action statute.  Some have determined that only injured parties 
may be paid with insurance proceeds; general unsecured creditors are not entitled 
to receive such funds.
295
  This suggests that the proceeds of liability insurance are 
held in the equivalent of a constructive trust for the benefit of tort claimants.
296
  
                                                                                                                         
 
292 See Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis (In re F.O. Baroff Co.), 555 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(construing the predecessor to N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(1) (West 2007)); see also Baez v. Medical 
Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 65, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that, under § 3420(a)(1), “upon 
filing of a bankruptcy petition, the insured is divested of his interest in the proceeds of the policy to 
the extent that those proceeds are needed to compensate the injured party, which proceeds at that 
point vest in the injured party”) (holding that a pre-judgment tort claimant, unlike “other unsecured 
creditors,” was entitled to post-petition interest paid out of the debtor‟s liability insurance 
proceeds). 
293 In re F.O. Baroff Co., 555 F.2d at 42. 
294 Id. at 44.  A few subsequent decisions have criticized Baroff.  See, e.g., Galecor v. Inst. of 
London Underwriters, 729 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (contending that the “Second 
Circuit ignored plain statutory language”). 
295 See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 295 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (in reference 
to the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance policies, the court explained that the tort 
claimants “have the right to receive some property of the estate that general unsecured creditors 
cannot receive”); Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 786 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (noting 
that liability insurance proceeds “could not be made available for distribution to the creditors other 
than those who have claims under the policies”); id. at 786 n.62 (contending that if insurance 
proceeds are property of the estate, they should not be distributed pursuant to the bankruptcy 
priority scheme because unsecured creditors are “without claims covered by the particular 
insurance”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03, at 362-25 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (stating that 
“policy proceeds are not available to all creditors, and in that sense are different from other 
property of the estate”); id. ¶ 362.07, at 362-85 (15th ed. rev. 2002) (noting that policy proceeds are 
“available only to creditors with the type of claims covered by the policy”); Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2269 
(2000) (“When a firm files for bankruptcy, the proceeds of insurance policies go directly to the 
injured claimants, despite their nominal status as unsecured creditors.”); see also Houston v. 
Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1993) (“But under the typical liability 
policy, the debtor will not have a cognizable interest in the proceed of the policy.  Those proceeds 
will normally by payable only for the benefit of those harmed by the debtor under the terms of the 
insurance contract.”); Beckham, supra note 289, at 787 (“Most courts and practitioners assume that 
insurance proceeds are exclusively for the benefit of the tort claimant.”). 
296 See Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 398 (“The [insurance] proceeds may be viewed as property that 
is held in a type of constructive trust that can be reached only by a particular class of creditors, not 
by creditors generally.”).  Professor Zaretsky also contends that the insurer is comparable to a 




Alternatively, even if general unsecured creditors may be paid with liability 
insurance, tort claimants hold priority rights in the proceeds akin to those of 
secured creditors.
297
  Under either understanding—tort claimants as constructive 
trust beneficiaries or as secured parties—pre-judgment tort claimants possess a 
property interest in the debtor‟s insurance.
298
 
As with additional insureds,
299
 it is well-established that if the insurer has 
already paid the policy limits to the insured, the injured party may not recover 
from the carrier.
300
  When the insurer and insured settle for less than the coverage 
                                                                                                                         
guarantor who guaranteed debts only to tort claimants.  Id. at 388 (“The insurer is similar to a 
guarantor in that it undertakes the obligation to satisfy a claim against the principle debtor who, in 
this case, is the insured.”); id. at 390 (“As with the guaranty, which is available only to the creditor 
who is the beneficiary of the guaranty, a claim against an insurer is available only to the 
beneficiaries of the insurance.”). 
297 See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, 289 B.R. at 288-89, 296 (explaining that the debtor‟s 
unsecured tort claimants “are, in effect, multiple secured creditors having claims against a single 
fund,” namely, the proceeds of the liability insurance policy); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 388 n.46 
(“To the extent that insurance proceeds are available to satisfy their claims, the position of the 
beneficiary-claimants may be analogized to that of a secured party.  There is particular property 
that is earmarked for the satisfaction of their claims.  Moreover, their claims may be fully satisfied 
notwithstanding that mere general creditors may receive little or nothing.”); David Gray Carlson, 
Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1951, 1959 (2004) (explaining that the 
interest of an injured party in its tortfeasor‟s insurance is best understood as a statutory lien). 
298 See UCC § 1-201(35) (2001) (“„Security interest‟ means an interest in personal property.”); In 
re White, 297 B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (“The constructive trust is a legal fiction that 
adopts the analogy of a trust and declares that a beneficiary owns an equitable interest in 
property.”).  Further support for the conclusion that tort claimants have some type of property 
interest can be drawn from the cases that permit lifting of the automatic stay so that an injured party 
may prosecute the debtor in name only in order to recover against the debtor‟s carrier.  See 3 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07, at 362-85 (15th ed. rev. 2002) (briefly discussing this line of 
authority).  Lifting the stay for quicker recovery is generally something reserved to secured parties 
or those who otherwise have an interest in the debtor‟s property.  See generally id. ¶ 362.07 (15th 
ed. rev. 2002, 2005, 2006) (surveying the bases for lifting the stay, virtually all of which require 
that the party seeking relief hold an interest in the debtor‟s property).  Moreover, lifting the stay 
permits tort claimants to recover from liability insurance free from competition with other creditors.  
If a tort claimant‟s rights are no greater than those of other unsecured creditors, there is little basis 
for permitting such an extraordinary remedy.  See also In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533, 
537-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that, under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute, 
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008), pre-judgment tort claimants hold an interest in a 
bankrupt-insured‟s liability insurance requiring adequate protection before the debtor may 
compromise the policy by selling it back to the carrier free and clear of the tort claimants‟ interest), 
aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (“In the court‟s view, the weight of authority in Illinois 
favors the proposition that injured parties do generally have rights in insurance policies, and that 
such rights vest at the moment of injury.”). 
299 For the rule applicable to additional insureds, see supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
300 See Altadis USA, Inc. v. NPR, Inc., 162 F. App‟x 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
because the insurer had already paid the insurance proceeds to the insured, the injured party could 
not recover against the insurer); 7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 106:12 (“The 
claimant bringing the direct action is subject to the maximum amount limitation of coverage 
declared in the policy.  That is, the claimant cannot recover more from the insurer than the insured 




limits, however, the rights of tort claimants appear to depend on whether they 
hold a property interest in the insurance.  Courts frequently hold that a 
compromise under the policy limits bars injured persons without a property 
interest from suing the carrier for any remaining coverage, as long as the 
settlement is not a fraudulent transfer to the insurer subject to avoidance by 
general creditors.
301
  But if the tort claimants possess a property interest,
302
 then a 
sub-policy limits compromise generally does not extinguish their rights against 
the insurer; the injured persons remain free to pursue the carrier for the difference 
between the coverage limits and the settlement amount, whether they obtained 
their property interest by contract
303






                                                                                                                         
might have recovered if the action had been brought by him or her.”) (collecting authorities); 46A 
C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (the injured party is “limited to the amount of the policy”). 
301 See, e.g., Michel v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 82 F.2d 583, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1936) (reversing trial 
court‟s directed verdict and holding that the jury should have addressed whether insured‟s release 
of insurer for less than one-sixth of the value of its claim constituted fraudulent transfer as to 
insured‟s judgment creditor despite fact that judgment creditor held no interest in policy at time of 
settlement) (applying Florida law); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 233-42 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1996) (carefully reviewing Michigan law and reaching the conclusion that injured parties 
with unliquidated tort claims have no property interest in the tortfeasor‟s insurance policies, despite 
Michigan‟s post-judgment direct action statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3006 (West 2002), but 
may challenge a settlement between the insured and its carriers under fraudulent transfer law, the 
same as any other unsecured creditor); Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 108 P.3d 340, 
342-43, 346 (Idaho 2005) (upholding a settlement for substantially less than the policy limits that 
resolved a coverage dispute between the carrier and its insured, and was executed prior to the tort 
claimant obtaining a judgment against the insured, because tort claimants have no rights in liability 
policies); Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 971 P.2d 1142, 1146 
(Idaho 1998) (noting that Idaho has no direct action statute); see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 
Inc., 133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (“It might be clearer to say simply that tort 
claimants have no „legal or equitable‟ interest in the insurance policy in the first place, any more 
than they do in other property of the estate, so that their property rights are not impaired by a 
settlement of the debtor‟s claim to coverage.”).  Some states also have enacted statutes that prohibit 
the insurer and insured from agreeing to retroactively void an insurance policy after an injury to a 
person that may be covered by the policy.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.320 (West 
1999). 
302 To recap, tort claimants possess an interest in their tortfeasor‟s insurance when they (1) are 
contractual third-party beneficiaries, see supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text, (2) were 
injured in a pre-judgment state, see supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text, (3) were injured in 
a post-judgment state where the direct action statute is construed to grant an interest pre-judgment, 
see supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text, or (4) were injured in a post-judgment state and 
have obtained a judgment against the insured and complied with any additional conditions of the 
local direct action statute, see supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
303 See Phila. Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 222 A.2d 493, 494-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1966) (holding that a settlement between a tortfeasor and its carrier for less than the policy limits 
did not bar the plaintiff, who was a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy, from suing the 
carrier; the settlement apparently took place before the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the 
insured). 
304 See Smith & Wesson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 510 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) (holding that a settlement for less than the policy limits between two insured‟s and their 




                                                                                                                         
carrier, executed before the tort claimant injured by the insureds even sued them, was not binding 
on the tort claimant, and thus the tort claimant was entitled to summary judgment against the carrier 
for the full amount of its claim, because recognizing the settlement as binding “would defeat the 
beneficial purpose of” New York‟s post-judgment, direct action law, N.Y. Ins. Law section 3420 
(West 2007)) (“A settlement agreement between insurer and insured, made without the 
participation of the injured third party, should not be given the broad effect of barring the third-
party judgment creditor‟s rights.  Such agreement might readily be collusively entered into between 
the insurer and its insured.”); Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450, 450 (N.Y. 1929) 
(Cardozo, C.J.) (direct action filed under the precursor to section 3420) (explaining that tort 
claimant was not “affected by the compromise” between carrier and insured for less than the policy 
limits executed while tort claimants action against insured was still pending); Arida v. Essex Ins. 
Co., 750 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that settlement of declaratory 
judgment action between carrier and insured for less than the policy limits, executed while tort 
claimant‟s lawsuit against the insured was pending, did not bar tort claimant from suing the carrier 
post-judgment under section 3420). 
305 See Fleming v. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1974).  In that case, Fleming‟s 
cattle were damaged by the insured.  Id. at 537.  While Fleming‟s suit was pending, the insured and 
its carrier settled for less than the policy limits.  Id. at 538.  Fleming subsequently obtained a 
judgment against the insured for well above the settlement amount and then sued the insurer under 
Alabama‟s direct action statute, which is now codified at Ala. Code sections 27-32-1, 27-32-2 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Fleming, 495 F.2d at 535.  The Fifth Circuit explained that the statute provides 
the injured person with the equivalent of a lien on the tortfeasor‟s liability insurance, id. at 539-40, 
and that this interest “relates back” to the moment the injury is suffered, id. at 541.  Thus, “Fleming 
having acquired such a lien or vested interest, the insurer could not defeat his right of action by its 
settlement with the named insured.”  Id. at 540.  And Fleming was free to pursue the carrier for any 
remaining coverage.  Id. at 541. 
  Decisions from other jurisdictions, while not expressly addressing the question, contain 
language suggesting that a settlement for under the policy limits is not binding on the tort claimant 
once the claimant obtains a property interest.  See, e.g., In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533, 
537 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (observing that under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute, 215 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008), “a claim covered by a liability insurance policy in 
Illinois, once pursued to judgment against the insured, must be satisfied up to the policy limits” 
(emphasis added)), aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004); Kranzush v. 
Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 266 (Wis. 1981) (explaining that Wisconsin‟s pre-
judgment direct action statute, WIS. STAT. ANN § 632.24 (West 2006), makes an insurer “liable up 
to the policy limits” (emphasis added)); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807, 
809 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (California‟s post-judgment direct action statute, CAL. INS. CODE § 
11580(b) (West 2005), “provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability 
insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the 
policy limits.” (emphasis added)).  But cf. Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 
Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 277 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that even if tort claimants possessed direct action 
rights against debtor‟s carriers, good faith settlement between debtor and the insurers discharged 
any such rights) (apparently applying Illinois law, but failing to specify whether the hypothetical 
direct action rights reflected the existence of a property interest or not). 
  As with additional insureds, see supra note 258, tort claimants are generally subject to the 
carrier‟s defenses against the insured.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 
S.W.3d 42, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The rights of any third-party to the insurance contract are 
derivative rights and can rise to no greater dignity than the rights of the insured under the 
contract.”); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (“The injured person‟s rights are no better than 
those of the insured, however, and the insurance company may assert any defense against the 




Enhanced protection for tort claimants with a property interest is consistent 
with the treatment of other parties in analogous positions.  For example, as 
discussed above, compromises for less than the policy limits do not preclude 
additional insureds and loss payees from suing the insurer for the remaining 
coverage because of their status as third-party beneficiaries.
306
  Similarly, a 
number of authorities have concluded that a debtor and a third party who owes 
the debtor money may not settle the debtor‟s claim without the consent of a 
creditor who has already attached a security interest to the third party‟s obligation 
and notified the third party of the interest.
307
 
Returning now to the Johns-Manville case, if the settlement between the 
debtor and its carriers did not fully exhaust the available proceeds,
308
 the 
channeling injunction probably eliminated the state law rights of some tort 
claimants—those with a property interest in the policies—to sue Manville‟s 
                                                                                                                         
injured person which it could assert in a suit by the insured.”).  But, also as with additional 
insureds, see supra note 258, the availability of defenses under an insurance contract and the 
binding effect of a modification of that same contract (such as a settlement) are separate questions 
governed by different legal principles.  See Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450, 
450 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (distinguishing the impact of policy defenses from the impact of a 
settlement between the insured and insured); Smith & Wesson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 510 
N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (same); see also Fleming, 495 F.2d at 541 & n.10 
(applying Alabama law) (noting that while tort claimants are subject to a carrier‟s defenses against 
the insured arising before any injury, “grounds of defense sought to be created by the insurer 
subsequent to the accident,” such as a settlement between the carrier and the insured, “would not be 
available” in a proceeding under Alabama‟s direct action statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-32-1, 27-32-2 
(LexisNexis 2007)). 
306 See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text. 
307 See 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d 467, 468-70, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that a settlement between the debtor and a third-party obligor, entered into after the debtor had 
assigned its rights to a creditor as security and after the creditor had notified the third party of the 
assignment, was not binding on the creditor), appeal after remand, 973 P.2d 992 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999); Progressive Design, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., 206 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (Neb. 1973) 
(same) (“As assignee [sic] of the contract, any settlement made by plaintiff [the debtor] is 
necessarily ineffective unless the assignee [the secured creditor] is a party to it.”); 9 RONALD A. 
ANDERSON & LARRY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318:8 (1999) 
(“Similarly, after an assignment has been made, the assignor [the debtor] cannot settle the claim 
against the account debtor [the third party] without the consent of the assignee [the secured 
party].”).  See generally Okla. Natural Gas v. Apache Corp., 124 F. App‟x 604, 608 (10th Cir. 
2005) (applying Oklahoma law) (holding that settlement agreement between assignor and buyer of 
gas well did not alter rights of assignee of gas well who was not party to agreement and where 
agreement listed gas well as “previously transferred”); Cent. Ohio Receivables Co. v. Huston, No. 
87AP-1185, 1988 WL 99356, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1988) (“Similarly, an assignor 
generally lacks the power to discharge the obligor, whether by affirmative action or by default, 
after the obligor has received notice of the assignment.”).  It should be noted that modification of 
an account post-assignment or post-notification is permitted in some circumstances.  See generally 
U.C.C. § 9-405(a) & (b) (1999); 4447 Assocs., 889 P.2d at 475 n.11 (“The account debtor and the 
assignor are free to make changes as provided by the original account contract or which may be 
commercially reasonable within the context of the transaction.”). 
308 See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. 




insurers for any remaining coverage.  Thus, the injunction operated as a non-
debtor release. 
Third-party releases extinguish a creditor‟s independent rights against the 
shielded non-debtor.
309
  The analysis in this subpart indicates that additional 
insureds and some tort claimants hold independent property interests in the 
debtor‟s insurance, thereby providing them with such rights against the carrier.  
Thus, any bankruptcy order barring these additional insureds and tort claimants 
from suing the carriers—when the coverage has not been exhausted—constitutes 
a third-party release.
310
  However, whether insurance non-debtor releases should 
be governed by the same legal principles as such releases generally turns on the 
relationship of the debtor‟s insurance to the bankruptcy estate.  It is to that issue I 
now turn. 
2.  Insurance Policies and Proceeds in Bankruptcy 
A debtor‟s insurance policies are generally considered estate property.
311
  
The most persuasive reason for this conclusion is that the debtor holds title to the 
insurance policies it purchased.
312
  “Since the debtor is the owner of the policy, 
the policy becomes property of the estate.”
313
  The debtor‟s insurance policies are 
thus shielded by the automatic stay, prohibiting the insurers from cancelling them 
after the debtor files for bankruptcy.
314
 
Critically, ownership of an insurance policy is not the same as ownership of 
or entitlement to the proceeds of that policy.  “The interest in the policy does not 
                                                                                                                         
 
309 See supra Parts IV.A.1. & IV.A.3. 
310 Cf. Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy court 
granted debtor‟s carriers a non-debtor release barring all third parties (including additional insureds 
and tort claimants) from suing them; as part of their settlements with the debtor, the insurers paid 
the full policy limits into the estate). 
311 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03, at 362-24 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“The prevailing view is 
that an insurance policy is property of the estate, protected by the automatic stay.”) (collecting 
authorities); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a debtor‟s estate includes “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” with 
minor exceptions). 
312 See Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 793 n.74 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (liability 
insurance policies are property of the estate because “of the debtor‟s contractual rights and 
ownership interests under and in the policies”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 385 (“The debtor 
certainly has a legal interest, title, in the insurance policy itself.”). 
313 Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 385; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-67 
(15th ed. rev. 2005) (explaining that insurance policies “as a whole” belong to the estate “because 
the corporation owns and pays for the policies”). 
314 3 COLLIER ¶ 362.03, at 362-24.  Any rights the debtor holds under its policies are estate property 
as well.  Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Any rights the 
debtor has against the insurer, whether contractual or otherwise, become property of the estate.”); 5 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-60 & n.1 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (“Insurance policies 
and debtors‟ rights under insurance policies have been generally held to be property of the estate.”) 
(collecting authorities). 




by itself give the debtor any direct right to the proceeds.”
315
  Therefore, whether 
insurance proceeds are property of the estate is a distinct issue from whether the 
underlying policy belongs to the estate.
316
  And the status of policy proceeds can 
vary with the facts of each case.
317
 
When the debtor is both the insured and the loss payee, as in the case of 
fire, life, and much automobile coverage, there is little question that both the 
insurance policy and the related proceeds are estate property.
318
  But the courts 




Some decisions have held that liability insurance proceeds are not estate 
property because the debtor has no right to keep the proceeds when the insurer 
pays on a claim.
320
  “The proceeds are paid to the victim of the insured‟s 
wrongful act.”
321




Other cases have found that liability insurance proceeds are generally 
property of the estate.
323
  Some have justified this conclusion on the ground that 
                                                                                                                         
 
315 Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 386; accord 5 COLLIER ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-60 & n.1 (“[O]wnership 
of an insurance policy does not necessarily entail entitlement to receive proceeds of that policy.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
316 See La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 
1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The question is not who owns the policies, but who owns the liability 
proceeds.”); Landry, 260 B.R. at 785 (“While the rights held by a debtor under insurance policies 
are property of the estate, whether the funds paid by the Insurers on account of the insurance 
policies are property of the estate is an entirely different question.”).  But see Homsy v. Floyd (In re 
Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 534 n.17 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “the vast majority of courts do 
not bother to distinguish ownership of insurance policies from ownership of the proceeds of those 
policies, but treat that the two go hand-in-hand”). 
317 In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (“[I]nsurance policies are property 
of the estate . . . , but the question of whether the proceeds are property of the estate must be 
analyzed in light of the facts of each case.” (emphasis in original)); accord In re Scott Wetzel 
Servs., Inc., 243 B.R. 802, 804 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). 
318 In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. at 668 (“Unquestionably, proceeds from collision, life, and fire 
insurance policies are property of the estate when the proceeds are made payable to the debtor 
rather than to a third party, such as a creditor.”); accord Landry, 260 B.R. at 789. 
319 See Landry, 260 B.R. at 784-94 (containing an extensive discussion of the split). 
320 See Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The 
overriding question when determining whether insurance proceeds are property of the estate is 
whether the debtor would have a right to receive and keep those proceeds when the insurer paid on 
a claim.”); Landry, 260 B.R. at 786-87 (adopting the Edgeworth analysis); In re Scott Wetzel Serv., 
Inc., 243 B.R. at 804 (same); see also Landry, 260 B.R. at 800 (“There is no statutory basis for 
concluding that the proceeds of liability insurance policies are property of the estate.”). 
321 Landry, 260 B.R. at 786. 
322 In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d at 56; accord Landry, 260 B.R. at 786 (“In the liability insurance 
context the debtor has no cognizable claim to the proceeds paid by an insurer on account of a 
covered claim.”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 387 (“[T]he debtor does not have any direct interest 
in the policy proceeds, nor does the debtor have any control over the allocation of the proceeds.”). 
323 See, e.g., Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., Inc., 796 F.2d 553, 560 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that 
the proceeds of liability insurance policies are property of the estate). 








Still other decisions have ruled that the status of liability insurance proceeds 
depends on the type of coverage provided by the policy—namely, whether the 
policy covers the debtor.  If the debtor purchases a liability insurance policy that 
indemnifies only its directors and officers (i.e., the company is not itself an 
insured under the policy) the proceeds are not part of the estate, according to this 
line of authority.
325
  If the policy provides coverage solely to the debtor, however, 
then the proceeds are estate property.
326
  Finally, when the policy covers the 
debtor and third parties, the courts in this line are divided.  Some conclude that 
all of the proceeds are part of the estate.
327
  Others have ruled that only the 
debtor‟s interest in the proceeds are estate property; neither the rights of co-
insureds nor the property from which they seek payment are part of the estate.
328
 
The bankruptcy status of insurance proceeds is critical to assessing the 
validity of insurance non-debtor releases.  Recall the primary factual scenario 
involving this type of release.  The carrier and the debtor enter into a settlement 
in which the insurance policy and all related rights are transferred back to the 
carrier in exchange for a payment to the debtor that is less than the policy limits 
(and less than the value of the claims held by any tort plaintiffs and/or additional 
                                                                                                                         
 
324 Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 329 (8th 
Cir. 1988). 
325 See, e.g., La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 
F.2d 1391, 1399-1401 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that officer and director liability policies were 
property of the estate, but that the proceeds were not because the officers and directors were the 
only insureds and the proceeds were payable only to them); Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 
F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1995) (following In re La. World Exposition). 
326 In re Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d at 535. 
327 See, e.g., In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. 12, 14, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that all 
proceeds of the insurance policy were part of debtor‟s estate even though the policy provided 
primary coverage to both the debtor and its directors and officers); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 
B.R. 413, 420 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (reaching the same conclusion under similar facts as 
CyberMedica because the “Proceeds available for the Debtor‟s liability exposure are not segregated 
from the Proceeds available to the directors and officers” and thus the Debtor “has a sufficient 
interest in the Proceeds as a whole to bring them into the estate.”). 
328 For example, in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R. 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), 
the court found that the co-insured directors and officers “have no interest, disputed or otherwise, in 
the Estate‟s Policies, nor to the Estate‟s entitlement to policy proceeds.”  Id. at 527.  It 
conceptualized the relationship between the carriers, the debtor, and the additional insureds as 
follows: the estate has claims against the insurers and the co-insured managers have claims against 
the insurers.  Id.  Thus, the directors and officers “right to any cash would be from the Insurers, as a 
contractual entitlement, not from the property [of the estate] being sold, as a kind of in rem right, 
and would be independent of anything the Estate sought or received.”  Id.; see also In re Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that only the debtor‟s 
interests in policy proceeds were property of the estate; the co-insured‟s “claims against the 
insurers or its interests in the insurance policies are not property” of the debtor‟s estate), aff‟d, 149 
B.R. 860, 863 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“The bankruptcy court correctly distinguished, however, the rights 
of the debtor from the rights of FWC [the co-insured].  Only Forty-Eight‟s interests are part of the 
estate.  FWC‟s interest in insurance policies is not part of the estate.”). 




insureds).  Subsequently, the bankruptcy court enters an order releasing all 
claims against the insurer relating to the compromised policy, an order which 
purports to extinguish the rights of co-insureds and tort plaintiffs to pursue the 
insurer for the remaining coverage.
329
 
Consider first the propriety of an insurance non-debtor release like this 
when only the debtor‟s rights in the proceeds are part of the estate; the proceeds 
rights of additional insureds and tort claimants neither constitute, nor flow from, 
interests in estate property.  Under this legal conclusion, additional insureds and 
tort plaintiffs hold contractual or statutory claims against the insurer that are 
distinct from the estate.  A release discharging these causes of action is 
indistinguishable from the standard non-debtor release.  Therefore, an insurance 
release is permissible only if it comports with the law generally applicable to 
third-party releases.  In pro-release jurisdictions, the release must satisfy the 
Master Mortgage test
330





If it does, the court may enter the release under §§ 105(a) and/or 1123(b)(6).  In 
anti-release jurisdictions, an insurance release is void;
333
 lawsuits by co-insureds 
                                                                                                                         
 
329 This is substantially the structure proposed in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R. 
at 520-21, 523, and In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 219-20, 223-24 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1996). 
330 See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Master Mortgage elements).   
331 See supra notes 209-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Modified Master Mortgage 
elements). 
332 The bankruptcy of Adelphia is an excellent example.  As noted previously, that case mirrors the 
primary factual scenario involving insurance non-debtor releases.  See supra note 329.  Adelphia 
was pending in the Southern District of New York, see 364 B.R. 518, which is part of the Second 
Circuit, a pro-release jurisdiction, see SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992).  The bankruptcy court concluded 
that the directors‟ and officers‟ rights to the liability insurance proceeds were not interests in estate 
property, but rather were independent claims against the carriers.  In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 
364 B.R. at 527.  The court then proceeded to apply the Master Mortgage test to the proposed 
release.  Id. at 528-30 (concluding that, since the Test was not satisfied, the court lacked the power 
to release the directors‟ and officers‟ claims against the insurer for the remaining coverage). 
  In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973, aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992), is 
also instructive.  Like Adelphia, the facts were consistent with the primary factual scenario.  See id. 
at 975-76 (outlining the settlement between the debtor and its carriers and the impact of the release 
on the debtor‟s parent company, FWC, a co-insured under the insurance policies subject to the 
compromise); id. at 980 (“[T]he amount of the settlement here is less than the face amount of the 
policies, so that it is impossible to say that this settlement would exhaust the policies.”).  The 
bankruptcy court held that only the debtor‟s interest in the insurance policies were estate property.  
Id. at 977, aff‟d, 149 B.R. at 863 (expressly approving of this finding).  It subsequently concluded 
that releasing FWC‟s rights against the carriers was impermissible.  Id. at 978.  In reaching this 
determination, the court distinguished several early pro-release cases by noting that (1) Forty-Eight 
Insulations was liquidating rather than reorganizing, (2) FWC‟s claims would not lead to 
contribution or indemnity claims against the debtor, and (3) FWC was not guaranteed full payment 
on its claims.  Id. at 978.  Each of these bases would eventually become an aspect of the Master 
Mortgage test.  See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-release line of authority). 




and tort creditors against the carrier may not be enjoined in these territories when 
the insurer and the debtor settle for less than the policy limits. 
Now consider the legitimacy of an insurance release when all of the 
proceeds payable under the policy are property of the estate.  Pursuant to this 
legal conclusion, the additional insureds‟ and tort claimants‟ rights to proceeds—
the rights enabling them to bring suit against the debtor‟s carrier—are essentially 
interests in estate property.  This changes the analysis.  First, if all insurance 
proceeds are property of estate, there are statutes beyond §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) that may authorize insurance non-debtor releases.  Sections 363(f), 
1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) expressly allow for the disposition of estate 
property free of third-party interests.
334
  These statutes might authorize a debtor 
to transfer its insurance policy (and any related rights) back to the carrier free of 
the interests of co-insureds and tort claimants.
335
  After such a transaction, the 
                                                                                                                         
 
334 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (“The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest 
in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 
1123(a)(5)(D) (permitting “sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or 
free of any lien” (emphasis added)); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that secured claims receive 
fair and equitable treatment when the plan provides “for the sale . . . of any property that is subject 
to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the 
proceeds of such sale” (emphasis added)).  The fact that the transfer of the insurance policies is a 
“settlement” rather than a “sale” is irrelevant.  See In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 364 B.R. at 526 
(“A sale incident to a settlement is still a sale even if the Insurers are in a unique position to make 
the purchase, and even if there are no other bidders with the ability or motivation to do so.”); In re 
Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. at 245 (holding that “[e]quating compromises/settlements of lawsuits 
to sales of a debtor‟s property is appropriate because there is so little to distinguish them”); id. at 
245-47 (offering multiple, persuasive arguments for the conclusion that sales and settlements are 
essentially the same for purposes of § 363, including § 363(f)).  But see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 363.02, at 363-11 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (noting that “the cases are mixed . . . on whether the 
settlement of a claim that the estate owns is a sale (that is, disposition) of property of the estate”). 
335 In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003), aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 
635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004), supports this conclusion with respect to § 363(f).  That case also 
appears to follow the primary factual scenario: The debtor wanted to sells its insurance policies 
back to the carriers and have the court enjoin the debtor‟s pre-judgment tort claimants from suing 
the insurers.  Id. at 535; see also id. at 538 n.2 (implying that the sales price was below the 
coverage limits of the various policies).  The court noted that the insurance policies were property 
of the estate and thus the debtor possessed the power to sell them.  Id. at 535-36.  The court also 
explained that the policies could be sold under § 363(f) free and clear of any third-party property 
interests as long as the interest-holders received adequate protection.  Id. at 536.  The debtor 
intended to use the proceeds of the sale for the general benefit of the estate, not to pay claims 
covered by the policies.  Id. at 535.  And the debtor proposed no other form of adequate protection 
for the tort claimants.  Id. at 536; see infra note 336 for more on adequate protection.  Thus, the 
“buy-back arrangement”—which included the sale of the policies, the injunction shielding the 
carriers, and the debtor‟s use of the proceeds for general purposes—was permissible only if the tort 
claimants held no property interests in the policies.  In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. at 536.  
However, the court ruled that, under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute, 215 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 5/388 (West 2008), the pre-judgment tort claimants did possess property interests in the 
debtor‟s liability insurance.  In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. at 537-38.  The court thus refused 
to approve of the buy-back arrangement. 




additional insureds‟ and tort plaintiffs‟ claims would probably attach to the funds 
the insurer paid in exchange for the return of the policy.
336
  But the additional 
insureds‟ and tort claimants‟ interests in the insurance policy itself would be 
gone, and thus so would their contractual and statutory rights against the insurer 
for the difference between the settlement amount and the policy limits.  Since the 
co-insureds and tort claimants would now only hold rights in the settlement 
payment, the bankruptcy court would possess ample authority to enjoin them 
from suing the insurer.
337
 
Second, if all liability insurance proceeds are estate property, then insurance 
third-party releases are probably not subject to the limits on general non-debtor 
releases contained in the Master Mortgage test or my modified version of the 
test.  For example, § 363(f) is one possible basis for insurance releases when all 
of the insurance proceeds are part of the estate.  Bankruptcy trustees may use that 
statute in Chapter 7 cases.
338
  Insurance releases might therefore be permissible 
in Chapter 7 actions,
339
 unlike general non-debtor releases.
340
  This would 
                                                                                                                         
  The crucial point here is that Allied Products supports the proposition that, because 
insurance policies are property of the estate, the policies may be sold pursuant to § 363(f) free and 
clear of the property interests of tort claimants.  The problem with the debtor‟s scheme in Allied 
Products was merely the lack of adequate protection for the tort claimants, not any absolute 
prohibition on selling insurance policies free and clear of tort claimant property interests. 
  It should be noted that there is authority that implicitly contradicts Allied Products.  See 
In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 290, 295, 300-01 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (concluding 
that all of the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance policies were property of the estate, but 
assessing the insurance non-debtor release in the plan of reorganization under § 105(a) and the 
Master Mortgage test, rather than under § 363(f) or the provisions of Chapter 11 identified supra 
note 334). 
336 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property . . . sold . . . by 
the trustee, the court . . . shall prohibit or condition such . . . sale . . . as is necessary to provide 
adequate protection of such interest.”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06[9] (15th ed. rev. 2005) 
(“The most common form of adequate protection is to have the lien or other interest attach to the 
proceeds of the sale.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that secured claims receive fair 
and equitable treatment when the plan provides “for the sale . . . of any property that is subject to 
the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds 
of such sale” (emphasis added)). 
337 See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (“And thus when an asset of the estate is 
sold by the trustee in bankruptcy free and clear of any liens, the court can enjoin a creditor from 
suing to enforce a preexisting lien in the asset.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (explaining that bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to issue an 
injunction barring a creditor from seeking to enforce an interest in property purchased from the 
debtor under § 363(f) where the injunction is “necessary and appropriate to give the „free and clear‟ 
aspect of § 363(f) meaning”) (collecting authorities); P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Va. (In re 
P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (“Accordingly, § 105[(a)] 
authorizes this court to enjoin any act to collect an interest in the bankruptcy estate in contravention 
of a court order to sell the property free and clear of all interests under § 363(f)(5).”). 
338 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3 and 5 
of this title apply in cases under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title . . . .”). 
339 Cf. Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (in a Chapter 7 
liquidation, after the debtor settled with its liability insurance carriers and the bankruptcy court 
approved the settlement, the bankruptcy court issued an injunction barring all third parties 




eliminate the need to pay dissenting creditors in full on the claims extinguished 
by an insurance third-party release.  To elaborate, remember that the payment-in-
full requirement applies to general third-party releases because of the best 
interests test.  Since that type of release is prohibited in Chapter 7 cases, if the 
debtor were to liquidate, the creditor would receive complete satisfaction on its 
claim from the debtor, the co-obligor, or a combination of the two.  The best 
interests test mandates that the creditor receive as much in the debtor‟s Chapter 
11 case as it would receive in a Chapter 7.  Accordingly, a Chapter 11 plan must 
promise the creditor full payment on any claims extinguished by a general third-
party release.  However, if insurance non-debtor releases are permissible in 
Chapter 7, the crucial first premise of this argument is not true with respect to 
insurance releases.
341
  Hence, insurance third-party releases would be exempt 
from the payment-in-full element contained in both versions of the Master 
Mortgage test. 
Similar arguments exist that the remaining elements of the two Master 
Mortgage tests are either moot or inapplicable to insurance releases,
342
 if such 
releases are in fact authorized under § 363(f).
343
  But these arguments are not 
                                                                                                                         
(including additional insureds and tort claimants) from suing the insurers for claims seeking 
additional coverage under the settled policies; however, as part of their settlements with the debtor, 
the insurers paid the full policy limits into the estate, distinguishing this case from the primary 
factual scenario involving insurance non-debtor releases; moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not 
mention § 363(f) or otherwise identify the statutory basis for the sale and injunction). 
340 See supra notes 215, 220 and accompanying text. 
341 In addition to § 363(f), two provisions of Chapter 11—§§ 1123(a)(5)(D) and 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—might also authorize insurance non-debtor releases.  If insurance releases are 
permissible only under one or both of the Chapter 11 sections, and not under § 363(f), then the 
analysis offered in the body changes.  Unlike § 363(f), the two Chapter 11 statutes do not apply in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  11 U.S.C. § 103(g).  Insurance third-party releases would thus be 
prohibited in Chapter 7 cases, just like general non-debtor releases.  And therefore, the argument 
that the best interests test mandates payment in full on claims extinguished by general releases 
would have equal force when applied to insurance releases. 
342 For example, both tests require an “identity-of-interest” between the released third party and the 
debtor.  This element concerns subject matter jurisdiction.  Such jurisdiction will always exist in 
the context of a § 363(f) sale and a supporting injunction because bankruptcy courts have 
jurisdiction over all property of the estate.  28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2006).  Both versions of the 
Master Mortgage test also mandate that a non-debtor release be “essential to the reorganization.”  
See supra notes 203, 211 and accompanying text.  But the standard for approving a sale under § 
363 is “essentially a business judgment test,” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1][f] (15th ed. 
rev. 2005), a much lower standard.  Finally, both versions of the Master Mortgage test require a 
substantial level of creditor consent to any third-party release.  However, there is no similar 
requirement that a trustee obtain consent from creditors before conducting a § 363 sale.  See, e.g., 
11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (c), (f).  Creditors may object, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1][2], but 
their dissent alone cannot block a sale under § 363. 
343 The authorities adopting the first position—that only the debtor‟s interest in liability insurance 
proceeds is part of the estate—have expressly rejected § 363(f) as a basis for granting insurance 
non-debtor releases; and they have done so precisely on the ground that only the debtor‟s interest in 
the proceeds is estate property.  For example, in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R. 
518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the court concluded that § 363(f) was inapplicable because it found 
that the proceeds rights of the director and officer additional insureds were not derived from any 




                                                                                                                         
interest in property of the estate, but rather flowed from “contractual entitlement[s]” against the 
carriers that were independent of the estate.  Id. at 527; accord In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 
133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a debtor may not use § 363(f) to sell a 
liability insurance policy back to the insurer free of the interests of a co-insured because the co-
insured‟s interest in the policy does “not become property of the estate”), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860, 864 
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (“The [bankruptcy] court correctly held that another party‟s interests do not 
become property of the estate and therefore cannot be sold under § 363 which deals with the sale of 
property of the estate.”). 
  There are also arguments that § 363(f) does not permit insurance non-debtor releases 
even if the second position is correct—even if all liability insurance proceeds are indeed estate 
property.  The power to authorize a sale of property free and clear of third-party interests under § 
363(f) is contingent upon meeting one of five conditions.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)-(5) (2006).  
Only two of these conditions could possibly be satisfied in the context of an insurance settlement 
for less than the policy proceeds that contains a non-debtor release of the carrier.  First, § 363(f)(4) 
permits a free-and-clear sale where the third-party‟s property “interest is in bona fide dispute.”  Id. 
§ 363(f)(4).  This provision might be satisfied with respect to tort plaintiffs if their claims against 
the debtor are legitimately contested.  See In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (holding that the tort claimants‟ interest, if any, in the debtor‟s insurance policies were 
subject to bond fide dispute, satisfying § 363(f)(4), because “the Debtor vehemently denies liability 
to the tort claimants”).  The standard might also be met against tort claimants and additional 
insureds if the carrier has legitimate bases for challenging the debtor‟s or the additional insured‟s 
entitlement to coverage.  But if there is no valid argument available to place the interests of tort 
plaintiffs or additional insureds in bona fide dispute, then § 363(f)(4) is inapplicable.  Second, § 
363(f)(5) allows for a sale free and clear where the third party “could be compelled, in a legal or 
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5).  
Since tort claimants merely possess a right to payment out of insurance proceeds, it seems likely 
that § 363(f)(5) could be used to transfer insurance policies free of their property interests.  
Additional insureds, however, beyond their right to the payment of proceeds, are typically owed a 
duty to defend by the carrier.  This might mean that § 363(f)(5) may only be used to extinguish the 
claims of tort plaintiffs against the carrier.  On this reading, the claims of additional insureds are 
beyond the scope of the statute. 
  The power to sell property free and clear in a Chapter 11 plan is not limited to the five 
conditions in § 363(f).  7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.05[2][b][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004).  Thus, 
including an insurance non-debtor release in the debtor‟s plan of reorganization may avoid the 
limitations set forth in that statute.  However, the two provisions of Chapter 11 that provide the 
power to sell estate property free and clear use the more specific term “lien” in describing such 
sales.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (permitting “sale of all or any part of the property of the 
estate, either subject to or free of any lien” (emphasis added)); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing 
for sales “free and clear of such liens” (emphasis added)).  Now, another Chapter 11 provision, § 
1141(c), provides that “the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and 
interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.”  Id. § 1141(c) 
(emphasis added).  But, while § 1141(c) uses the broader term “interest,” the “free and clear” 
impact of that statute is limited by the terms of the plan of reorganization: Property dealt with by 
the plan is free and clear “except as otherwise provided in the plan.”  Id.  Thus, if there is no statute 
in Chapter 11 that permits a plan to include a sale free and clear of interests that are not liens, the 
plan would either (1) have to preserve the property interests of tort claimants and additional 
insureds, mooting any “free and clear” impact of § 1141(c), or (2) satisfy the requirements of § 
363(f).  In sum, a sale free and clear of the type of “interests” in the debtor‟s insurance held by tort 
claimants and additional insureds might go beyond the power granted by the specific language of 
§§ 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).  That would leave § 363(f) as the only statutory basis for 




sufficiently pertinent to the issues raised by asbestos non-debtor releases to 
warrant significant attention here. 
To recap: If only the debtor‟s interest in liability insurance proceeds is 
property of the estate, then the standard rules applicable to non-debtor releases 
also govern insurance releases.  The sole statutory bases for insurance third-party 
releases would be §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), the provisions granting bankruptcy 
courts their general equitable powers.  And many courts have ruled that these 
laws do not provide sufficient authority for non-debtor releases.  If all of the 
liability insurance proceeds are estate property, however, then bankruptcy courts 
have other statutes at their disposal—§§ 363(f), 1123(a)(5)(D) and 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Extinguishing the claims of co-insureds and tort plaintiffs 
against an insurer is arguably more justifiable under these statutes than under the 
two equitable provisions.
344
  Moreover, the limits that pro-release authorities 
impose on general non-debtor releases are largely inapplicable to insurance 
releases, to the extent the latter may be granted under § 363(f).  And thus, 




                                                                                                                         
such relief.  Of course, there is an argument that the tort claimants‟ interests are essentially the 
equivalent of liens, see supra notes 290-91, 297, and accompanying text, but it is virtually 
impossible to reach the same conclusion with respect to the interests of additional insureds. 
  Two final points relating to the scope of § 363(f) deserve brief attention.  First, suppose 
that a co-insured is not merely an additional insured, but rather jointly purchases the insurance with 
the debtor and is also a primary, named insured.  In that situation, the debtor and the co-insured 
would best be conceptualized as co-owners of the policy.  Any attempt to extinguish the co-
insured‟s rights in such a case via an insurance non-debtor release would probably be governed by 
§ 363(h), rather than § 363(f).  Section 363(h) permits the sale of property free and clear of the 
rights of certain joint owners if a series of stringent requirements is met.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
363(h)(1)-(4); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.08[1] (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“Because [§ 363(h)] 
authorizes a trustee to sell and thereby deprive a nondebtor of its property, there are significant 
conditions to the exercise of the power.”).  It might be very difficult to show that an insurance non-
debtor release satisfies § 363(h).  (Since additional insureds are third-party beneficiaries under an 
insurance policy, not co-owners, In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 364 B.R. at 525, § 363(h) is not 
relevant where the non-debtor insured is merely an additional insured.)  Second, suppose that the 
debtor was the additional insured on a policy procured by a parent or other related company.  In 
that case, I suspect that neither § 363(f) nor § 363(h) would be available.  See In re Forty-Eight 
Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. at 978 n.5 (stating that § 363(h) had “no application” in a case mirroring 
these facts). 
344 See Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 410-11 (“Of course, any determination based on the court‟s 
„channeling‟ power is dependent on a finding that the policy proceeds are property of the estate.  If 
the insurance proceeds were viewed as an asset that does not become property of the estate, they 
would not be subject to the „channeling‟ power and section 363(f) would not apply.”); see also In 
re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 B.R. 238, 253-54 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (distinguishing Johns-
Manville because the claims at issue there were against property of the estate—i.e., the insurance 
policies, whereas Elsinore Shore Associates requested the enjoining of claims against independent 
third parties). 
345 There are plausible middle grounds between these two extremes.  For example, perhaps an 
additional insured‟s right to policy proceeds is not an interest in estate property, but a tort 
claimant‟s right to such proceeds does constitute such an interest.  Under this legal conclusion, the 
standard non-debtor release rules would apply to the release of claims held by additional insureds, 




V.  SECTION 524(g) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A.  The Purpose and General Structure of Section 524(g) 
As Part IV illustrates, the law with respect to non-debtor releases is 
unsettled.  In the aftermath of the Manville case, Congress believed that similar 
uncertainty plagued the usage of a litigation trust and channeling injunction to 
address future claims, and that the ambiguous legal environment inhibited 
Manville‟s attempts to raise money for its on-going operations.
346
  This 
“undermined the „fresh start‟ objectives of bankruptcy and the goals of the trust 
arrangement.”
347
  Section 524(g),
348
 and its companion provision § 524(h),
349
 
were intended to remove the cloud hanging over the “trust/injunction 
mechanism” used in Manville, and subsequently in the bankruptcy of UNR,
350
 
and legitimize those procedures for other companies seeking to reorganize 
because of asbestos liabilities.
351
 
                                                                                                                         
while §§ 363(f), 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) would potentially govern the release of 
claims against the carrier held by tort claimants. 
346 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 
(“Nevertheless, lingering uncertainty in the financial community as to whether the injunction can 
withstand all challenges has apparently made it more difficult for [Manville] to meet its needs for 
capital and has depressed the value of its stock.”). 
347 Id.; see also 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Brown) 
(“Without a clear statement in the code of a court‟s authority to issue such injunctions, the financial 
markets tend to discount the securities of the reorganized debtor.  This in turn diminishes the trust‟s 
assets and its resources to pay victims.”). 
348 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006). 
349 Id. § 524(h). 
350 See Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 271-72 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1990) (summarizing a Chapter 11 plan that substantially mirrored Manville‟s in its 
treatment of asbestos tort claims); H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3340, 3349 (explaining that UNR “has resolved its chapter 11 reorganization with a similar 
trust/injunction arrangement”). 
351 H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The Committee has 
approved section 111 of the bill in order to strengthen the Manville and UNR trust/injunction 
mechanisms and to offer similar certitude to other asbestos/trust injunction mechanisms that meet 
the same kind of high standards with respect to regard for the rights of claimants, present and 
future, as displayed in the two pioneering cases.”). 
  As indicated in the main text, Congress wished to legitimize the trust/injunction structure 
in both future actions and in asbestos bankruptcies that utilized the structure prior to the enactment 
of § 524(g)—namely the Manville and UNR cases.  The retroactive effect was accomplished 
through § 524(h), which essentially created a post hoc statutory basis for the previously issued 
Manville and UNR channeling injunctions.  Subsection (h) provides that injunctions issued in 
asbestos bankruptcies before the enactment of § 524(g), and having substantially the same impact 
as a § 524(g) injunction, shall be deemed to satisfy virtually all of the requirements of subsection 
(g), if three additional standards are met.  11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1).  First, when the plan was initially 
confirmed, the court determined that the plan was “fair and equitable in accordance with the 
requirements of section 1129(b).”  Id. § 524(h)(1)(A).  Second, the court appointed a future claims 
representative as part of the confirmation process.  Id. § 524(h)(1)(B).  And third, the future claims 
representative “did not object to confirmation of the plan or issuance of” the injunction.  Id. § 




In designing § 524(g), Congress had the same aim as the drafters of the 
reorganization plan in Johns-Manville—finding a way to “preserve the going 
concern value” of the debtor in order to provide “a source of payment for . . . 
future claims.”
352
  Congress was also impressed by the protections afforded 
present and future claimants in the Manville and UNR bankruptcies.
353
  It felt that 
such protections were a required feature of any trust/injunction mechanism 
enacted into law.
354
  As a result, Congress modeled the statute on the specific 
structure established in the Manville case.
355
 
When crafting § 524(g), Congress was primarily focused on the features of 
the litigation trust and the rights of future claimants.
356
  Extending injunctive 
protection to third parties received comparatively little attention.  It was noted in 
passing during the Senate debate,
357
 but was not mentioned once in the House 
debate
358
 or in the House Report on the statute.
359
  Nonetheless, provisions 
allowing the bankruptcy court to shield non-debtors via the trust/injunction 
mechanism were included in the statute.
360
 
                                                                                                                         
524(h)(1)(C); see also id. § 524(h)(2) (containing some additional provisions regarding how § 
524(g) applies to pre-enactment litigation trusts that, as of the effective date of the statute, were 
under a stay of operations). 
352 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Graham); see also Part 
III.B.2. (discussing the purposes of the Manville trust and injunction). 
353 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (remarks of Sen. Graham). 
354 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The Committee 
has concluded, therefore, that creating greater certitude regarding the validity of the trust/injunction 
mechanism must be accompanied by explicit requirements simulating those met in the Manville 
case.”). 
355 Id. at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348. 
356 On the protection of future claimants, see id. (describing § 524(g) as involving “the 
establishment of a trust to pay the future claims, coupled with an injunction to prevent future 
claimants from suing the debtor”); id. at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The 
Committee remains concerned that full consideration be accorded to the interests of future 
claimants who, by definition, do not have their own voice.”); 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (remarks of 
Sen. Graham) (“It is the uncertainty of the number and amount of these future claims, and the need 
to implement a procedure that recognizes these future claimants as creditors under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, that necessitates this amendment . . . .”); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 902 
n.164 (noting that the legislative history “clearly establishes the focus of Section 524(g) is to 
protect future claimants”); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 271-72 
(“The central innovation of § 524(g) is that it provides a means by which a debtor can limit the 
rights of persons—the future claimants—who are not present in court to defend those rights.”); 
Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy As a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise Threatening Mass Tort 
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2073 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the “asbestos 
amendments” was to protect debtor manufacturers from future liability). 
357 See 140 CONG. REC. S4523-24 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sens. Graham, Helfin, 
Cambell & Brown). 
358 See 140 CONG. REC. H10765-66 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Brooks); id. at 
H10772 (remarks of Rep. Fish). 
359 See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40-41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348-50. 
360 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4) (2006). 




Section 524(g) allows bankruptcy courts to issue an injunction that 
“supplement[s] the injunctive effect of a discharge”
361
 by shielding the debtor 
and certain third parties from current and future asbestos-related claims.
362
  The 
injunction may enjoin entities from taking legal action to recover “on any claim 
or demand that, under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part 
by” a qualifying litigation trust
363
 established to address the debtor‟s asbestos 
liabilities.
364
  This relief, which is referred to as a “supplemental injunction” or a 
“channeling injunction,” is designed to immunize the reorganized debtor from 
litigation so that it can generate the funds necessary to satisfy its tort 
obligations,
365
 and provide an incentive for related non-debtors to contribute 
assets to the litigation trust for the payment of tort claims.
366
 
B.  The Requirements for a Supplemental Injunction Protecting the Debtor 
Section 524(g) contains an exacting series of requirements that must be 
satisfied before the court may issue a supplemental injunction protecting the 
debtor.  And the statute adds further conditions on top of the general 
requirements if the injunction also shields non-debtors.  This subpart sets forth 
the general requirements, those that must be met before any § 524(g) injunction 
is permissible. 
First, and most importantly, the injunction must be issued “in connection 
with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under chapter 11.”
367
  This 
entails that the debtor be reorganizing pursuant to Chapter 11, not liquidating 
under Chapter 7.
368
  Thus, in addition to the requirements specified by § 524(g), 
the supplemental injunction and the related provisions of the debtor‟s plan of 
reorganization have to comply with Chapter 11‟s mandates.
369
 
                                                                                                                         
 
361 Id. § 524(g)(1)(A). 
362 Id. § 524(g)(3)-(5). 
363 Id. § 524(g)(1)(B).  A “demand” is essentially a future claim that was not asserted during the 
bankruptcy.  See id. § 524(g)(5). 
364 See id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i), (i)(I). 
365 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Brown) (“The underlying 
company funds the trust with securities and the company remains viable.  Thus, the company 
continues to generate assets to pay claims today and into the future.”). 
366 Id. (remarks of Sen. Graham) (“By providing a trust to pay claims and an injunction channeling 
the present and future asbestos claims to that trust, the debtor and third parties who are alleged to 
be liable for the asbestos claims against the debtor will be encouraged to participate in a system that 
will maximize the assets available to asbestos claims, present and future, and provide for an 
equitable distribution and method of payment.” (emphasis added)); Porter, supra note 30, at 229 
(“The inclusive protection of parents, affiliates, and subsidiaries that is contemplated by § 524(g) 
rests on the premise that these parties will make appropriate contributions to the trust in order to 
justify the benefit of the channeling injunction.”); see also id. at 229 (contending that the statute has 
succeeded in inducing third parties to make contributions in exchange for injunctive relief). 
367 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A). 
368 NAT‟L BANKR. REVIEW COMM‟N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 321 (1997). 
369 In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc. 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (“To achieve this [supplemental 
injunctive] relief, a debtor must satisfy the prerequisites set forth in § 524(g), in addition to the 




Second, the debtor must be “subject to substantial future demands for 
payment” arising from its asbestos-related activities.
370
  Third, the “amounts, 
numbers, and timing of such future demands” need to be impossible to 
determine.
371
  Fourth, if future claimants pursue these demands “outside the 
procedures prescribed by” the reorganization plan, such action is “likely to 
threaten the plan‟s purpose to deal equitably with claims and future demands.”
372
  
For example, in the bankruptcy of The Babcock & Wilcox Company, the court 
found this requirement to be met because, without the plan mechanisms, “claims 




                                                                                                                         
standard plan confirmation requirements.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A))); see, e.g., In re Porter 
Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *1-*4 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006) 
(separately addressing the requirements of Chapter 11 generally and of § 524(g) specifically), aff‟d, 
No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (Bankr. D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 
02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *5-*17 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (same), aff‟d, 343 
B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 784-93 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003), order 
entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003) (same), 
aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004). 
370 Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I) states that “the debtor is likely to be subject to substantial future 
demands for payment arising out of the same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the 
claims that are addressed by the injunction.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).  
And § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) makes it clear that the “claims that are addressed by the injunction” must 
be the debtor‟s asbestos-related liabilities.  See id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (stating that a § 524(g) 
litigation trust, which is prerequisite to a supplemental injunction, may only assume the liabilities 
of a debtor who “has been named as a defendant in personal injury, wrongful death, or property 
damage actions seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to, 
asbestos or asbestos-containing products.”); see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d at 234 
n.45 (explaining that the debtor must be subject to “substantial demands for payment in the future 
arising out of” its asbestos-related activities).  For good examples of cases where the debtor 
satisfied the requirement of § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I), see In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 604 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1996) (primary debtor faced nearly 100,000 personal injury asbestos claims upon filing 
for bankruptcy in 1990 and 737,033 by the claim-filing deadline), and In re Federal-Mogul Global 
Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, at *29 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16 2007) (debtor projected to 
face 200,000 to 500,000 claims over the next 40 years). 
371 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II); see also Sander L. Esserman & David J. Parsons, The Case for 
Broad Access to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) in Light of the Third Circuit‟s Ongoing Business Requirement 
Dicta in Combustion Engineering, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 193 n.30 (2006) (contending 
this is an “easy” requirement to satisfy because, “[g]iven the history of asbestos litigation, the 
lengthy latency periods . . . , and evolving medical technology, it is difficult to predict with even a 
modicum of certainty the timing or extent of future demands that may be asserted against the 
Debtor”). 
372 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III). 
373 In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *22 (Bankr. E.D. La. 
Nov. 9, 2004), vacated on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL 4982364 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 
2005); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[2], at 524-50 (15th ed. rev. 2008) (“[I]f the 
court finds that the viability of the debtor or a successor, after reorganization, would not be 
seriously threatened by the assertion” of present and future claims, then § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)III) is not 
satisfied.). 




Fifth, as noted above, the supplemental injunction must be “implemented in 
connection with” a litigation trust, established by the debtor‟s plan of 
reorganization.
374
  Sixth, the trust has to assume the asbestos liabilities of the 
debtor
375
 and use “its assets or income to pay claims and demands.”
376
  Seventh, 
the trust must be funded “in whole or in part” by the debtor‟s securities and by an 
obligation of the debtor “to make future payments, including dividends,” to the 
trust.
377
  Eighth, the trust must either own, “or by the exercise of rights granted 
under such plan . . . be entitled to own if specified contingencies occur, a 
majority of the voting shares of” the debtor, the debtor‟s parent corporation, or 
each subsidiary of the debtor that is also a debtor in the bankruptcy.
378
  This 
requirement ensures that the trust may obtain control of the reorganized debtor if 
the trust otherwise turns out to have insufficient funds to fulfill its obligations 
under the plan of reorganization.
379
  Ninth, the trust‟s operating procedures must 
“provide reasonable assurance” that the trust will have the financial resources to 
pay in “substantially the same manner” comparable present claims and future 
demands.
380
  Significant discrimination between present claims and future 
                                                                                                                         
 
374 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i). 
375 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I); Findley v. Falise (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 
473, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the trust “must . . . assume the debtor‟s wrongful death, 
personal injury and property damage liabilities for exposure to asbestos products”), aff‟d in part, 
vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996).  Some courts have held that the trust may assume non-
asbestos liabilities as well.  See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 267 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1996) (holding that debtor‟s § 524(g) trust could assume debtor‟s lead liabilities as well as its 
asbestos liabilities). 
376 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(IV). 
377 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II); see, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 602-04 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1996) (outlining the funding of the trust—which included (1) hundreds of millions in common 
stock of the reorganized debtor, and (2) promissory notes valued at $200 million issued by the 
reorganized debtor to the trust—and noting that the total funding exceeded $1.2 billion).  Some 
courts have interpreted this provision to require that the reorganized debtor constitute a “going 
concern”—that it have some continuing business operations after exiting bankruptcy.  See, e.g., In 
re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 238 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The implication of this requirement 
is that the reorganized debtor must be a going concern, such that it is able to make future payments 
into the trust to provide an „evergreen‟ funding source for future asbestos claimants.”).  Contra 
Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 187 (“This paper argues that there has not been and should 
not be an ongoing business requirement. . . .”). 
378 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III). 
379 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[2], at 524-50 (15th ed. rev. 2008).  The “contingency” that 
grants a trust control of the debtor must be an event that would occur prior to the point in time 
when obtaining control of the debtor would be worthless.  In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 
175-79 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (holding that debtor‟s plan did not satisfy § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) 
because there was “no plausible scenario” in which the trust would be able to obtain a controlling 
interest in debtor‟s stock “when [the shares] were still valuable”). 
380 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006).  The statute explains that the trust “will operate through 
mechanisms such as structured, periodic, or supplemental payments, pro rata distributions, 
matrices, or periodic review of estimates of the numbers and values of present claims and future 
demands, or other comparable mechanisms.”  Id. 








Tenth, as part of the confirmation process, the persons with claims to be 
addressed by the trust must be placed in a separate class (or classes).
382
  Eleventh, 
at least seventy-five percent of the members of the separate class voting on the 
plan have to vote in the plan‟s favor.
383
  Twelfth, the court must appoint a legal 
representative for future claimants “for the purpose of protecting” their rights.
384
  
Nothing in the statute states that the representative must approve of the plan as a 
prerequisite to confirmation,
385
 but “future claimants‟ representatives have 
asserted that no channeling injunction may be issued without their 
endorsement.”
386
  Thirteenth, the court must determine that granting the 
protections of a supplemental injunction to the debtor is “fair and equitable” to 




Fourteenth, the terms of the supplemental injunction need to be set forth in 
both the plan of reorganization and the disclosure statement.
388
  Fifteenth, after 
adequate notice, the court must conduct a hearing on the injunction.
389
  Sixteenth, 
the supplemental injunction does not become effective until “the order 
confirming the plan of reorganization” is “issued or affirmed by the district 
court” and the time for appeal from the district court‟s action has expired.
390
 
                                                                                                                         
 
381 See In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. at 183-84 (holding that the plan violated § 
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because the plan classified and treated differently asbestos claims based solely 
upon the time at which the claims were filed); In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2004) (finding that plan violated § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because of excessive discrimination between 
claims). 
382 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).  The statute‟s reference to multiple “classes” is relevant in 
several contexts.  First, when a bankruptcy involves multiple debtors, each with their own asbestos 
claimants, it may be appropriate to place the plaintiffs for each debtor in a distinct class.  Second, 
most courts put personal injury claimants and property damage claimants in separate classes.  See, 
e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. at 605 (finding § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) satisfied where the 
primary debtor‟s asbestos personal injury claimants and asbestos property damage claimants were 
placed in two separate classes (Classes six and eight respectively)).  For a third context, see infra 
note 456. 
383 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 
384 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).  See generally Fed. Ins. Co. v. W.R. Grace, Civ. Ac. No. 04-844, 2004 WL 
55 5517843, *4-*10 (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2004) (addressing various issues regarding the appointment 
of a § 524(g) future claims representative, including the proper statutory authority for the 
appointment, the correct conflict-of-interest standard, and the appropriate appointment procedure). 
385 See Barliant, supra note 32, at 457 n.84 (“The Bankruptcy Code does not require that the future 
claims‟ representative approve the section 524(g) trust or the overall plan.”). 
386 Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, supra note 32, at 909 n.121. 
387 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 
388 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(aa). 
389 Id. § 524(g)(1)(A). 
390 Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)-(A)(i) (emphasis added).  The statute further provides that, once the 
injunction becomes “valid and enforceable,” it “may not be revoked or modified by any court 
except through appeal in accordance with paragraph (6).”  Id. at 524(g)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added); 




These sixteen requirements are all expressly set forth in the statute.  But 
some authorities have interpreted various portions of § 524(g) to imply additional 
mandates.  For example, the statute provides that a channeling injunction may be 
entered to “supplement the injunctive effect of a discharge.”
391
  In construing this 
language, one court ruled that, since the injunction is supposed to “supplement” 
the “discharge,” at least one debtor in the bankruptcy must be entitled to a 
discharge under § 1141(d);
392




C.  Section 524(g)’s Additional Requirements When The Injunction Protects 
Non-Debtors 
Section 524(g)(4) allows some non-debtors to receive the protection of the 
supplemental injunction—i.e., it permits the issuance of non-debtor releases.
394
  
                                                                                                                         
see also id. § 524(g)(6) (preserving the power of an “appellate court” to act on an appeal either of 
an injunction issued under the statute or of “the order of confirmation that relates to the 
injunction.”).  However, the statute also states that “after entry of such injunction, any proceeding 
that involves the validity, application, construction, or modification of such injunction . . . may be 
commenced only in the district court in which such injunction was entered.”  Id. § 524(g)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added).  While paragraphs (3)(A)(i) and (2)(A) appear to be in conflict, they can be 
reconciled as follows: Subparagraph (3)(A)(i) bars attempts to change the terms of the injunction, 
whereas subparagraph (2)(A) addresses modifications expressly contemplated by the initial terms 
of the confirmation order. 
391 Id. § 524(g)(1)(A). 
392 Id. § 1141(d). 
393 See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003); see also Esserman & 
Parsons, supra note 371, at 200-01, 204 (summarizing and rejecting this argument).   For another 
example, see also supra note 377 (discussing the implied “going-concern” requirement). 
394 Extending the supplemental injunction to non-debtors under § 524(g)(4) should be distinguished 
from the legal impact of another part of the statute.  Under § 524(g)(3), some third parties are 
automatically entitled to a measure of protection, apart from the supplemental injunction, when the 
requirements regarding the litigation trust are satisfied.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A).  That 
paragraph provides that entities who become direct or indirect transferees of the debtor or the trust, 
pursuant to the reorganization plan or afterwards, shall not be liable on any asbestos-related claims 
by reason of the transfer.  Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that “no entity that pursuant to such plan 
or thereafter becomes a direct or indirect transferee of, or successor to any assets of, a debtor or 
trust that is the subject of the injunction shall be liable with respect to any claim or demand made 
against such entity by reason of its becoming such a transferee or successor”).  This provision is 
designed to cut off any successor liability such transferees might otherwise face.  4 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[4] (15th ed. rev. 2008).  Similarly, persons that loan money to the debtor, 
the trust, or a transferee of either, pursuant to the reorganization plan or afterwards, are not liable to 
any asbestos claimants simply in virtue of the loan.  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A)(iii) (stating that “no 
entity that pursuant to such plan or thereafter makes a loan to such a debtor or trust or to such a 
successor or transferee shall, by reason of making the loan, be liable with respect to any claim or 
demand made against such entity, nor shall any pledge of assets made in connection with such a 
loan be upset or impaired for that reason”); see also id. § 524(g)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that the 
protection for transferees and lenders does not shield them from liability under fraudulent transfer 
law).  Extinguishing a third party‟s successor liability, arising because of its transactions with the 
debtor taking place after the bankruptcy filing, involves a different set of issues from releasing or 




However, the statute lists additional conditions that must be met when the 
injunction shields third parties.  First, any non-debtor who will be receiving the 
benefits of the injunction must be identified “by name or as part of an identifiable 
group” in the terms of the injunction.
395
  Second, as with the debtor, protecting a 
third party via the injunction must be fair and equitable to future claimants “in 
light of the benefits provided” to the trust “on behalf of such . . . third party.”
396
  
Notably, this language does not mandate that every third party contribute funds 




Third, § 524(g) only permits certain third parties to receive the protection of 
the injunction—and they may be shielded from only particular types of asbestos 
claims.
398
  Section 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) provides that the supplemental injunction 
may bar actions against non-debtors “alleged to be directly or indirectly liable for 
the conduct of, claims against, or demands on the debtor,” but only “to the extent 
such alleged liability arises by reason of” one of the following four relationships 
with the debtor: 
(I) the third party‟s ownership of a financial interest in the debtor, a past or 
present affiliate of the debtor, or a predecessor in interest of the debtor; 
                                                                                                                         
enjoining claims against the third party flowing from pre-bankruptcy activity.  See Brubaker, supra 
note 173, at 962 n.3.  And discharging post-filing lenders is similarly distinguishable.  Accordingly, 
§ 524(g)(3) is generally beyond the scope of this article.  It should be noted, however, that some 
courts conflate the provisions granting third parties the protection of the supplemental injunction 
with the provisions granting immunity to successors and lenders.  See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 
204 B.R. 586, 605-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996). 
395 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(2006). 
396 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (providing that “the court determines, before entering the order confirming 
such plan, that identifying such debtor or debtors, or such third party (by name or as part of an 
identifiable group), in such injunction with respect to such demands for purposes of this 
subparagraph is fair and equitable with respect to the persons that might subsequently assert such 
demands, in light of the benefits provided, or to be provided, to such trust on behalf of such debtor 
or debtors or such third party”). 
397 Id.; see, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *17 
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (confirming plan where it appears the protected third parties 
contributed nothing; all contributions were made on their behalf by the reorganized debtors), aff‟d, 
343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) 
(confirming plan with supplemental injunction that shielded various non-debtor parties related to 
the debtor because the debtor‟s parent company made contributions on behalf of the related parties, 
satisfying § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii)), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004). 
398 It should be noted that § 524(g)(4) does not expressly limit the third-party claims that may be 
enjoined to asbestos claims.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A) (2006).  However, the overall structure 
of the statute, the purpose of the act, and the legislative history, plainly establish such a limitation.  
See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Graham) (“Mr. 
President, upon the establishment of a trust to pay asbestos claims, the bankruptcy court may enjoin 
claims against the debtor and certain third parties alleged to be liable for the asbestos claims 
against the debtor, channeling such claims to the trust for payment.” (emphasis added)).  And no 
court or commentator has suggested otherwise. 




(II) the third party‟s involvement in the management of the debtor or a 
predecessor in interest of the debtor, or service as an officer, director or 
employee of the debtor or a related party; 
(III) the third party‟s provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party; 
or 
(IV) the third party‟s involvement in a transaction changing the corporate 
structure, or in a loan or other financial transaction affecting the financial 
condition, of the debtor or a related party, including but not limited to— 
(aa) involvement in providing financing (debt or equity), or advice to an 
entity involved in such a transaction; or 




A number of courts and commentators have concluded that the language of 
§ 524(g) leaves many ambiguities.
400
  Paragraph (4)(A)(ii) is no exception.  
However, this provision does offer rather clear guidance with respect to the 
enjoining of some types of claims. 
First, § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) only allows for the restraining of claims alleging 
that a non-debtor is “directly or indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims 
against, or demands on the debtor.”
401
  This language suggests that supplemental 
injunctions may not extinguish rights against a third party arising from the third 
party‟s independent conduct.  And several courts have adopted this 
understanding.  For example, in Combustion Engineering,
402
 the initial plan of 
reorganization channeled to the litigation trust the asbestos liabilities of two 
affiliates of the debtor, Basic and Lummus.
403
  Some of the claims against these 
two entities flowed from products that they distributed on their own.
404
  In other 
words, the claims were “wholly separate from any liability involving Combustion 
Engineering.”
405
  The Third Circuit held that the “plain language” of § 524(g) 
prohibited the extension of the supplemental injunction to “these non-derivative 
third-party actions.”
406
  The court explained that “§ 524(g)[(4)(A)(ii)] limits the 
situations where a channeling injunction may enjoin actions against third parties 
                                                                                                                         
 
399 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii).  The statute defines a related party to mean (1) past and present 
affiliates of the debtor, (2) the debtor‟s predecessors in interest, and (3) “any entity that owned a 
financial interest” in the debtor or the parties identified in (1) and (2).  Id. § 524(g)(4)(a)(iii). 
400 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 902 (“Unfortunately, Section 524(g) is not always a model of 
clarity, and its legislative history is sparse.”); Kenneth Pasquale & Arlene G. Krieger, Combustion 
Engineering and the Interpretation of Section 524(g), 2007 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW Part I § 4, 
at 149 (explaining that § 524(g) “is a convoluted series of requirements” and that recent litigation 
“has exposed a number of significant ambiguities in the application” of the statute). 
401 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). 
402 In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004). 
403 Id. at 201. 
404 Id. at 231 (“By contrast, the asbestos-related personal injury claims asserted against Combustion 
Engineering, Basic, and Lummus arise from different products, involved different asbestos-
containing material, and were sold to different markets.”). 
405 Id. at 235. 
406 Id. (emphasis added). 








Similarly, it appears clear that the supplemental injunction is allowed to bar 
claims seeking to hold a parent company or manager of the debtor responsible for 
the debtor‟s asbestos liabilities by piercing the corporate veil.
408
  Courts and 
commentators frequently describe veil piercing as creating a type of “indirect 
liability.”
409
  And section 524(g) permits the enjoining of actions asserting that a 
third party is “directly or indirectly liable” by reason of “the third party‟s 
ownership of a financial interest in the debtor” or “the third party‟s involvement 
in the management of the debtor.”
410
 
There is also little question that the channeling injunction may prohibit 
actions against insurance companies in which plaintiffs seek to recover under 
liability insurance policies the carriers sold to the debtor.  The statute states that 
the injunction may bar lawsuits alleging that a third party is directly or indirectly 
liable by reason of its “provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party.”
411
  
Moreover, this was the precise type of claim released in Johns-Manville,
412
 the 
bankruptcy upon which § 524(g) is based. 
A more difficult case than these three examples concerns the liability of 
joint tortfeasors.  Suppose asbestos claimants seek to hold a senior manager of 
the debtor liable because he was involved in the debtor‟s tortious activity.  It is 
well established that directors and officers are personally liable for corporate 
torts if they participate in the wrongful conduct.
413
  The claimants would, in 
                                                                                                                         
 
407 Id. at 234 (emphasis added); accord In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., No. 01-10578, 2008 WL 
4493519, *8-*9 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2008) (holding that § 524(g) supplemental injunction 
could not be extended to two entities whose asbestos liabilities arose from their own conduct and 
did “not derive in any way from liability of the Debtors”; the two entities were “not alleged to be 
liable for the „conduct of‟, claims against‟, or „demands on‟ the Debtors”); In re Quigley Co., No. 
04-15739(SMB), 2008 WL 2097016, at *6, *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2008) (holding that 
claims against the debtor‟s parent could be enjoined under § 524(g) because the claims sought to 
hold the parent vicariously liable for the debtor‟s conduct and “vicarious liability is a form of 
derivative liability”); see also 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. 
Graham) (“Mr. President, upon the establishment of a trust to pay asbestos claims, the bankruptcy 
court may enjoin claims against the debtor and certain third parties alleged to be liable for the 
asbestos claims against the debtor, channeling such claims to the trust for payment.” (emphasis 
added)). 
408 See In re Quigley, 2008 WL 2097016 at *6 (offering several examples of the types of derivative 
claims that can be enjoined pursuant to § 524(g), including “alter ego, piercing the corporate veil, 
domination and control, and respondeat superior” (emphasis in original)). 
409 See, e.g., U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 70 (1998) (referring to veil piercing as establishing 
“indirect, derivative liability”); Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated 
Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165, 1186 (contrasting direct liability with “the indirect liability 
that occurs where the corporate veil has been pierced”). 
410 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(I), (ii)(II) (2006) (emphasis added). 
411 Id. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III). 
412 See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. 
413 3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002). 




essence, be asserting that the manager is a joint tortfeasor with the debtor.
414
  
There is language in § 524(g) that suggests that enjoining such an action is 
permissible.  The statute provides that a supplemental injunction may bar claims 
against a third-party alleging that the third-party is “directly or indirectly liable 
for the conduct of . . . the debtor” by reason of “the third party‟s involvement in 
the management of the debtor . . . or service as an officer, director or employee of 
the debtor.”
415
  First, the hypothetical plaintiffs are charging the manager with 
direct tort liability.  Second, while the liability flows from the manager‟s own 
conduct, as was the case with Basic and Lummus in Combustion Engineering, 
that conduct is inseparable from the debtor‟s because the manager‟s actions were 
the debtor‟s actions.  Thus, the claims allege that the manager is liable for the 
debtor‟s conduct.  This distinguishes the manager from Basic and Lummus, 
whose conduct was completely independent.  Third, and last, the manager‟s 
liability “arises by reason of” his service as an officer of the debtor; it was only 
through such service that the manager was involved with the debtor‟s torts. 
I am not necessarily convinced by this reading.
416
  But it does illustrate that 
the language of § 524(g) provides considerable basis for expanding the protection 
of the supplemental injunction beyond mere “derivative” liability of third parties.  
Because the statute permits the enjoining of claims that assert “direct” liability, 
the language may be construed to allow for the release of joint tortfeasor claims 




Section 524(g)(4) contains additional ambiguities.
418
  But my purpose here 
is not to definitively resolve all issues regarding the language of that provision.  
                                                                                                                         
 
414 See id. (noting that a plaintiff may hold liable as joint tortfeasors the corporation and a manager 
that participated in the act that caused the plaintiff‟s injury). 
415 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(II) (emphasis added). 
416 It is also worth noting that there are probably very few individuals left comparable to my 
hypothetical manager given how long ago most asbestos torts took place. 
417 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(III).  In Johns-Mansville Corp. v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co. (In 
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008), rev‟d on other grounds, Travelers Indem. 
Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009), the Second Circuit implicitly rejected my joint-tortfeasor 
argument.  The court concluded that a § 524(g) supplemental injunction could not enjoin claims 
against insurers alleging that the carriers (1) influenced Manville‟s failure to disclose the dangers of 
asbestos, and (2) violated a duty to disclose information about asbestos that they learned through 
their dealings with Manville.  Id. at 58, 67-68.  The court repeatedly described these claims as 
based on the insurers‟ “independent” conduct or duties.  See id. at 55, 64-65, 67.  But the precise 
allegations, such as influencing Manville to not divulge material, suggest that the insurers were 
being prosecuted, at least in part, as joint tortfeasors.  See United States v. Union Corp., 277 F. 
Supp. 2d 478, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Joint tortfeasors are parties who either act together in 
committing a wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite to form a single injury.”). 
418 For example, some authorities suggest that § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III) allows for extension of the 
supplemental injunction to parties that shared insurance with the debtor, in addition to those that 
sold insurance to the debtor.  See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459, 481 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2003), subseq. vacated on other grounds, 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2005).  At least one 
commentator has criticized this understanding.  See Brubaker, BANKR. LAW LETTER, supra note 
196, at 11 (asserting that, even if sharing insurance constitutes the “provision of insurance” for 




Rather, I believe that the bulk of non-debtor releases granted in asbestos cases 
raise more pressing concerns than strict compliance with the terms of § 
524(g)(4). 
VI.  LIMITATIONS ON ASBESTOS NON-DEBTOR RELEASES 
A.  The Varying Scope of Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases 
Virtually all, if not all, plans of reorganization in asbestos bankruptcies 
contain third-party releases.
419
  Many of these provisions enjoin claims that are 
firmly within the scope of § 524(g).  For example, most of the plans shield 
insurers from claims arising from insurance policies that the carriers issued to the 
debtor,
420
 consistent with § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III).  Most also prohibit the assertion 
                                                                                                                         
purposes of paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(III), the non-debtors‟ liability in Combustion did not arise “by 
reason of” the shared-insurance relationship, as required by § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) if the non-debtors 
are to be protected by the supplemental injunction).  I think Professor Brubaker has the superior 
understanding.  Another issue is whether the supplemental injunction may shield carriers, who have 
settled their coverage disputes with the debtor, from state-law contribution actions brought by non-
settling insurers.  Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Five: An Update on 
Developments in Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 8-8 MEALEY‟S ASB. BANKR. REP. 24, 10-11 
(2009) [hereinafter Plevin et al., Where Are They Now].  In some cases, these contribution claims 
are channeled to the trust for payment.  Id.  Protecting the settling carrier is probably permissible in 
this circumstance because the non-settling insurer is essentially seeking to hold the settling carrier 
“indirectly liable for the conduct of . . . the debtor” by reason of its “provision of insurance to the 
debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(III); see In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 856 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (adopting this understanding of (4)(A)(ii) & (ii)(III)).  In other 
bankruptcies, the contribution claims are enjoined even though the non-settling carrier will not be 
paid anything by the trust.  See, e.g., In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 856.  Section 524(g)(1)(B) 
provides that the supplemental injunction may bar claims “to be paid in whole or in part by a trust 
described in paragraph (2)(B)(i).”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  Some non-settling 
insurers have thus objected in cases where they will receive no payment from the trust.  See, e.g., In 
re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 856; see also Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, supra, at 22 n.143 
(collecting other examples).  Despite the language in paragraph (g)(1)(B), which seems to give the 
non-settling carriers a compelling argument, at least one court has held that a supplemental 
injunction may enjoin their rights despite the lack of payment.  See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 
at 856. 
  For an excellent discussion of some of the ambiguities that plague § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), see 
In re Quigley Co., No. 04-15739(SMB), 2008 WL 2097016 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2008).  See, 
e.g., id. at *5 (explaining that the phrase “arises by reason of” in § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) is ambiguous). 
419 Every plan that I reviewed in preparing this article contained at least one such release. 
420 See, e.g., Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as Modified at 
Confirmation at 30-31, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter 
A.P.I. Third Amended Plan]; In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 
616243, at *15-*16 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T 
Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 
2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); see also Plevin et 
al., Where Are They Now, supra note 418, at 11. (“Policyholder-debtors typically extend that relief 
in their Chapter 11 plans to insurers who have entered into settlement agreements with the debtor 
pre-confirmation. In some instances, plans allow insurers who settle post-confirmation to also be 




of claims against (i) non-debtor parent and affiliate companies,
421
 and (ii) 
directors and officers,
422
 where the claimants seek to hold such parties liable for 
the debtor‟s conduct solely by reason of their status as corporate affiliates or 
managers of the debtor.  These types of supplemental injunctions are consistent 
with §§ 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I) and (II), respectively. 
However, a significant number of asbestos releases contain expansive 
language that arguably extinguishes claims that are beyond the scope of § 
524(g).
423
  For example, in the bankruptcy of A.P.I. Inc., the non-debtor release 
in the reorganization plan extinguished all “Third Party Claims,”
424
 a term 
defined to include every claim “based upon, relating to, arising out of, or in any 
way connected with” asbestos claims against the debtor.
425
  Such language is 
likely broad enough to encompass joint-tortfeasor liability, rather than just the 
types of derivative liability that are well within the scope of the statute.  To 
illustrate, a cause of action seeking to hold a parent company liable for asbestos 
harm as a joint-tortfeasor with the debtor clearly “relates” and is “connected” to 
asbestos claims against the debtor.  Yet, despite the release‟s broad language, 
A.P.I.‟s plan of reorganization was confirmed.
426
  Likewise, in the J T Thorpe 
bankruptcy, the court released various third parties from claims against them that 
“were either directly or derivatively through the [d]ebtor . . . on the same subject 
matter as any Claims” against the debtor.
427
  Language such as “directly” and “on 
                                                                                                                         
protected by the court‟s § 524(g) injunction.”); Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 204 
(“[I]nsurance companies are often protected by an § 524(g) injunction[.]”).  Sometimes, the plan 
cites both § 524(g) and § 105(a) as the basis for the insurance releases.  See infra notes 438-39 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this point. 
421 See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *4, *6-*7 (Bankr. 
D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006); In re Kaiser 
Aluminum Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *15-*16; In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the debtor‟s parent, Thorpe Corporation, and various affiliates 
were receiving protection under the supplemental injunction), order entered by, 2003 WL 
23573844, at *10-*13 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003) (setting forth the terms of the supplemental 
and “third-party” injunctions), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 
2004); see also Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 204 (“Indeed, parent and affiliate 
companies . . . are often protected by an § 524(g) injunction[.]”). 
422 See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., 2006 WL 4667137 at *4, *6-*7; In re Kaiser Aluminum 
Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *15-*16; A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 14-15, 26-30.  
423 The precise scope of many of asbestos third-party releases is difficult to determine, a perhaps 
intentional feature of such provisions.  See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 993 (“The driving force 
behind non-debtor releases seems to be a relentless desire to steadfastly avoid articulating and 
valuing what and whose claims are being released.”). 
424 A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 28-29. 
425 Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 3 (defining “Asbestos Claim” in sufficiently broad 
language to arguably encompass joint-tortfeasor claims; the definition of “Third-Party Claim” is 
potentially unnecessary). 
426 Order Confirming Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as 
Modified at Confirmation, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 5, 2006). 
427 See In re J T Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); id. at *10-
*13 (setting forth the terms of the injunctions barring prosecution of any released claims; the terms 
offer additional detail on the parties actually protected).  In comparison, the Porter Hayden plan of 




the same subject matter” also probably includes joint-tortfeasor liability.  But the 
J T Thorpe plan was confirmed as well.
428
  And there are other examples.
429
 
B.  Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) 
Given the ambiguities in § 524(g) and the breadth of many asbestos non-
debtor releases, it is not surprising that courts and parties frequently cite § 105(a) 
as an alternative ground for granting an asbestos release.  In numerous cases, the 
plan or confirmation order indicates that the supplemental injunction or other 
non-debtor release was issued pursuant to § 524(g) and § 105(a),
430
 and there are 
even cases that cite to just § 105(a).
431
 
If a third-party release in an asbestos case is conferred under § 105(a) (or § 
1123(b)(6)) rather than § 524(g), it is subject to all of the legal principles 
discussed in Part IV above.  First consider general non-debtor releases—i.e. 
releases that do not involve insurance.  In anti-release jurisdictions, general 
releases are beyond the power of the court.
432
  And judges abiding by local 
precedent should strike such releases, as occurred in the Western Asbestos 
Company bankruptcy,
433
 a case from the Northern District of California 
Bankruptcy Court, which falls within the anti-release Ninth Circuit.
434
  Yet, this 
                                                                                                                         
reorganization is much narrower, and the claims released fall well within the statute.  The plan only 
shields the non-debtors from “Asbestos Bodily Injury Claim[s].”  In re Porter Hayden Co., 2006 
WL 4667137, at *4, *6.  There is no additional, general language, such as “relating to,” “connected 
with,” or “same subject matter.”  See id. at *6; accord In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 
136, 153-54 (D. Del. 2006). 
428 In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003 WL 23573844. 
429 See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, *33 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Nov. 16 2007) (“[T]he supplemental injunction enjoins all Entities that hold or assert claims, 
demands or causes of action against any of the Released Parties relating in any way to any Claim 
against or Equity Interest in any of the Debtors” (emphasis added)); In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 
586, 606 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that the parties protected by the supplemental injunction 
include “any other Entity that is alleged to be co-liable with the Debtors and provides value to the 
Debtors or the Trust or any of the respective successors or assigns thereof”).  Of course, sometimes 
the proponents of the plan realized that the contemplated non-debtor release goes beyond § 524(g), 
and thus they asked the court to grant the release solely pursuant to § 105(a).  See, e.g., In re 
Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 189-91 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (refusing to confirm the Chapter 11 
plan and holding that the “sweeping” § 105(a) release contained therein was legally barred). 
430 See, e.g., A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 26-30; In re U.S. Mineral Prods., No. 
01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5887219, *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 29, 2005); In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003 
WL 23573844, at *10-*13. 
431 See, e.g., Order Confirming the Joint Plan of Reorganization, as of September 28, 2005, as 
Amended Through January 17, 2006, at 13-15, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992 
(Bankr. E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2006).  
432 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. 
433 See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 846-47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (pursuant to Ninth 
Circuit precedent, finding invalid a § 1123(b)(6) non-debtor release; the release purported to 
extinguish claims (1) based upon the non-debtors‟ pre-petition operation or management of the 
debtor, but (2) unrelated to the bankruptcy case). 
434 See Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 
1995) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases). 




does not always happen.  Some courts bound by anti-release authority have 
upheld § 105(a) releases.
435
  In my view, the pro-release authorities have the 
better position.  Thus, I believe that general asbestos releases are, indeed, 
permissible under § 105(a) (and § 1123(b)(6)).
436
  But such releases are valid 
only if they satisfy the Master Mortgage test, or (I would contend) my modified 
version of it.  And virtually every decision I reviewed that upheld a § 105(a) 
release—including decisions from pro-release, anti-release, and open 
jurisdictions—made no such finding.
437
 
                                                                                                                         
 
435 For example, the Fifth Circuit is an anti-release jurisdiction.  Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale), 62 
F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Section 524[(e)] prohibits the discharge of debts of non-debtors,” 
and thus § 105(a) may not be used to grant non-debtor releases).  But in the J T Thorpe 
reorganization, a bankruptcy court located in the Southern District of Texas entered third-party 
releases pursuant to § 524(g) and § 105(a).  See In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 791 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 2003), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*13 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); 
see also In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *24-*28 (Bankr. 
E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2004) (another case from within the Fifth Circuit approving of non-debtor releases 
entered under § 524(g) and § 105(a)), vacated on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL 
4982364 (E.D. La. 2005); In re Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 294 B.R. 663, 683-86 (N.D. Tex. 
2003) (same). 
436 See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 19-20, 106-36. 
437 As indicated in the text, there are decisions relying upon § 105(a) as authority for a general, 
asbestos non-debtor release from (1) pro-release jurisdictions, (2) anti-release jurisdictions, and (3) 
jurisdictions where the circuit court has not yet made a definitive ruling on the subject of non-
debtor releases (i.e., “open jurisdictions”).  In only two of these cases did the court apply the 
Master Mortgage test. 
  Pro-Release Jurisdictions.  My research uncovered just one opinion from a pro-release 
circuit that cited § 105(a) as a basis for a general asbestos release.  See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 
Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (citing both § 524(g) and § 105(a)).  The Eagle-Picher 
court did not apply the Master Mortgage test.  Id. at 279-81.  However, the test was first articulated 
only two years earlier, see In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 934-35 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1994), and the Sixth Circuit had not yet adopted either the pro-release position or the 
Master Mortgage test, see Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning 
Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656-58 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that non-debtor releases are permissible 
pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and adopting the Master Mortgage test).  Therefore, this is 
not too surprising. 
  Anti-Release Jurisdictions.  As noted in the immediately preceding footnote, three courts 
from the Fifth Circuit have ignored governing anti-release precedent and upheld asbestos releases 
issued in part under § 105(a).  Two did not apply the Master Mortgage test.  See In re J T Thorpe 
Co., 308 B.R. at 788-91; In re Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 294 B.R. at 683-86.  The third did, 
and found the test satisfied.  See In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 2004 WL 4945985, at *24-*28.  
The opinion in In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., was vacated on appeal because the parties reached 
a settlement.  That settlement lead to a revised Chapter 11 plan that was ultimately confirmed and 
that also cited § 105(a) as the entire or partial basis for two asbestos non-debtor releases.  Order 
Confirming the Joint Plan of Reorganization, as of September 28, 2005, as Amended Through 
January 17, 2006, at 11-15, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan. 
18, 2006). 




Next consider insurance non-debtor releases in asbestos cases.  Some courts 
and reorganization plans have cited § 105(a)—either in conjunction with § 
524(g)
438
 or by itself
439
—as authority for such releases.  If § 105(a) is genuinely 
the basis for an insurance release, then courts contemplating such relief must 
address all of the complexities regarding insurance releases discussed in Part 
IV.B.  However, if there is any type of non-debtor release that § 524(g) almost 
certainly authorizes, it is an insurance release.  Accordingly, despite frequent 
references to § 105(a), insurance third-party releases in asbestos cases are best 
understood as flowing from § 524(g). 
In sum, non-debtor releases issued pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) in 
asbestos bankruptcies—i.e., general releases only, not insurance releases—are 
either invalid or, in my view, must satisfy the Master Mortgage test, including 
the requirement that all dissenting claimants receive payment in full on the 
released causes of action.  Few plans of reorganization in asbestos cases have 
promised payment in full on claims extinguished by third-party releases.
440
  This 
may flow from the fact that courts frequently rely upon both § 524(g) and § 
105(a), or just § 524(g), as authority for the release.  But as will be shown in the 
next part, the requirement of payment in full applies to § 524(g) releases as well. 
C.  Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under § 524(g) 
Under the case law in both pro and anti-release jurisdictions, asbestos non-
debtor releases that extend beyond the powers conferred by § 524(g) must, at the 
very least, provide payment in full on the extinguished claims.  I firmly support 
                                                                                                                         
  Open Jurisdictions.  The Third and Eighth Circuits have not yet taken a side in the debate 
over non-debtor releases.  But there are lower court opinions from both circuits approving of § 
105(a) asbestos releases without considering the Master Mortgage elements.  See, e.g., In re U. S. 
Mineral Prods., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5887219, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 29, 2005) 
(granting a § 105(a) injunction, but failing address to the Master Mortgage test); In re U.S. Mineral 
Prods., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5898300 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 29, 2005) (also failing to 
address the Master Mortgage elements); A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 30-31 
(providing for non-debtor releases to be granted under § 524(g) and § 105(a)); Order Confirming 
Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as Modified at Confirmation 
at 11-16, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 5, 2006) (issuing two injunctions 
under §§ 524(g) and 105(a) that constitute non-debtor releases, but nowhere addressing the Master 
Mortgage elements).  But see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459, 480-85 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2003) (after finding that two non-debtors could not be protected by a § 524(g) channeling 
injunction from claims that were “independent” of the debtor because such claims were outside the 
scope of the § 524(g), the court concluded that a § 105(a) non-debtor release was impermissible as 
well because the Master Mortgage/“Dow” factors were not satisfied), subseq. vacated, 391 F.3d 
190, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the bankruptcy court subsequently found that the 
Master Mortgage/“Dow” factors were met). 
438 See, e.g., A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 30-31; In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 
456, 462, 465-66 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004), aff‟d, No. 3:03-CV-00989 MJJ, 2004 WL 1944792 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2004); In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*11.  
439 See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, *33-*34 (Bankr. 
D. Del. Nov. 16, 2007); In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *7-*8 
(Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006). 
440 See infra notes 469-72 and accompanying text. 




this conclusion.  In this part, I argue, among other things, that a similar 
requirement applies to releases that fall within the scope of the statute.  Section 
524(g) displaced many of the legal requirements applicable to non-debtor 
releases issued outside the asbestos context.  But it did not moot all of them.  And 
one of the principles that is still applicable is the final element of both the Master 
Mortgage test and my modified version of the test—the mandate that the plan of 
reorganization promise full payment to dissenting creditors. 
1.  The Relationship of § 524(g) to General Non-Debtor Release Law 
Section 524(g) significantly altered the law governing non-debtor releases 
in asbestos insolvencies.  To begin with, the specific authorization to issue third-
party releases contained in the statute makes the circuit split over the legality of 
non-debtor releases irrelevant to any release validly granted pursuant to § 524(g).  
Recall that the judicial debate over third-party releases in non-asbestos cases 
centers on §§ 105(a), 1123(b)(6), and 524(e).
441
  The explicit sanctioning of 
third-party releases in § 524(g) eliminates any need to rely on the two equitable 
statutes as a basis for such relief.
442
  And § 524(g) expressly states that courts 
may grant supplemental injunctions shielding non-debtors “[n]otwithstanding the 
provisions of section 524(e).”
443
 
Section 524(g) also moots or displaces (1) most of the Master Mortgage 
test that pro-release courts use to assess the validity of releases, and (2) at least 
one piece of my Modified Master Mortgage test.
444
  Under element two of both 
tests, the release must be “essential” to the reorganization.  And under element 
three of the courts‟ version, the benefitting releasee has to contribute substantial 
assets to the reorganization plan.  These two standards flow from §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6), which, again, are not implicated by channeling injunctions in 
asbestos cases.  Moreover, § 524(g) contains substitute requirements for both 
components.  The element that requires essentiality is replaced by the mandate 
that without the injunction, the plan cannot “deal equitably with claims and 
future demands.”
445
  And the “substantial contribution” element is replaced by 
the requirement that the injunction be fair and equitable “in light of the benefits 
provided” on behalf of the protected third party.
446
  Similarly, the fifth piece of 
the Master Mortgage test, that “all or substantially all” parties impacted by the 
release receive payment in full, is likely also derived from the two equitable 
statutes, and thus no longer relevant to asbestos releases.  Finally, the § 524(g) 
condition that seventy-five percent of the voting asbestos claimants cast their 
                                                                                                                         
 
441 See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text. 
442 For a discussion of why § 524(g) clearly does not displace any authority bankruptcy courts 
possess to issue non-debtor releases under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) outside the asbestos context, 
see supra note 196. 
443 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (2006). 
444 The elements of the Master Mortgage test and my Modified Master Mortgage test that I discuss 
in the next several paragraphs are explained at supra notes 200-31 and accompanying text. 
445 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III). 
446 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 




ballot in favor of the plan
447
 displaces element four of the Master Mortgage test, 
which provides that the parties impacted by a release must “overwhelmingly 
consent” to the plan of reorganization. 
Between the original Master Mortgage test and my modified version, there 
are three elements left to consider vis-à-vis § 524(g): (1) the third party has an 
“identity of interest” with the debtor such that prosecuting the claims otherwise 
scheduled for release could impact the estate (the first element of both tests); (2) 
the class of creditors impacted by the non-debtor release accepts the plan 
pursuant to § 1126(c)
448
 (the third element of my test); and (3) the plan promises 
payment in full to dissenting creditors on any claims extinguished by the release 
(the final element of both tests). 
The Identity-of-Interest Element.  The identity-of-interest requirement 
concerns subject matter jurisdiction.  If the debtor and the released third party do 
not have an identity of interest, any lawsuit against the third party will have no 
impact on the estate, placing the underlying claim beyond the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court.  Subject matter jurisdiction is an absolute prerequisite to any 
judicial order.
449
  A bankruptcy court may thus not enjoin a claim outside its 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the identity-of-interest element still applies to asbestos 
non-debtor releases even when they are granted pursuant to § 524(g).
450
  Yet very 
                                                                                                                         
 
447 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 
448 Id. § 1126(c). 
449 Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) 
(“The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court‟s having jurisdiction over both 
the subject matter and the parties.”); Comm. v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 498 
(D. Vt. 1993) (observing that subject matter jurisdiction “is a statutory and constitutional 
prerequisite to a court‟s ability to entertain a legal action”). 
450 See In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *24 (Bankr. E.D. 
La. Nov. 9, 2004) (assessing the identity-of-interest element with respect to a non-debtor release 
issued under both § 524(g) and § 105(a)), vac. on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL 
4982364 (E.D. La. 2005); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 156 (D. Del. 
2006) (in one sentence, finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the § 524(g) 
channeling injunction). 
  Another jurisdictional issue deserves note.  While the language of § 524(g) suggests that 
a supplemental injunction becomes valid either upon issuance or affirmance by the district court, 
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A) (2006), when the injunction protects third parties, the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code will often require more than traditional appellate review by the 
district court.  To the extent bankruptcy courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over actions 
between non-debtors, they do so pursuant to their “related to” jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 
(2006) (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under 
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 
(permitting “any or all” bankruptcy matters to be referred to bankruptcy courts); Celotex Corp. v. 
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n. 5 (1995) (“Proceedings „related to‟ the bankruptcy include . . . suits 
between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.”).  However, absent consent of 
the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), bankruptcy courts may not issue final judgments in related 
proceedings, id. at § 157(c)(1).  Rather, “[i]n such proceeding[s] the bankruptcy judge shall submit 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or 
judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge‟s proposed 




few courts have addressed this requirement.
451
  This is particularly problematic 




The § 1126 Creditor Consent Element.  Acceptance of the plan under § 
1126(c) by the class of creditors impacted by a third-party release was included 
in my Modified Master Mortgage test because it is clear that a non-debtor release 
granted pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) can not survive cramdown.  The 
same is true with respect to § 524(g) releases. 
                                                                                                                         
findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely 
and specifically objected.”  Id.  A non-debtor release is effectively a final judgment.  In re Digital 
Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that a non-debtor release “is 
equivalent to issuing a final adjudication of the merits” of the released claims); Brubaker, supra 
note 173, at 1070 (“A non-debtor release is not a mere status quo injunction; a non-debtor release 
effectively adjudicates the released non-debtor action.  The release operates as an adjudication on 
the merits, fully binding for res judicata/preclusion purposes.”).  Accordingly, any such release 
granted by the bankruptcy court—including a supplemental injunction issued under 11 U.S.C. § 
524(g)—is subject to de novo review by the district court if a party impacted by the release objects 
on appeal.  See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 1070 (“The non-debtor actions that are „adjudicated‟ 
through non-debtor releases are, at best, non-core, „related to‟ actions, beyond the power of a 
bankruptcy judge to determine by final order without consent of the litigants.”).  But see In re 
Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (concluding that confirmation of plan 
with supplemental injunction barring claims against third parties is a core proceeding). 
  Alternatively, to avoid the waste of judicial resources resulting from duplicative 
assessment of a channeling injunction, the district court can withdraw the reference under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(d) and grant the release itself, in the first instance, as contemplated by § 524(g)(3)(A).  
See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 1070 n.432 (“Limitations on a bankruptcy court‟s core jurisdiction 
are not implicated where the district court enters the final order approving non-debtor release and 
injunction provisions.”); e.g., In re Burns & Roe Enter., Inc., No. 08-4191 (GEB), 2008 WL 
4280099, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2008) (withdrawing the reference for the confirmation hearing “in 
the interest of judicial economy” so that the district court judge, sitting jointly with the bankruptcy 
judge, could consider the debtor‟s proposed § 524(g) channeling injunction). 
451 See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 
30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006) (neither opinion discusses 
the identity-of-interest requirement); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 
2006 WL 616243, at *13-*18 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (addressing the identity-of-interest 
requirement with respect to a § 105(a) non-debtor release, but not with respect to the § 524(g) 
channeling injunction), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).  There 
are also courts that applied the identity-of-interest requirement but apparently thought it was not a 
prerequisite to jurisdiction, just one possible jurisdictional ground.  See In re U.S. Mineral Prods. 
Co., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5898300, at *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 29, 2005) (finding that 
each beneficiary of the releases and injunctions “shares an identity of interest with the Debtor . . . , 
or was instrumental to the successful prosecution and conclusion of the Chapter 11 Case, provided 
necessary funding to the Debtor, and/or has contributed substantial assets or other benefits to the 
Debtor‟s reorganization” (emphasis added)); In re ABB Lummus Global, Inc., No. 06-10401-JKF, 
2006 WL 2052409, at *20 (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 29, 2006) (same). 
452 Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Caleb V. Smith & Sons, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 606, 606 (D. Conn. 1996) 
(“A federal district court has a duty to independently determine whether it has jurisdiction to 
consider a case before it.”) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 720). 




As noted previously, the general requirements for confirmation apply to any 
Chapter 11 plan that contains a § 524(g) channeling injunction.
453
  Thus, in 
asbestos cases involving § 524(g), as in other bankruptcies, it is necessary to 
satisfy the requirement that either (1) every impaired class consent under § 
1126(c), or (2) the plan be confirmable via a cramdown over the objection of any 
impaired, dissenting class.
454
  There is no reason to believe that a § 524(g) non-
debtor release is more amenable to cramdown than a § 105(a) release.  Indeed, 
the Third Circuit has ruled that no § 524(g) channeling injunction may be 
crammed down, whether it protects third parties or not.
455
  Therefore, as with 
non-asbestos third-party releases, the class of asbestos claimants impacted by any 
§ 524(g) release must accept the plan under § 1126(c).
456
 
Section 1126(c) is satisfied when, among voting members of the class, at 
least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number approve of 
the plan.
457
  The second part of this standard is substantially mooted by the 
requirement in § 524(g) that at least seventy-five percent of voting asbestos 
claimants approve of the plan.
458
  But the first part of § 1126(c) is a distinct 
requirement that must still be satisfied.  A plan is thus unconfirmable unless at 
                                                                                                                         
 
453 See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text. 
454 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8)(A), 1129(b)(1); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1124.01, at 
1124-3 (15th ed. rev. 2003) (“A class of claims is impaired under § 1124 if the plan alters the legal, 
equitable or contractual rights to which holders of such claims are otherwise entitled.”); id. ¶ 
1124.02, at 1124-5 (“Any alternation of these rights constitutes impairment, even if the value of the 
rights is enhanced.” (emphasis added)) (collecting authorities). 
455 See Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.), 426 F.3d 675, 680 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Pre-packaged bankruptcies employing a [§ 524(g)] channeling injunction are not 
eligible for the „cram down‟ provision contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) which allows the 
bankruptcy court to confirm a plan of reorganization over creditors‟ objections in certain 
circumstances.”). 
456 In addition, when a supplemental injunction extinguishes claims against third parties, there is a 
compelling argument that asbestos claimants with rights against both the debtor and the released 
third parties must be placed in a distinct class (or subclass).  Including them in a class with tort 
claimants who possess rights against only the debtor is inconsistent with the classification and 
treatment principles set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4).  See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 
983 (making this point in the context of non-asbestos third-party releases); see also id. at 976-77 
n.61 (arguing that subclassification of future claims, separating those with rights against the debtor 
and third parties from those with rights against only the debtor, is necessary under § 
524(g)(2)(b)(ii)(bb) to avoid “irreconcilable conflicts” of interest); id. at 981-86 (arguing that non-
asbestos third-party releases frequently corrupt the integrity of class formation and treatment 
because courts do not take the extinguished non-debtor claims into account in analyzing whether 
the plan of reorganization satisfies §§ 1122(a) and 1123(a)(4)).  Such separate classification is 
consistent with the language of § 524(g) which mandates that “a separate class or classes of 
[asbestos] claimants . . . [be] established.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(b)(ii)(BB) (emphasis added).  But 
cf. In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 182 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (placing the asbestos claimants 
in four distinct classes rendered “the Plan unconfirmable on its face”).  Thus, the class that must 
consent under § 1126(c) to any § 524(g) non-debtor release is the distinct class of asbestos 
claimants with rights extinguished by the release. 
457 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). 
458 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 




least two-thirds in value of the voting asbestos claimants impacted by any third-
party release vote in favor of the plan.
459
  In theory, this should prevent the votes 
of large numbers of parties with smaller tort claims from overwhelming the votes 
of those with more serious personal injuries.
460
  However, some commentators 
have observed that it does not always work out this way in practice.
461
 
The Payment-in-Full Element.  The requirement that the reorganization plan 
promise all dissenting creditors payment in full on any claims extinguished by a 
§ 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) non-debtor release was included in my Modified Master 
                                                                                                                         
 
459 An excellent is example is the Quigley bankruptcy.  See In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 653-
59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the class of personal injury asbestos claimants did not 
accept the plan; eighty-five percent in number of those voting did so in favor of the plan, well more 
than the fifty-percent requirement of § 1126(c) and the seventy-five percent requirement of § 
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb); but only either sixty-five percent or fifty-two percent in dollar amount 
(the court used two different measures) of those voting did so in favor of the plan, both of which 
were less than the two-thirds requirement of § 1126(c)); In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 114-15 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that the debtor‟s plan could not be confirmed because the 
asbestos claimants failed to accept the plan under § 1126(c), as outlined in the previous 
parenthentical); see also In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 
616243, at *2, *10, *15 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (separately addressing the requirement of § 
1129(a)(8), which incorporates § 1126(c), and § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. 
Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 785, 787-89 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (separately 
addressing the requirements of §§ 1126(c) and § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)), order entered by, No. 
02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-
11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra 
note 32, at 285 n.72 (noting that the seventy-five percent requirement is “in addition to” the two-
thirds mandate of § 1126(c)). 
460 See the discussion of the Quigley bankruptcy supra note 459.  See also Brown, supra note 32, at 
859-60 (“[G]iven the wide disparity among the potential values of asbestos claims, it is possible 
that a large block of low-value claimants will vote in favor of a plan (thereby satisfying the super-
majority “number of claimants” requirement of Section 524(g)) while a much smaller number of 
high-value claimants will vote against the plan (thereby preventing the plan from satisfying the 
two-thirds “value of claims” requirement of Section 1126(c)).”). 
461 See Mark D. Taylor, As the Wave of Asbestos Bankruptcies Recedes: What Have We Learned?, 
6-12 MEALEY‟S ASB. BANKR. REP. 22, 1 (2007) (discussing how large number of unimpaired claims 
controlled the vote in many asbestos bankruptcies); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, 
supra note 32, at 285 n.73 (explaining that, because courts generally weight all asbestos claims at 
one dollar per claim for voting purposes, the large numbers of unimpaired claimants “can veto any 
plan that they . . . believe will not adequately provide for their interests,” to the detriment of the 
smaller numbers of impaired claimants).  Former Bankruptcy Judge Barliant and his co-authors 
have identified additional, related problems with the voting process in asbestos bankruptcies.  In 
some reorganizations, tort plaintiffs who settled with the debtor pre-petition are permitted to vote 
on the plan.  This enables the plan proponents to essentially buy some of the votes necessary to 
reach the seventy-five percent threshold of § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).  Barliant, supra note 32, at 
462-64; see, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. at 113.  In other cases, claims arising after a specified 
cut-off date, but prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, have been denied the right to vote on 
the plan.  Barliant, supra note 32, at 458-62. 




Mortgage test because of the best interests of creditors test.
462
  Pursuant to the 
best interests test, which is contained in § 1129(a)(7), a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan is confirmable only if it provides each dissenting, impaired 
creditor at least as much as the claimant would be paid if the debtor liquidated 
under Chapter 7.
463
  Third-party releases are impermissible in Chapter 7 cases.
464
  
                                                                                                                         
 
462 See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 76-77.  The pro-release courts have never articulated their basis 
for adding this element to the original Master Mortgage test. 
463 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2006); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (15th 
ed. rev. 2004) (explaining that the test “is an individual guaranty to each creditor or interest holder 
that it will receive at least as much in reorganization as it would in liquidation”).  Unlike the cram-
down provisions in § 1129(b), which protect classes of creditors, see In re Sentry Operating Co., 
264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001), the best interests test protects individual creditors (and 
individual holders of equity interests), see In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 230 B.R. 715, 741 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) (the best interests test “is designed to protect those individual creditors 
who voted against a particular plan, but who, nonetheless, are being bound to such plan.”); 7 
COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at 1129-46 (“Section 1129(a)(7) operates on an individual creditor or 
interest holder level.”).  This means that each creditor (and each holder of an equity interest) has “a 
limited veto power over the terms of a chapter 11 plan.”  CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, 
BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 775 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter TABB]; 
accord 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at 1129-46 (The best interests test “renders irrelevant class votes 
if but one [dissenting] member of that class would get less than their liquidation preference under 
the plan.”). 
  The best interests test reflects one of the foundational precepts of Chapter 11: The 
debtor‟s various constituencies are free to negotiate and formulate a plan of reorganization via the 
structures of Chapter 11; however, the final product of this process may not deprive any objecting 
creditor or interest-holder of its direct financial stake in the debtor—i.e., its rights upon liquidation 
of the debtor—without that person‟s consent.  See TABB, supra, at 775.  Put another way, “the Code 
assumes that any value over and above liquidation value is subject to negotiation and debate, and 
its allocation subject to group vote rather than individual demand.”  7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at 
1129-45 to 1129-46.  But each creditor‟s entitlement to liquidation value is “inviolable.”  Brubaker, 
supra note 173, at 992.  See generally 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7] (providing an extensive overview of 
the best interests test); Natalic Regoli, Confirmation of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A Practical Guide 
to the Best Interest of Creditors Test, 41 TEX. J. BUS. LAW 7 (2005) (same); FERRIEL & JANGER, 
supra note 174, at 764-67 (providing a brief overview of the best interests test). 
  In deciding whether the best interests of creditors test is satisfied in a given case, the 
court must “conjure up a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation that would be conducted on the 
effective date of the plan.  The court then makes an independent finding, based on the evidence and 
arguments presented, whether creditors will receive as much under the plan as they would in the 
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.”  In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770, 787 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 
172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997).  In assessing what would occur in the hypothetical liquidation, “it is 
generally agreed that all provisions applicable in a chapter 7 liquidation are to be taken into 
account.”  In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174.  Thus, the bankruptcy court must, inter alia, apply the 
Chapter 7 distribution scheme, id. at 172, as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2006) (stating the order 
of priority in a Chapter 7 case).  And the court must take “into account such matters as 
subordinations (11 U.S.C. § 510) and recoveries from general partners (11 U.S.C. § 723) that 
would be applied in a chapter 7 liquidation.”  In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 172; accord H.R. REP. 
No. 95-595, at 412-13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368-69; see, e.g., In re 
Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174 (holding that the disallowance of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) 




A creditor may thus recover any deficiency from a solvent co-obligor if the 
debtor‟s Chapter 7 distribution does not completely satisfy the creditor‟s claim.
465
  
Therefore, because the dissenting creditor would receive payment in full on its 
claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation from either the debtor, the co-obligor, or a 
                                                                                                                         
“must be taken into account in the [best interests] test‟s hypothetical liquidation”).  See generally 7 
COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][c], at 1129-50 to 1129-55 (addressing various issues that arise in applying 
the best interests test as a result of the Chapter 7 distribution scheme and related provisions of 
Chapters 5 and 7 of the Code). 
  As part of the best interests analysis, the court typically reviews a “liquidation analysis” 
that summarizes how much creditors would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7, and 
compares the analysis to the payments contemplated by the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan.  See, e.g., 
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 643 (1988) (explaining that at 
the confirmation hearing “Manville presented an extensive liquidation analysis based on 
documentary evidence and expert testimony,” and that the bankruptcy judge “found that Class-4 
present asbestos health claimants would receive 100% on their claims under the plan but would 
receive only 56%-81% in a liquidation”).  Many authorities indicate that the plan proponents must 
present a liquidation analysis.  See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc‟ns, Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 366 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In order to show that a payment under a plan is equal to the value that the 
creditor would receive if the debtor were liquidated, there must be a liquidation analysis of some 
type[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b][iii], at 1129-47 (concluding 
that § 1129(a)(7)‟s statutory language “essentially requires every plan proponent to perform a 
liquidation analysis of the estate”); see also Regoli, supra, at 24 n.58 (collecting authorities holding 
that a liquidation analysis is mandatory).  Others indicate, however, that the court may dispense 
with a liquidation analysis in some circumstances.  See, e.g., In re AG Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 
77 B.R. 665, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that no liquidation analysis was necessary 
where it was “patently obvious” from the petition schedules and financial statements that unsecured 
creditors would receive less in a liquidation than under the debtor‟s plan); see also Regoli, supra, at 
24 n.58 (collecting authorities finding that a liquidation analysis was unnecessary).  When a 
liquidation analysis is conducted, it has to be “based on evidence and not mere assumptions or 
assertions,” In re Adelphia Commc‟ns, Corp., 361 B.R. at 366, but it need not establish with high 
levels of certainty the value creditors would receive if the debtor proceeded with a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, id. at 366-67 (“However, the valuation of a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation is, by 
nature, inherently speculative and is often replete with assumptions and judgments.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. at 788 (“The valuation of a 
hypothetical Chapter 7 for purposes of § 1129(a)(7) is not an exact science. The hypothetical 
liquidation entails a considerable degree of speculation about a situation that will not occur unless 
the case is actually converted to chapter 7.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  For a summary of 
liquidation analyses, see 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b][iii], at 1129-47 to 1129-49; for a 
comprehensive overview, see Regoli, supra, at 23-39. 
464 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 73-74, 76 n.350 (collecting judicial and secondary authorities).  But 
cf. id. at 74 n.338 (collecting judicial authorities granting releases in Chapter 11 liquidations). 
465 Id. at 76 & n.350; accord Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992 (“In a Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding, creditors retain their rights to pursue non-debtors for full payment, because there is no 
reorganization to protect by providing non-debtor releases.”); see also Hydee R. Feldstein, 
Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 524(e): The Validity of Third-Party Releases in a Plan, 22 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 25, 43 (1994) (“Where a creditor holds, or creditors generally hold, claims against a 
nondebtor, § 524(e) . . . would preserve those claims and they would survive a chapter 7 discharge 
of the debtor pursuant to § 524(a).”). 




combination of the two, the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan must promise full payment 
to the dissenting creditor if the plan releases the co-liable third party.
466
 
This reasoning is equally applicable to non-debtor releases granted under § 
524(g).  That statute only permits the issuance of a supplemental injunction “in 
connection with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under [C]hapter 
11.”
467
  Section 524(g) channeling injunctions, protecting third parties or 
otherwise, are prohibited in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  Accordingly, as with other 
types of debtors, when an asbestos debtor liquidates through Chapter 7, its tort 
claimants are entitled to payment of any deficiency from solvent co-obligors.  
And thus, once again, because any dissenting asbestos claimant would receive 
full payment on its claim in a Chapter 7 proceeding from the debtor, the co-
obligor, or a mix of each, the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan must promise payment in 
full to the dissenting asbestos claimant if the plan releases the co-obligor.
468
 
                                                                                                                         
 
466 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 77 & n.351; accord Brubaker, supra note 173, at 991-94 (arguing 
that non-debtor releases violate the best interests of creditors test); id. at 992 (“[G]iving at least 
liquidation value to each creditor requires protection of the Chapter 7 right to pursue non-debtor 
actions.”); Kenneth M. Lewis, When are Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Setting the 
Record Straight on Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, 3 J. BANKR. LAW AND PRAC. 163, 174-75 
(1994) (arguing that a plan containing a non-debtor release does not satisfy the best interests test if 
co-obligors have sufficient assets to satisfy any deficiencies on the discharged claims); see also 
Feldstein, supra note 465, at 43 (“Accordingly, if the claims released . . . have any real value, then 
the best interest test requires realization of that value for the plan to be confirmed.”); cf. Class Five 
Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 
2002) (holding that non-debtor releases are permissible only when all dissenting creditors whose 
claims are extinguished by the release are paid in full under the debtor‟s plan); In re Boyer, 90 B.R. 
200, 201 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (“Because unsecured creditors would receive full payment if this 
were a chapter 7 case, they are entitled to full payment and interest if full payment in the chapter 11 
case is not made as of the effective date of the plan.”).  As previously discussed, the same analysis 
applies to the release of independent claims against a third party.  See supra note 223 and 
accompanying text.  But this analysis is not pertinent to § 524(g) because, as explained supra at 
notes 401-07 and accompanying text, § 524(g) may not be used to extinguish independent claims 
against non-debtors.  The statute my only be used to extinguish third-party claims when the third 
party and the debtor are co-obligors of some type. 
467 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
468 A crucial assumption of this argument, in either the non-asbestos or the asbestos context, is that, 
under the best interests test, it is mandatory to consider what a creditor would receive from both the 
debtor and the co-obligor if the debtor liquidated through Chapter 7.  Professor Brubaker, the first 
commentator to fully develop how the best interests standard impacts non-debtor releases briefly 
addressed this point.  See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 991-994.  He argued that the language of § 
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) is not restricted to claims against the debtor: “It requires a comparison of what a 
holder would receive under the plan on account of an abstract „claim‟ with the amount the holder 
would receive if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.”  Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992 
n.118.  Thus, he concluded, “the best interests equation also properly mandates consideration of 
creditors‟ comparative recoveries on non-debtor claims, to the extent the plan is treating those non-
debtor claims by release.”  Id. at 992.  Obviously, I concur with Professor Brubaker‟s analysis.  
And there is general language in the case law that supports our understanding of the best interests 
test.  See, e.g., In re Zaruba, 384 B.R. 254, 262 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2008) (“The best interests of 
creditors test requires that the debtor demonstrate that creditors will fare at least as well in Chapter 




                                                                                                                         
11 as they would in Chapter 7.” (emphasis added)).  However, there is also general language to the 
contrary.  See, e.g., In re Smith, 357 B.R. 60, 67 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (“Under section 
1129(a)(7), absent consent, each creditor or interest holder in an impaired class must receive (i) 
property (ii) that has a present value equal to (iii) that participant's hypothetical chapter 7 
distribution (iv) if the debtor were liquidated instead of reorganized on the effective date of the 
plan.” (emphasis added)); In re Lisanti Foods, Inc., 329 B.R. 491, 500 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (“In 
making such a showing, the liquidation value of the debtor‟s assets is controlling.” (emphasis 
added)); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-46 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“This 
means that, absent consent, a creditor . . . must receive property that has a present value equal to 
that participants hypothetical chapter 7 distribution if the debtor were liquidated instead of 
reorganized on the plan‟s effective date.” (emphasis added)).  None of the authorities containing 
these broad statements considered the application of the best interests test when the plan of 
reorganization contains a non-debtor release, and so their pertinence is questionable.  Moreover, the 
only cases to address the relationship of the best interests test to non-debtor releases have implicitly 
sided with Professor Brubaker and me.  See Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., 354 
B.R. 1, 9 (D. Conn. 2006) (reversing confirmation of debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan and remanding with 
instructions to the bankruptcy court to consider whether the plan satisfied the best interest test; the 
district court‟s concern was that the plan released a creditor‟s claim against non-debtor guarantors, 
and thus the creditor “may be significantly less secured under the debtor‟s plan than under a 
Chapter 7 liquidation”); In re Conseco, Inc., 301 B.R. 525, 527-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(explaining that the debtor‟s prior plan of reorganization was not confirmable because it violated 
the best interests test by providing that creditors who were entitled to a Chapter 7 liquidation 
distribution had to release non-debtors in order to receive any payment under the Chapter 11 plan).  
Both Mercury Capital Corp. and In re Conseco, Inc., support the proposition that, when a plan 
contains a third-party release, the best interest analysis must take account of distributions the 
releasing creditors would receive in Chapter 7 from the debtor and the protected third parties.  See 
also In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (“Indeed, because 
a chapter 7 trustee of [a] partnership may proceed against the partners individually, 11 U.S.C. § 723 
(1988), the best-interest-of-creditors test . . . requires the court to find that creditors will receive at 
least as much from the partners‟ contributions to the [partnership‟s] plan as they would from the 
assertion of a chapter 7 trustee‟s rights against the partners,” if the plan releases the partners.) (For 
reasons set forth later in this footnote, Boston Harbor is only indirect support for my position.). 
  Professor Brubaker does acknowledge in his article that many of the earlier pro-release 
authorities ignored “the creditors‟ Chapter 7 right to seek full satisfaction from non-debtors in 
gauging satisfaction of the best interests test—comparing a creditor‟s Chapter 11 distribution with a 
hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution, from the debtor only.”  Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992; see 
also id. at 994 n.124 (offering as an example In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 748 (E.D. Va. 
1988), aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989)); TABB, supra note 463, at 776 (“In determining what the 
creditors and interest holders would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation, the courts generally limit 
their inquiry to what those parties would receive in the bankruptcy case itself.  In other words, a 
court does not ask whether the creditor or interest holder would be better off overall if the debtors 
were to liquidate, but only compares the bankruptcy distributions in chapter 7 versus chapter 11.”).  
But, by generally adopting the Sixth Circuit‟s addition to the Master Mortgage test—the 
requirement that all dissenting creditors impacted by a non-debtor release receive payment in full 
on the released claims—the pro-release authorities now implicitly accept the position held by 
Professor Brubaker and myself: When a plan contains a third-party release, the best interests test 
requires considering what the creditor would receive from the released party in the Chapter 7 case. 
  I must point out one decision that, while not addressing non-debtor releases, contradicts 
my position more directly than the authorities discussed in the first paragraph of this footnote.  In In 
re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999), the court stated that, when 




                                                                                                                         
applying the best interests test, the judge must consider what “the creditor would receive from the 
chapter 7 trustee—and only that amount—for comparison with the dividend available under the 
plan.”  Id. at 411 (emphasis added).  The Dow bankruptcy court justified this assertion by pointing 
to case law construing the Chapter 13 best interest of creditors test, id., which is substantially 
similar to Chapter 11‟s, compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2006), with id. § 1129(a)(7).  The court 
explained that judicial authorities interpreting the Chapter 13 test “uniformly hold that amounts 
obtainable from other sources, such as guarantors, are irrelevant when performing that section‟s 
best-interest-of-creditors test.”  In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. at 411 (emphasis added). 
  The Chapter 13 case law is not nearly as broad as the Dow court suggested.  None of the 
authorities it cited involved guarantors or other non-debtors.  All of the decisions concerned the 
impact of nondischargeable claims against the debtor on the application of the Chapter 13 best 
interests test.  Each of the dissenting creditors in these actions essentially argued that, because their 
claims were nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding, they could pursue collection against the 
debtor post-liquidation for any deficiency; thus, since they would ultimately receive full payment if 
the debtor went through Chapter 7, the best interest test mandated that the debtor‟s Chapter 13 plan 
pay them in full.  See Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1982); In 
re Syrus, 12 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1980).  The contention was rejected in all of these opinions.  In Rimgale, the Seventh Circuit 
explained that, if the argument were valid, Chapter 13‟s more generous discharge provisions would 
be nullified.  In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431; accord In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 553 (explaining that, 
under the argument, the Chapter 13 discharge statute “would be . . . meaningless”).  (A Chapter 13 
discharge is broader than a Chapter 7 discharge.  8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1328.02[2], at 1328-
9 (15th ed. rev. 2005); compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2006) with id. § 727.)  The Syrus court relied 
upon the language of the Chapter 13 statute containing the best interest test, 12 B.R. at 607, which 
directs the court to compare a claim‟s plan distribution to “the amount that would be paid on such 
claim if the estate of the debtor liquidated under chapter 7,” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)) (emphasis 
added).  The court explained that most authorities construe the italicized language to refer to “the 
amount that would actually be distributed out of the assets that were in the estate.”  In re Syrus, 12 
B.R. at 607; see also In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 553 (“Section 1325(a)(4) speaks only to recovery from 
assets of the debtor‟s estate.”).  Finally, “nondischargeability does not insure 100% payment . . . [,] 
only the right to pursue collection of the debt.”  In re Syrus, 12 B.R. at 607; see also 8 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.05[2][d] (15th ed. rev. 2008) (“Many such claims are never paid despite the 
lack of a discharge because debtors remain unable to satisfy them after bankruptcy.”). 
  Even if the Chapter 13 case law relied upon by the Dow bankruptcy court is correct (and 
there is authority to the contrary, though it is a decided minority), the relationship of 
nondischargeability to the Chapter 13 best interest test has little bearing here.  First, as the Dow 
court concedes, see In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. at 411, the language of the Chapter 11 best 
interest test is different from Chapter 13‟s.  It does not refer to “the amount that would be paid . . . 
under chapter 7,” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(b) (emphasis added), but rather to “the amount that such 
holder [of a claim or interest] would receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated,” id. § 
1129(a)(7) (emphasis added).  This is a small, but crucial difference.  In a Chapter 7 case, a creditor 
would “retain” its right to sue co-liable non-debtors for any shortage.  Thus, the Chapter 11 best 
interest test mandates recognition of that right in a plan of reorganization containing a third-party 
release of the creditor‟s claim. 
  Second, as the Rimgale court explained, § 1328 (the Chapter 13 discharge statute) would 
be nullified if, when performing the Chapter 13 best interests analysis, judges had to consider what 
a creditor would recover from the debtor post-liquidation on a nondischargeable claim.  In re 
Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431.  However, no such problem is created if, while conducting the Chapter 
11 best interests analysis, the judge considers what a creditor would obtain from a non-debtor 




Few Chapter 11 plans in asbestos cases have complied with the payment-in-
full requirement dictated by the best interests test.  Rather, in numerous asbestos 
bankruptcies, the court approved a § 524(g) non-debtor release without 
mandating that the plan promise complete satisfaction of the extinguished claims.  
Virtually all § 524(g) litigation trusts operate under a “fixed percentage pay-
out.”
469
  Under such an arrangement, asbestos claimants only receive a 
percentage of the full liquidated value of their tort claims.
470
  The precise fraction 
is typically set in the reorganization plan, but “is subject to change over time 
                                                                                                                         
outside a hypothetical Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  No piece of Chapter 11 would be rendered 
meaningless by following such a procedure. 
  Third, there is a much better analogy to the Chapter 11 best-interests-test/non-debtor-
release relationship than the interconnection of the Chapter 13 best interests test and 
nondischargeable claims: Partnership reorganizations.  11 U.S.C. § 723(a) provides that if the estate 
of a bankrupt partnership cannot pay all claims in full, the trustee may pursue general partners for 
any deficiency to the extent permitted under non-bankruptcy law.  This statute has lead the courts 
to conclude that the assets that a trustee would recover from non-debtor general partners in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation must be considered when conducting a Chapter 11 best interests analysis.  
See, e.g., In re Union Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. 553, 575 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (“Because a 
bankruptcy court should consider the value of a § 723(a) recovery when calculating the liquidation 
value needed for the § 1129(a)(7) comparison, . . . a plan proponent should also provide evidence 
of the net worth of a partnership debtor's general partners.”) (citation omitted); see also 7 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7][c][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Under chapter 7 practice, the trustee of 
a debtor has recourse to the personal assets of the partners of the debtor in order to satisfy 
partnership debts.  Thus, if the chapter 11 debtor is a partnership, the liquidation analysis will also 
have to estimate the probable collections from general partners of assets which could be paid to 
creditors.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(g) (“The court may order any general partner to file a 
statement of personal assets and liabilities within such time as the court may fix.”).  Considering 
what the trustee would recover from non-debtor general partners is quite similar to considering 
what creditors would recover from third parties that are co-liable with the debtor.  Moreover, if the 
partners of a debtor-partnership are solvent, the Chapter 11 plan must provide creditors with 
payment in full.  See In re Grandfather Mountain Ltd. P‟ship, 207 B.R. 475, 484 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
1996) (explaining that, in light of § 723(a), the best interests test mandated that two unsecured 
creditors receive payment in full under the partnership-debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization 
because it was “undisupted” that the general partners were solvent); MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., 
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 814 (3d ed. 2006) (because 
the Chapter 7 trustee of a debtor-partnership with solvent partners may recover sufficient funds 
from the partners to pay creditors in full under 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006), the best interests test 
mandates that any such partnership pay creditors in full if it is reorganizing under Chapter 11) 
(collecting authorities).  This supports the proposition that, when a plan releases solvent non-
debtors, full payment on the released claims is necessary. 
  In sum, the crucial assumption of my argument—that the best interests test mandates 
considering what a creditor would receive from both the debtor and the non debtor if a Chapter 11 
plan releases claims against the non-debtor—is firmly supported.  The Dow bankruptcy court is 
probably correct that non-bankruptcy collections from third parties are usually irrelevant in 
performing the best-interests analysis.  But the story changes completely when a plan of 
reorganization releases claims against such third parties. 
469 Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Distribution Plans, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 174 (2006). 
470 Id. 






  By design, these types of plans do not 
promise payment in full.
472
  Yet neither courts nor litigants press best-interests 
objections against such plans. 
Part of the problem may be that it is common for virtually all asbestos 
claimants to vote in favor of the plan.
473
  Consenting claimants do not receive the 
protection of the best interests test.  But in many asbestos insolvencies, even the 
dissenting claimants do not object to confirmation (on any ground at all, let alone 
under the best interests test).
474
  There are many possible explanations for why 
                                                                                                                         
 
471 Id. at 175. 
472 See, e.g., Joint Plan of Reorganization as of September 25, 2005, as Amended Through January 
17, 2006, at Exhibit B at 2, 11, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 
4945985 at *24-*28 (Bankr. E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2004) (indicating that the intention of the plan was to 
pay as close to the full liquidated value as possible, but adopting an initial payment percentage of 
only thirty-four percent given “the inherent uncertainty” concerning the debtor‟s total asbestos 
liabilities); Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization, at Exhibit 2 at 3, In re United States Mineral 
Prod., No. 01-2471 (JKF) (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 27, 2005) (“Because there is uncertainty in the 
prediction of both the number and severity of future claims, and the amount of the trust‟s assets, no 
guarantee can be made of any Payment Percentage of a Trust‟s Claim‟s liquidated value.” 
(emphasis added)); In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 836-37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(explaining that the litigation trust “will process and pay the Class 4 claims to the extent possible,” 
and that the trust will begin by paying 11.5% of the liquidated value of such asbestos claims); Third 
Amended Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for Asbestos Claims 
Management Corporation (With Technical Modifications), at Appendix A at 5, No. 02-37124-SAF-
11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2003) (“The NGC Bodily Injury Trust will only be able to pay 
Asbestos Claimants a percentage . . . of the Allowed Liquidated Value . . . of their claims.”); Plan 
of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for J T Thorpe Company, Exhibit A 
at 2, In re J T Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2002) (stating that parties 
would only be paid a “percentage of the Liquidated Value of each Asbestos Claim . . . to provide 
reasonable assurance than the Successor Trust will be in a financial position to continue to pay 
similar Asbestos Claims in substantially the same manner”); see also RAND, supra note 2, at 102 
(“These plans establish the amount due a claimant—termed the “full liquidated value” of a claim—
for each type of claim. However, over time, trusts typically pay lower than liquidated value on 
current claims in order to preserve funds for paying future claims.”); Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged 
Asbestos Bankruptcies, supra note 32, at 912 (noting that asbestos prepacks are often expressly 
designed not to pay future claims and certain present claims in full). 
473 See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *15 
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (of the asbestos claimants voting, 99.84% voted in favor of the plan); 
In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 787-89 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that over ninety-nine 
percent of the voting members of each class of asbestos claimants voted in favor of the plan), order 
entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 
02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); see also Esserman & Parsons, supra 
note 371, at 194 n.33 (“It is common for virtually all claimants voting upon a plan to vote in 
favor.”). 
474 See Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, supra note 418, at 9 (“In many § 524(g) cases, a debtor's 
insurers are the only objecting parties.  As a result, if the debtor can persuade the court that the 
insurers lack standing, the debtor will be able to proceed with an uncontested confirmation 
hearing.”); e.g., In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 836 (noting that “the only parties objecting to 
confirmation are four insurance companies”). 




virtually no one (if not no one) has objected to § 524(g) third-party releases on 
best interests grounds.  Perhaps litigants are unaware of their legal rights.
475
  Or 
perhaps my argument is not quite as strong as it appears. 
2.  Counterarguments Regarding the Payment-In-Full Requirement 
Although few bankruptcy courts have addressed the identity-of-interest 
element, I suspect subject-matter jurisdiction will often be satisfied with respect 
to non-debtor claims appropriately enjoined by a § 524(g) supplemental 
injunction.
476
  In addition, most courts carefully apply § 1126(c) in asbestos 
bankruptcies.
477
  My contention that the best interests test mandates full payment 
on any non-debtor claims barred by a § 524(g) channeling injunction is more 
controversial. 
The Best Interests Test and the Language of § 524(g). The most obvious 
response to my best interests argument is that § 524(g) contains language 
indicating that partial payment of enjoined asbestos claims is permissible.  The 
statute provides that a supplemental injunction may enjoin a claim or demand 
that, “under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by” a 
qualifying litigation trust.
478
  Similarly, in setting forth the requirements that need 
to be satisfied if the injunction bars future claimants from suing the debtor or 
third parties, the act refers to future demands “to be paid in whole or in part by 
a” litigation trust.
479
  Section 524(g) also appears to contemplate less than full 
payment for asbestos plaintiffs in its requirement that the trust‟s operating 
procedures “provide reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a 
financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar 
claims in substantially the same manner.”
 480
  If payment in full were necessary, 
                                                                                                                         
 
475 This may flow in part from the fact that courts assessing the best interests in asbestos cases 
appear to never consider what the tort claimants would receive from the released third parties in the 
event the debtor liquidated.  See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 
4667137, at *2 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006) (best-interests finding consists of a single sentence 
and does not mention the released third parties), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 
7, 2006); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *10 (same); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 
B.R. at 787 (same).  In fairness to these courts, and others, the third parties may have been 
discussed in the liquidation analysis, even though they were not mentioned in the opinions. 
476 Most enjoinable non-debtor claims falling within the scope of § 524(g) would probably give rise 
to the type of indemnity and contribution claims that could “conceivably” impact the estate.  See 
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy courts have 
jurisdiction over claims that “could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in 
bankruptcy”).  Since subject-matter jurisdiction is generally beyond the scope of this article, I do 
not wish to say more on the topic. 
477 See supra note 459 (collecting authorities). 
478 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
479 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
480 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006). 








Clearly, if this response is valid, my argument is defeated.  But the response 
fails for three reasons.  First, a key aspect of § 524(g) is the enhancement of 
traditional Code protections.  For example, as noted previously, in the standard 
Chapter 11 case, a plan may be confirmed if either (1) each class of creditors 
“has accepted” the plan,
482
 or (2) the plan complies with the cramdown 
provisions.
483
  A class “accepts” the plan where at least two-thirds in amount and 
more than one-half in number of the voting claimants cast their ballots in favor of 
the plan.
484
  But § 524(g) demands more: A plan with a supplemental injunction 
cannot be confirmed under any circumstances unless at least seventy-five percent 
of the voting members of each class of asbestos claimants vote for the plan.
485
  
Likewise, in other Chapter 11 reorganizations, the requirement that a plan be 
“fair and equitable” with respect to a given class of creditors only applies when 
the debtor seeks to confirm the plan via cramdown.
486
  Section 524(g), however, 
mandates that any plan enjoining future claims be “fair and equitable” to the 
persons that hold such rights in light of the benefits provided to the litigation trust 
by the debtor or any third party protected by the injunction.
487
  If § 524(g) non-
debtor releases are permissible when the extinguished claims are not paid in full, 
then the claimants impacted by such a release are entitled to less protection than 
creditors whose third-party rights are discharged under § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6).  
This is contrary to § 524(g)‟s focus on augmenting Code requirements. 
Second, Congress expressly identified the one provision in the Code that § 
524(g) supplemental injunctions need not comply with when non-debtors are 
protected by the injunction.  According to the statute, third-party releases are 
authorized “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 524(e).”
488
  If Congress 
had wanted to exempt § 524(g) non-debtor releases from any other Code 
requirements, it could easily have listed statutes in addition to § 524(e).  It did 
not do so.  To the contrary, Congress indicated that the rest of the Code governs 
supplemental injunctions when it provided that such injunctions are permissible 
only “in connection with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under 
[C]hapter 11.”
489
  And, of course, pursuant to § 1129(a)(7), reorganization plans 
need to satisfy the best interests test.  Consistent with § 524(g)‟s straightforward 
                                                                                                                         
 
481 Cf. Findlay v. Falise (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit.), 878 F. Supp. 473, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (concluding that, because the original Manville plan was supposed to pay all claims in full, 
there was no need for any “special mechanism of the type described” in § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V)), 
aff‟d in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996). 
482 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8)(A). 
483 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
484 Id. § 1126(c). 
485 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 
486 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
487 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 
488 Id. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
489 Id. § 524(g)(1)(A). 




terms, the courts have universally subjected reorganization plans containing 
channeling injunctions and litigation trusts to all of Chapter 11‟s provisions.
490
 
Third, the language in § 524(g) that arguably permits non-debtor releases 
without payment in full on the enjoined claims is amenable to alternative and 
preferable understandings.  A supplemental injunction need not shield third 
parties.  The text of the statute plainly authorizes injunctions that protect only the 
debtor.
491
  If the debtor is the sole beneficiary of a channeling injunction, it is 
quite possible that there will be insufficient funds to pay all asbestos claimants in 
full since third parties will have no incentive to contribute resources to the 
trust.
492
  The language allowing payment “in part” should be read to permit 
debtors who are insolvent on a going-concern basis—even with the protection of 
a channeling injunction—to utilize the trust/injunction mechanism.  Indeed, such 
debtors may be the ones for whom the mechanism will be most beneficial, 
maximizing the available resources for tort and commercial creditors.  
Additionally, asbestos plaintiffs frequently sue sixty to seventy defendants for 
their injuries.
493
  Such plaintiffs may receive compensation from multiple alleged 
tortfeasors.  The “in part” language in § 524(g) should thus also be interpreted to 
allow litigation trusts to make partial payments to plaintiffs who obtain damages 
from other defendants.  Given these alternative constructions, it is completely 
unnecessary to read the phrase “in part” as undermining claimant protections 
contained elsewhere in the Code.  This is especially true with respect to the 
protection guaranteed by the best interests test, which is “one of the cornerstones 
of [C]hapter 11 practice.”
494
 
                                                                                                                         
 
490 See supra note 369 (collecting authorities).  Of course, I contend that they have not applied the 
best interests test correctly. 
491 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (stating that a supplemental “injunction may bar any 
action directed against a third party” (emphasis added)), with id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that 
no successor who receives property from the debtor or the litigation trust pursuant to the plan or 
thereafter “shall be liable with respect to any claim” (emphasis added)). 
492 See supra notes 469-72 and accompanying text (noting that few plans of reorganization in 
asbestos bankruptcies promise payment in full to the tort claimants); infra notes 545-51 and 
accompanying text (noting that many asbestos debtors defaulted on the plans of reorganization, 
paying less than was promised under the plan). 
493 Brickman, supra note 24, at 992. 
494 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 
2004); accord In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1997). 
  Another textual provision someone objecting to my argument could raise is § 
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II), which provides that a debtor may not utilize § 524(g) unless the amount of its 
future asbestos obligations cannot be determined.  If such amounts cannot be determined, one 
might ask, how can a plan of reorganization assure payment in full to asbestos claimants?  This is a 
pretty thin basis for any contention that the best interests test no longer requires payment in full on 
claims barred by a non-debtor release in asbestos cases.  And it is clearly subject to my first two 
replies in the text.  I think it is also subject to a version of the third reply: The language is amenable 
to an alternative interpretation.  Just because the debtor‟s future liabilities “cannot be determined,” 
does not mean that the debtor and other parties are entirely in the dark.  If they were, the court 
would be unable to assess the feasibility of the plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006); it would 
be impossible to determine whether the debtor could satisfy its plan obligations (even with the 




Does the Best Interests Test Always Require Payment in Full?  Another 
response to my argument is that the best interests test does not always require 
payment in full on claims extinguished by a third-party release, whether the 
release is issued under § 105(a) or § 524(g).  Suppose a group of asbestos 
plaintiffs holds claims of questionable validity against the third parties shielded 
by a supplemental injunction.  In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the plaintiffs would 
receive only pro rata payments from the insolvent debtor and likely nothing from 
the third parties.
495
  Or suppose that the debtor‟s Chapter 7 filing, combined with 
the crush of tort claims, would put pressure on the third parties to file for 
bankruptcy themselves.  Perhaps both the debtor and the non-debtors scheduled 
for protection under the injunction are insolvent when the debtor‟s asbestos 
liabilities are taken into account.  Under either the “weak-third-party-claims” 
scenario or the “insolvent-non-debtor” scenario, the bankruptcy court may 
conclude that the tort claimants would not receive payment in full if the debtor 
proceeded with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and thus the Chapter 11 plan need not 
completely satisfy the released claims despite the best interests test. 
It is first necessary to point out the limited nature of this counterargument.  
The two hypothetical scenarios raise an issue about the applicability of the full-
payment requirement only when the debtor‟s liquidation analysis demonstrates 
(1) that the non-debtor claims are genuinely questionable, or (2) that the released 
third parties are truly insolvent.
496
  Either point will be established in merely a 
subset of asbestos (or other) bankruptcies involving non-debtor releases.  The 




Nonetheless, this response has merit.  In assessing whether a plan meets the 
best interests test, courts consider the solvency of non-debtors in certain 
circumstances—most importantly, in the partnership context, where they must 
assess the financial status of general partners of a debtor-partnership.
498
  If the 
                                                                                                                         
flexibility written into many asbestos-related plans of reorganization).  If non-debtors are going to 
be shielded by a § 524(g) third-party release, they should not be able to hide behind any uncertainty 
regarding the debtor‟s liabilities in order to avoid the full application of the best interests test.  And 
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II) ultimately does not contain any language that suggests otherwise. 
495 See Feldstein, supra note 465, at 43 (“Accordingly, if the claims released under the plan have 
any real value, then the best interest test requires realization of that value for the plan to be 
confirmed.” (emphasis added)); cf. Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 208 (suggesting that 
asbestos claimants will frequently be better off if the debtor reorganizes because third parties 
shielded by a § 524(g) supplemental injunction are certain to make financial contributions; if the 
debtor liquidates the asbestos claimants will have to conduct “speculative and costly litigation” in 
order to recover from the third parties). 
496 For a short discussion of liquidation analysis, see supra note 463. 
497 See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 237, 238 n. 51 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that 
there was no evidence that two affiliates of the debtor, who were seeking the protection of a non-
debtor release, needed to reorganize; noting, in particular, that one of non-debtors was clearly 
solvent). 
498 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7][c][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Under [C]hapter 7 
practice, the trustee of a debtor has recourse to the personal assets of the partners of the debtor in 
order to satisfy partnership debts.  Thus, if the [C]hapter 11 debtor is a partnership, the liquidation 




partners are solvent, a Chapter 7 trustee is entitled to pursue the partners for any 
deficiency,
499
 and the Chapter 11 plan must therefore pay the partnership‟s 
creditors in full.
500
  Where the partners are insolvent, however, the best interests 
test arguably no longer requires complete satisfaction of creditor claims.  
Likewise, courts sometimes assess the validity of claims in performing best 
interests analysis.
501
  For example, one court held that, although the best interests 
analysis requires taking into account that the trustee would seek disallowance of 
certain claims under § 502(d),
502
 it is not necessary to adjudicate a § 502(d) 
objection
503
 or reach a definitive conclusion as to whether the trustee would be 
successful.  Rather, because the court considers only a hypothetical Chapter 7 
liquidation in performing best interests analysis, it is entitled to “speculate” about 
the likely outcome of the adjudication.
504
 
On the validity question, there is authority to the contrary.  Some courts 
have ruled that it is inappropriate to consider the legitimacy of claims in the best 
interests context because it is impractical to estimate the prospects of 
collectability.
505
  But all this indicates is that the issue is an open one. 
My intention here is not to resolve what courts should consider when 
conducting the best interests analysis in bankruptcies generally.  I am willing to 
assume that, if the circumstances so warrant, it is often appropriate to consider 
the solvency of non-debtors (e.g., of general partners) and the legitimacy of 
claims and objections (e.g., § 502(d) disallowance) when applying the best 
                                                                                                                         
analysis will also have to estimate the probable collections from general partners of assets which 
could be paid to creditors.”).  For a thorough discussion of this point, see supra note 468. 
499 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006). 
500 SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 468, at 814 (noting that because the Chapter 7 trustee of a debtor-
partnership with solvent partners may recover sufficient funds from the partners to pay creditors in 
full under 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006), the best interests test mandates that any such partnership pay 
creditors in full if it is reorganizing under Chapter 11) (collecting authorities).  For more on this 
topic, see supra note 468. 
501 See In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that the best interests 
test “requires estimation of disputed and contingent claims and of [C]hapter 7 administrative 
expenses.”). 
502 Id. at 174; see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006) (providing for the mandatory disallowance of 
claims filed by creditors holding property recoverable under various avoidance statutes). 
503 In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174 (“The „best interests‟ analysis in plan confirmation being 
hypothetical, it is not necessary (as would be required in an actual liquidation) to adjudicate the 
creditor‟s § 502(d) status before imposing the § 502(d) disability.”). 
504 Id. at 174 (“In computing the hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation, the court is entitled to view 
the entire record of the case and to engage in rational speculation about what would occur in a 
[C]hapter 7 liquidation.  Among other things, the court can hypothesize that certain claims would 
evoke the objection of a [C]hapter 7 trustee and can speculate about the likely fate of such 
objections, bearing in mind the protective purpose of the „best interests‟ test.”). 
505 See, e.g., In re Syrus, 12 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (“The extent of collectability and 
the offsetting costs of collection cannot be estimated by the courts.”); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 553 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980) (“It would also be impractical for the court to place a value on a 
creditor‟s right of action against a debtor not discharged; factors such as the speed with which 
judgment could be obtained, and collectability of the judgment, would have to be considered.  Yet, 
how could the Court fairly and accurately consider these factors?”). 




interests test.  I want to proffer a more narrow argument, applicable only to a 
limited number of cases: Assessing non-debtor solvency or the legitimacy of 
claims against the non-debtor for best interests purposes is inappropriate when 
such assessment is a prelude to a non-debtor release. 
If a co-obligor of the debtor is genuinely insolvent, it should commence its 
own bankruptcy (or perhaps jointly file with the debtor).  A release of liability is 
one of the signature benefits offered by the Code.  To achieve this coveted relief, 
a party almost always has to submit to the full jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court.  As explained by judges and commentators alike, it is such submission, 
combined with the party‟s insolvency, that justifies the bankruptcy court‟s 
extraordinary power to compel creditors to accept partial recovery.
506
  Sections 
105(a) and 524(g) create narrow exceptions to these principles, permitting the 
court to extinguish the liabilities of non-debtors who have not directly invoked 
the bankruptcy system.  Where the non-debtor proffers sufficient assets to enable 
the plan to promise payment in full to asbestos claimants, there is no great danger 
in protecting the non-debtor via a release.  But when the non-debtor contributes 
insufficient funding for complete resolution of the debtor‟s asbestos obligations 
because the non-debtor is purportedly insolvent—yet still receives the benefit of 
a release—the absolved third party escapes its tort liability without ever having to 
accede to the bankruptcy process.  If the non-debtor desires the type of relief 
generally reserved for debtors—if the non-debtor is seeking an actual release, a 
release of claims that will not be paid in full—it should submit fully to the 
bankruptcy court‟s jurisdiction.  Only then can a proper assessment of the third 
party‟s financial status take place.  Review of a liquidation analysis is too narrow 
a proceeding. 
Admittedly, my argument does not find support in the explicit language of § 
1129(a)(7) or elsewhere of the Code.  And we must be mindful of the Supreme 
Court‟s admonishment to employ a plain meaning approach to the interpretation 
of federal statutes,
507
 an approach the court has regularly followed with respect to 
the Bankruptcy Code.
508
  But third-party releases issued outside the asbestos 
context, and a significant number of releases in asbestos cases, are granted 
pursuant to § 105(a) and § 1123(b)(6).  Those statutes, as the primary sources of 
the bankruptcy court‟s general equitable powers,
509
 are obviously concerned with 
                                                                                                                         
 
506 See In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Judith R. 
Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor Claims in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 498 (1993)). 
507 See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) 
(“[W]hen the statute‟s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 
241(1989))). 
508 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that „when the 
statute‟s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.‟” (quoting Hartford Underwriters, 
530 U.S. at 6; construing various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code)). 
509 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 




equity.  And thus, it is appropriate for courts to give weight to broader 
bankruptcy policies and structural considerations, like those articulated in the 
previous paragraph, in deciding whether to grant a non-debtor release.  In fact, in 
my prior article, I expressly argued that, even when the Master Mortgage test (or 
my modified version) is satisfied, a court is not required to confer a release; it 
merely has the authority to do so.  After finding that the Master Mortgage 
elements are met, the court must still exercise its discretion and consider the 
equities in determining whether such a dramatic remedy is truly warranted in the 
case before it.
510
  Note that I am not asserting that courts are statutorily prohibited 
from considering a non-debtor‟s insolvency in deciding whether an actual 
release—as opposed to a channeling release—satisfies the best interests test.
511
  
Rather, I am contending that the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, 
always (or almost always) refuse to grant actual releases on equitable grounds 
where the purported justification for ignoring the last element of the Master 
Mortgage test is that the proposed beneficiaries of the release are insolvent.  If 
they are indeed insolvent, the prospective releasees should be denied relief unless 
they declare bankruptcy themselves.
512
 
                                                                                                                         
 
510 Silverstein, supra note 6, at 79-80 & n.358 (collecting authorities). 
511 For readers familiar with my past article, this is what distinguishes my point here from one of 
the anti-release arguments I rejected with respect to § 524(e) in the prior piece.  To recap, perhaps 
because § 524(e) does not expressly forbid releases, some anti-release authorities have relied upon 
the policies underlying that provision, and underlying the Bankruptcy Code generally, in arguing 
that § 524(e) bars third-party releases.  Silverstein, supra note 6, at 49-50, 122, 125.  I criticized 
such reasoning in light of the Supreme Court‟s plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation 
as exemplified in United States v. Energy Resource Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).  Silverstein, supra 
note 6, at 123-28.  The anti-release authorities used broad structural reasoning and underlying-
policy arguments to assert that § 524(e) is a statutory bar on all non-debtor releases, an 
interpretation that goes beyond the statute‟s plain terms.  This is exactly the type of statutory 
construction the Supreme Court has disavowed.  Id. at 123-26.  And thus, I still believe the anti-
release authorities are incorrect for the reasons I articulated in my last article.  In the current piece, I 
am relying on the same structural and policy arguments proffered by the anti-release authorities.  
But I am doing so in a very different context: I am using the anti-release arguments as a basis for 
recommending, on wholly equitable grounds, that courts refuse to grant § 105(a) and § 1123(b)(6) 
actual releases (as opposed to channeling releases) where the asserted justification for not paying 
the creditors in full is the alleged insolvency of the shielded non-debtor.  I am not using structural 
and policy reasoning to twist a statute like § 524(e) in a direction it will not go.  And the High 
Court‟s jurisprudence on statutory interpretation contains nothing that conflicts with my contention 
that, when exercising equitable powers, courts should consider broader arguments based on 
structure and underlying policies. 
512 Cf. In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc. 391 F.3d 190, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “the practical 
effect” of two proposed § 105(a) non-debtor releases “is to extend bankruptcy relief to two non-
debtor companies outside of bankruptcy”) (further observing that the releases allow the non-debtors 
“to cleanse themselves of non-derivative asbestos liability without enduring the rigors of 
bankruptcy”); Brubaker, supra note 173, at 994 (observing that “non-debtor releases interject 
discharge of creditors‟ non-debtor rights into a bankruptcy process designed to restructure only 
creditor claims against the debtor”). 




The same reasoning applies with respect to the validity of non-debtor 
claims that a plan proposes to extinguish.  In exercising its equitable discretion, a 
court should be very hesitant to permanently enjoin the prosecution of such a 
claim because it believes the cause of action is baseless, and thus would not be 
paid if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7.  Creditors holding claims against 
non-debtors are generally entitled, on equitable grounds, to either a promise of 
payment in full in the plan of reorganization, or a full adjudication on the merits.  
Moreover, if the claims against the third-party really are so weak, the third-party 
ought to be able to settle with the creditors for a modest amount,
513
 converting 
the requested relief from an equitably problematic involuntary release into a 
wholly legitimate voluntary one. 
Of course, this analysis is pertinent only to releases granted under §§ 105(a) 
and 1123(b)(6).  Section 524(g) is not a general equitable statute like the other 
two provisions.  Thus, there is substantially less basis to argue for equitable 
limits on supplemental injunctions in asbestos cases—such as my proposed 
restrictions on the scope of liquidation analyses conducted pursuant to the best 
interests test when a non-debtor release is involved.  Accordingly, for § 524(g) 
third-party releases, the validity of the claims against the non-debtor and that 
party‟s solvency are likely appropriate questions to consider in addressing 
whether the best interests test mandates payment in full on the released claims.  
And if the court ultimately concludes that either the non-debtor is insolvent or the 
claims against it lack merit, the court may uphold the § 524(g) non-debtor release 
even though the plan of reorganization does not promise the asbestos claimants 
full payment on the extinguished rights.
514
 
There is one more context in which the best interests test might not mandate 
payment in full for claims enjoined by a § 524(g) third-party release.  Recall the 
discussion in Part IV.B regarding insurance non-debtor releases issued outside 
the asbestos context.  There, I presented the following argument.  Assume a 
debtor and its insurer settle a coverage dispute for less than the policy limits.  
Assume further that, in conjunction with the settlement, the court issues a third-
party release extinguishing all claims against the carrier relating to the 
compromised policy, including claims held by additional insureds and tort 
claimants with property interests in the policy.  An insurance release of this type 
might be permissible under § 363(f) in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  If such releases 
are authorized in Chapter 7 cases, then additional insureds and tort claimants will 
not necessarily receive payment in full if the debtor liquidates.  And, if these 
                                                                                                                         
 
513 Cf. Brubaker, supra note 173, at 993 n.122 (“The risk averse non-debtor would be willing to 
trade a greater certain contribution in exchange for release from a lower projected, but uncertain, 
liability outside bankruptcy.”). 
514 In an essay on § 524(g), Katherine Porter offered the following: “The controversy that courts 
must resolve is whether [asbestos] claimants would receive more if solvent nondebtors either had to 
pay claimants out of their own (often sizeable) profits or had to file separate bankruptcy cases that 
put all of the nondebtor company‟s value at issue in negotiating the terms of a trust.”  Porter, supra 
note 30, at 229-30.  I am uncertain as to the precise point Ms. Porter is pressing in this quotation, 
but it seemed sufficiently related to my discussion of the best interests test and non-debtor solvency 
that I wanted to present it. 




creditors will not receive full payment in a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding, 
the best interests test does not require full payment on the released claims in the 
debtor‟s Chapter 11 action.  Accordingly, outside the asbestos context, when an 
insurance non-debtor release is included in a plan of reorganization that does not 
promise the additional insureds and tort claimants payment in full on the 
extinguished claims, the best interests test does not invalidate the release. 
If this argument is valid, then insurance third-party releases issued under § 
524(g) in asbestos cases would also not be subject to the payment-in-full 
requirement.  My contention—that the best interests test mandates full payment 
on the non-debtor claims enjoined by a supplemental injunction—is premised on 
the inability of courts to issue such an injunction (or any other type of third-party 
release) in Chapter 7 cases.  After all, § 524(g) applies solely in Chapter 11 
proceedings.  And non-debtor releases granted under § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) are 
legal, at most, only when necessary to a debtor‟s reorganization.  But if § 363(f) 
authorizes insurance third-party releases in Chapter 7 liquidations, then the 
premise of my position is false with respect to insurance releases.  This would 
mean that there is one type of § 524(g) non-debtor release that is conferrable 
without any promise of payment in full on the barred claims: a supplemental 
injunction shielding an insurance company under § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III).  
According to this argument, since insurance releases are allowed in Chapter 7 
under § 363(f), asbestos claimants will not always recover in full from the 
carriers if the debtor liquidates.  And thus, a § 524(g) insurance release may 
sometimes be included in Chapter 11 plans that do not promise the tort plaintiffs 
full payment on the enjoined claims. 
As I have implied at various points throughout this Article, I am undecided 
on the question of whether § 363(f) permits courts to grant insurance releases in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  To answer this question, I would need to resolve the 
complex issues discussed in Part IV.B, including the four-way split in the courts 
concerning whether (and to what extent) liability insurance proceeds are property 
of the estate.  That task is beyond the scope of this Article.  But I felt it essential 
to bring to the reader‟s attention the legal morass related to insurance non-debtor 
releases; in my experience, § 524(g) insurance releases are sought by plan 
proponents (and granted by the courts) in all asbestos bankruptcies.  Judges and 
lawyers thus need to be aware of the complexities inherent in this type of release.  
And since the authorities are split on a number of the issues that impact the 
propriety of Chapter 7 insurance releases, those same judges and lawyers must 
also be mindful of the local governing precedents.  For example, in jurisdictions 
where none of the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance are part of the 
debtor‟s estate, § 363(f) almost certainly may not be used to grant an insurance 
release, in Chapter 7 or otherwise.  And thus any § 524(g) insurance release must 
be contained in a plan that provides payment in full on the enjoined claims.  In 
territories where the debtor‟s share of the proceeds is part of the estate, § 363(f) 
probably may not be used to confer an insurance release—leading to the same 
result under § 524(g) as in the first group of jurisdictions.  Finally, in circuits 
where all of the proceeds are estate property, there is a strong case that § 363(f) 




does justify at least some Chapter 7 insurance non-debtor releases.
515
  And 
therefore § 524(g) insurance releases need not be contained in reorganization 
plans that provide full payment on the barred claims. 
The Best Interests Test and Future Claimants.  A final response to my best 
interests argument proceeds as follows.  Even if the best interests test does 
require payment in full on any claims extinguished by a § 524(g) release, this 
protection does not accrue to future claimants.  Section 1129(a)(7)(A) only 
applies to persons who hold “a claim or interest.”
516
  And future claimants do not 




This argument, even if valid, is of little import.  Section 524(g) requires that 
the holders of present and future claims receive substantially equivalent treatment 
under the plan of reorganization.  The statute mandates that the trust‟s operating 
procedures “provide reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a 
financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar 
claims in substantially the same manner.”
 518
  This language prohibits significant 
discrimination between present and future asbestos claimants.
519
  If present tort 
plaintiffs are entitled to payment in full, future tort plaintiffs must receive 
“substantially the same”
 
protection.  We can thus leave aside the issue of whether 
future claimants hold bankruptcy “claims” or not.
520
  Because these creditors are 
entitled to treatment comparable to present claimants, they must effectively 
receive the protections guaranteed by the best interests test. 
To summarize my position so far, if an asbestos non-debtor release is issued 
pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6), then general release law applies, including 
the requirement of payment in full on the extinguished claims.
521
  If an asbestos 
release is validly issued under § 524(g), then full payment is necessary, except in 
three circumstances: (1) where the released non-debtor is insolvent; (2) where the 
claims against the non-debtor are speculative; and (3) perhaps where the non-
debtor is an insurance company and the supplemental injunction bars claims 
against it related to insurance policies that have since been compromised.  As the 
case law currently stands, it is unclear whether payment in full is required in the 
third circumstance; the answer to the question likely varies with the circuit, and I 
am taking no firm position here. 
                                                                                                                         
 
515 I used the locution “strong case” because there are also issues specific to § 363(f), rather than to 
the property-of-the-estate question, that must be resolved.  See supra note 343. 
516 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2006). 
517 See id. § 524(g)(5).  Moreover, if the debtor liquidated, it is likely that future claimants would 
receive no money at all, at least from the debtor.  Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra 
note 32, at 276 (arguing that liquidation provides “some recourse for current claimants,” but “it 
would leave future claimants entirely without recourse”). 
518 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006) (emphasis added). 
519 See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (finding that plan violated § 
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because of excessive discrimination between claims). 
520 For a brief discussion of this issue, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
521 Of course, in anti-release jurisdictions, courts and litigants must take account of governing 
precedents that are contrary to my view. 




3.  Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases and the Fair-and-Equitable Standard 
There is one issue left to discuss regarding third-party releases issued 
pursuant to § 524(g).  The statute provides that enjoining future claimants from 
suing the debtor and/or third parties must be “fair and equitable” to such 
claimants “in light of the benefits provided” to the trust “on behalf of” the debtor 
and any protected third parties.
522
  What does the phrase “fair and equitable” 
mean?  I have saved this issue for last because, in my view, the “fair and 
equitable” language of § 524(g) should be construed in light of the payment-in-
full requirement mandated by the best interests test. 
When applying the “fair and equitable” requirement, most courts perform a 
generalized “fairness” analysis.
523
  This analysis is typically cursory in nature, 
comprising just a few sentences in the opinion confirming the plan of 
reorganization.  The court notes simply that the contributions provided by the 




Beyond § 524(g), the only other Bankruptcy Code provisions that use the 
phrase “fair and equitable” are the cramdown provisions.  Under § 1129(b)(1), a 
reorganization plan may be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting class 
only if the plan “is fair and equitable” with respect to the class.
525
  In the 
cramdown context, the concept of “fair and equitable” has multiple 
components,
526
 including both codified and uncodified elements.
527
  One of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
522 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 
523 In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 179 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (“Most courts that have looked 
at the fair and equitable requirement for the injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) have looked 
at all the elements of a plan and then made a generalized determination of what is fair and 
equitable.”). 
524 See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *16-
*17 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (noting the various contributions, and summarily concluding in 
one sentence that the plan was fair and equitable to future claimants), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 
2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (listing the parent 
company‟s contributions on behalf of itself and certain other released third parties, and then 
concluding with a one-sentence finding that extending the injunction to cover the parent and the 
other third parties was fair and equitable with respect to future claimants), order entered by, No. 
02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-
11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).  But see In re ABB Lummus Global, Inc., No. 06-
10401-JKF, 2006 WL 2052409, at *18-*20 (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 29, 2006) (finding the non-debtor 
release to be fair and equitable to future claimants because the contributions by the non-debtors 
were sufficient to enable all asbestos claimants to receive payment in full). 
525 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006); see also id. § 1129(b)(2) (indentifying several requirements 
included under the concept of “fair and equitable”); id. § 943 (providing that a municipality 
reorganization plan must comply with the sections identified in § 901); id. § 901 (identifying §§ 
1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A) & 1129(b)(2)(B)).  It should be noted that two other sections of the Code 
use the similar locution “fairly and equitably.”  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A), 
1114(g)(3). 
526 See generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1129.04[4], 1129.05 (15th ed. rev. 2004 & 2005). 




most crucial is the absolute priority rule,
528
 which is codified in § 1129(b)(2).
529
  
Another, uncodified piece adopted by many courts is a prohibition on the “unfair 




At least one court has expressly concluded that the phrase “fair and 
equitable” has a different meaning in § 524(g) than it does in § 1129(b).
531
  And 
the analysis of the § 524(g) requirement performed by other courts implies the 
same understanding.
532
  But there is a strong argument that the phrase has 
substantially the same meaning in both statutes. 
When Congress drafted the cramdown provisions, it chose the phrase “fair 
and equitable” with care.
533
  These words “reflect and stand proxy for almost a 
century of judicial decision-making, and over a century of legislative 
guidance.”
534
  And when Congress decided to use the term “fair and equitable” a 
second time, in § 524(g), it is reasonable to presume that the legislative body 
acted with the same circumspection.
535
 
If the traditional understanding of “fair and equitable” applies to channeling 
injunctions that bar future claimants from prosecuting their rights against the 
debtor or third parties, the impact would be significant.  For example, the 
absolute priority component would mandate that, where the channeling 
injunction shields the debtor from future claims, the plan must promise the future 
claimants payment in full, or the debtor‟s shareholders have to lose their 
equity.
536
  True, other provisions of § 524(g) only require that the litigation trust 
                                                                                                                         
527 Id. ¶ 1129.05 (identifying and discussing the codified pieces); id. ¶ 1129.04[4][b] (15th ed. rev. 
2004) (identifying and discussing the uncodified pieces); id. ¶ 1129.04[4][c] (discussing one 
particular uncodified piece—the new value component).  Some of the uncodified “fair and 
equitable” components are more well established than others.  Id. ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-90. 
528 Id. ¶ 1129.04[4][a], at 1129-90. 
529 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
530 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.04[4][b][ii], at 1129-107. 
531 See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 850 n. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003). 
532 See supra notes 523-24 and accompanying text. 
533 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-89. 
534 Id. ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-90. 
535 Moreover, in the cramdown context, the fair-and-equitable standard, including the absolute 
priority rule, only applies to dissenting classes of creditors.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).  
But future claimants are incapable of accepting or rejecting the plan because they are not direct 
participants in the reorganization process.  See id. § 524(g)(5)(A).  They are involved only through 
the future claims representative, see id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i), who arguably does not get to vote on the 
plan, see supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.  Since future claimants are not in a position to 
dissent from a plan that sacrifices their interests to other plan constituencies, alternative forms of 
protection are necessary.  Congress may reasonably have concluded that requiring that the plan 
always treat future claimants in a fair and equitable manner is one such protection.  (Another is the 
provision mandating that present and future asbestos claimants receive substantially similar 
treatment contained in § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).)  In short, there are good reasons to believe that § 
524(g) uses the phrase “fair and equitable” in the traditional sense.  However, as will be made clear 
in the text shortly, I ultimately find this conclusion unpersuasive. 
536 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[4][a], at 1129-92 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (explaining the 
absolute priority rule). 




(1) “be funded . . . by the securities of [one] or more debtors”
537
 and (2) receive 
immediate or contingent ownership of “a majority of the voting shares” of the 
debtor.
538
  But these obligations (and the other provisions of § 524(g)) are best 
understood, I contend, as setting merely the minimum requirements for the 
architecture of the litigation trust.  They do not negate requirements implicit in 
other Code sections that mandate higher standards in terms of the trust‟s 
structure.  On this interpretation of § 524(g), if a supplemental injunction enjoins 
future claims that the trust will not be paying in full, the original equity holders 
must lose their ownership interests.
539
 
There is an important response to this argument.  The phrase “fair and 
equitable” is used differently in §§ 524(g) and 1129(b)(1).  In the latter provision, 
the phrase is unqualified: A plan must be “fair and equitable . . . with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the 
plan.”
540
  In the former, the term is used in conjunction with other language: The 
court must determine that shielding the debtor or third parties “is fair and 
equitable . . . in light of the benefits provided” to the trust on behalf of the debtor 
or third parties.
541
  This contrast suggests that the words have a different meaning 
in § 524(g), a meaning that centers on the contributions being made by the 
shielded parties, rather than absolute priority or other traditional fair-and-
equitable principles.
542
  Given the alternative context, I find this second 
interpretation to be more persuasive.  “Fair and equitable” has a distinct meaning 
in § 524(g), one that is not rigidly tied to the understanding applicable to those 
same words as set forth in the cramdown statute. 
However, even though the words “fair and equitable” connote something 
different in § 524(g), this does not entail that their meaning is wholly variant 
from the identical language in § 1129(b)(1).  One piece of the cramdown 
understanding of “fair and equitable” is that the plan must not unreasonably shift 
the risk of plan failure from junior to senior creditors.
543
  A similar notion of risk 
shifting should be read into § 524(g)‟s usage of the phrase, particularly as applied 
to non-debtors protected by the supplemental injunction. 
Section 524(g)‟s “fair and equitable” requirement commands the court to 
determine whether it is appropriate to protect the debtor and non-debtors from 
                                                                                                                         
 
537 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2006). 
538 Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) (also stating that this requirement can be satisfied through ownership 
of the debtor‟s parent or subsidiaries). 
539 My argument here does not entail that the trust own 100% of the reorganized debtor 
immediately upon the latter‟s emergence from Chapter 11.  The trust might share ownership with 
other creditors, such as commercial claimants. 
540 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
541 Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
542 Cf. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 943.03[1][f] & 943.03[1][f][i][A], at 943-14 to 943-15 (15th 
ed. rev. 2000) (explaining that, while the Chapter 11 cramdown provisions govern in Chapter 9 
municipality reorganizations, “the strict fair and equitable rule of corporation reorganizations 
cannot be applied without some adjustments,” and identifying some of the adjustments that are 
necessary). 
543 See supra note 530 and accompanying text. 




future claims—restricting future claimants to recovery from the litigation trust—
given the level of funding the protected parties are contributing to the trust.
544
  
The primary concern with respect to future claimants is that the trust will run out 
of money years after confirmation, either because more future claimants appear 
than anticipated or because the debtor runs into business difficulties and is unable 
to fulfill its obligations to the trust.
545
  This is not an insignificant concern. 
In a recent article, James Stengel compiled a chart detailing the payments 
being made by nineteen asbestos litigation trusts as of 2006.
546
  The data present 
a bleak picture, to say the least.  Of the nineteen trusts, eleven were not making 
any payments at all to claimants at that time, though a few were scheduled to 
start doing so.  Four others were paying a de minimis amount—for example, one 
was paying twenty-five dollars and another was paying 0.6% of a claim‟s value.  
One trust was making payments only to plaintiffs suffering malignant injuries.  
And the other three were paying at 5%, 11.25%, and 15% of a tort claim‟s 
value.
547
  Not one of these trusts was paying even twenty-five cents on the dollar, 
let alone full compensation.  Stengel added that “all trusts pay only a fraction of 
claim value, most have reduced payments (often dramatically), and several have 
failed.”
548
  Other commentators have similarly documented the litigation trusts‟ 
payment problems.
549
  For example, Asbestos Litigation, a report by the RAND 
Corporation, notes that many trusts “pay only pennies on the dollar,”
550
 and 
offers the following conclusion: “It is certain that many of the asbestos personal 
injury trusts established as a result of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations pay 
only a small fraction of the agreed-upon value of plaintiffs‟ claims; there is no 




Some commentators contend that the fair-and-equitable requirement has 
induced third parties to make substantial contributions to litigation trusts.
552
  And 
                                                                                                                         
 
544 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 
545 See RAND, supra note 2, at 105 (“The history of asbestos litigation has been characterized by 
failures to forecast its magnitude, scope, and evolution with any accuracy.”); see also id. at 102 
(“The trusts are required to provide for future claimants and, consequently, the trusts are generally 
concerned about being sure there will be money for future claimants.”) (further explaining that to 
preserve funds for future claimants, trusts “typically pay lower than liquidated value on current 
claims”). 
546 Stengel, supra note 29, at 262.  Some of the trusts on the list, such as the Manville trust, predate 
§ 524(g). 
547 Id. 
548 Id. at 263 (emphasis added); id. at 262 (concluding that the asbestos litigation trusts “have been 
a dismal failure”). 
549 See, e.g., id., at 261 (“According to David Austern, the general counsel of the Manville Trust: 
„No existing asbestos trust, except for Manville, has ever paid full liquidated value to any 
claimant.‟”) (quoting David T. Austern, Presentation at the American Bankruptcy Institute Winter 
Conference, Dec. 4, 2003, at 6). 
550 RAND, supra note 2, at 102. 
551 Id. at xxix. 
552 See Porter, supra note 30, at 229. 




there are cases that lend some support to this conclusion.
553
  But the payment 
history of the trusts indicates that non-debtor contributions have not been nearly 
large enough.  And because it is likely that every one of the Chapter 11 plans that 
established the struggling trusts also released the contributing non-debtor, the 
asbestos claimants have lost the opportunity to seek compensation for their 
injuries from potentially liable parties.
554
 
It is true that other § 524(g) provisions (1) indirectly address the prospect of 
the debtor encountering new financial problems,
555
 and (2) require that the trust 
be in a financial position to pay present and future claims “in substantially the 
same manner.”
556
  Moreover, § 1129(a)(10) mandates that the plan be feasible.
557
  
But despite these protections, the “fair and equitable” language is best understood 
as heightening the necessary certainty that the trust will have sufficient assets 
when a channeling injunction applies to future claimants.  After all, such 
claimants are incapable of participating directly in the formulation of the plan of 
reorganization; rather, they are represented by a future claims representative,
558
 
who arguably does not get to vote on the plan.
559
  By mandating greater certainty 
that the plan will be successful, the “fair and equitable” requirement assures that 
other constituencies will not formulate a plan that forces future claimants to bear 
undue risk. 
This reading of § 524(g) is even more compelling when the supplemental 
injunction protects non-debtors.  The best interests test already requires that 
present and future claimants be promised payment in full on any claims barred by 
the injunction (at least in most circumstances).  The most logical additional 
                                                                                                                         
 
553 See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 114-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the 
debtor and Pfizer, its parent, would be funding the litigation trust with $645 million dollars, enough 
to permit asbestos claimants to recover in full); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 2003) (Thorpe Corporation, the parent of the debtor and one of the released parties, (1) 
pledged its equity in the debtor to secure a loan to the debtor, (2) promised to loan up to 3.5 million 
to the debtor, (4) released their claims to shared insurance with the debtor, and (4) contributed 
various other miscellaneous funds and assets), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 
23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).  
554 But cf. Shelley, supra note 32, at 258-59 (contending that many personal injury plaintiffs have 
improperly recovered from multiple litigation trusts, thus receiving more than full payment on their 
claims). 
555 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) (2006) (requiring that the trust be given at least the 
contingent right to own a majority of the voting shares of the debtor or related affiliates).  The 
“contingency” that grants a trust control of the debtor must be an event that would occur prior to 
the point in time when obtaining control of the debtor would be worthless.  In re Congoleum Corp., 
362 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). 
556 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). 
557 Id. § 1129(a)(10). 
558 See id. § 524(g)(5)(A) (providing that “the term „demand‟ means a demand for payment, present 
or future, that . . . was not a claim during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization” (emphasis added)); id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (providing for the appointment of a future 
claims representative). 
559 See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text. 




function that the “fair and equitable” standard could serve is greater assurance 
that future claimants will in fact receive full compensation if their right to pursue 
non-debtors is extinguished by a channeling injunction. 
In essence, I would read the § 524(g) “fair and equitable” requirement to 
mandate greater certainty than mere “feasibility”
560
 that the plan will be able to 
pay future claims, whether the supplemental injunction protects both the debtor 
and third-parties, or just the debtor. 
When assessing the assurance required by the “fair and equitable” standard, 
courts should take careful note of the fact that large numbers of § 524(g) trusts 
have failed to fulfill their plan obligations.  Given this state of affairs, the “fair 
and equitable” principle suggests that when courts issue supplemental injunctions 
that protect third-parties they should consider specifying that the relief granted is 
only a provisional injunction, not a full-blown non-debtor release.  Recall how 
provisional injunctions operate:
561
  Unlike third-party releases, a provisional 
injunction does not permanently enjoin or otherwise extinguish the creditor‟s 
claim against the third party the day the plan is confirmed.  Instead, it merely 
stays the creditor‟s right to pursue the third party.  If the plan‟s promise of 
payment in full is satisfied, the injunction becomes permanent.  But if the debtor 
defaults, the injunction is lifted and the creditor can pursue the non-debtor.  
Hence the name provisional injunction; permanent relief for the protected non-
debtor is contingent upon the creditor receiving total satisfaction of its debt.
562
  
The distinguishing feature of a provisional injunction is that, contrary to a non-
debtor release, it places the risk of plan failure on the benefitting non-debtor 
rather than the creditor. 
Nothing in § 524(g) suggests that the supplemental injunction must be 
permanent.
563
  The injunction need merely “supplement the injunctive effect of a 
discharge.”
564
  True, § 524(g)(3)(A)(i) states that, upon issuance or affirmance by 
the district court “the injunction . . . may not be revoked or modified by any court 
except through appeal in accordance with paragraph (6).”
565
  But this language 
does not rule out an injunction that expires by its own terms, as opposed to 
revocation or modification by a court.  Moreover, § 524(g)(2)(A) states that 
“after entry of such injunction, any proceeding that involves the validity, 
                                                                                                                         
 
560 See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the “feasibility” requirement of 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006)). 
561 See also supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. 
562 For a pre § 524(g) asbestos bankruptcy in which the plan contained a provisional injunction 
rather than a non-debtor release, see The New National Gypsum Co. v. The National Gypsum Co. 
Settlement Trust (In re National Gypsum, Co.), 219 F.3d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (channeling 
injunction protecting third parties did not bar asbestos claimants from suing the third parties “after 
exhausting the remedy or remedies provided by the [Trust]”). 
563 In In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., the future claims representative proposed, during the 
negotiations, that the “§ 524(g) injunction would be reevaluated if ABB Limited [the debtor‟s 
ultimate parent] defaulted on its obligations under the Plan.”  391 F.3d 190, 206 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2004).  In other words, he proposed a provisional injunction. 
564 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (2006). 
565 Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(i). 




application, construction, or modification of such injunction . . . may be 
commenced only in the district court in which such injunction was issued.”
566
  
One subparagraph says no modification is permissible; another says an action to 
modify must be brought before the issuing court.  The best way to reconcile these 
two provisions is as follows: Subparagraph (2)(A) permits modifications 
expressly contemplated by the initial terms of the plan of reorganization or 
confirmation order, and subparagraph (3)(A)(i) bars all other changes.
567
 
Of course, provisional injunctions do not provide third parties the finality 
they crave.  Only non-debtor releases do that.
568
  But if a third party desires 
certainty, it should have to contribute sufficient assets to make the success of the 
plan more than merely “feasible.”  The contributions should convince the court 




In short, given the payment history of most asbestos litigation trusts, while 
the protection provided by the best interests test seems broad, any promise to 
future claimants of payment in full on claims extinguished by a § 524(g) release 
may turn out to be hollow.  If such promises are to have value, a heightened 
feasibility requirement is essential.  And if that stricter standard is not satisfied in 
the eyes of the court, a § 524(g) provisional injunction should be the maximum 
relief granted to non-debtors. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The asbestos crisis has inspired courts and legislatures to develop some of 
the most radical remedies in the American legal system.  Non-debtor releases are 
a signature example.  But like other powerful remedies, non-debtor releases are 
subject to abuse, as this Article demonstrates.  Courts have consistently granted 
third-party releases that violate established legal principles. 
                                                                                                                         
 
566 See also id. § 524(g)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
567 But see In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (“While an 
injunction is an equitable remedy, in this instance, the equities are built into 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).  If 
those equities are satisfied, the Court does not believe that it has the discretion to limit the effect of 
the supplemental injunction to something less than permitted by statute.” (emphasis added)). 
568 And thus non-debtors seeking a release are likely to vigorously challenge any proposal that a 
court issue only a provisional injunction under § 524(g).  After all, supplemental injunctions and 
their related litigation “trusts have thus far successfully contained liability and prevented the 
continued pursuit of parent companies, subsidiaries, and buyers for mass tort liability.”  Johnston & 
Porter, supra note 31, at 514.  Indeed, “[e]ven when the asbestos trusts turn out to be underfunded, 
there has been no suggestion that asbestos plaintiffs have recourse against the reorganized debtors 
or their parents or affiliates.”  Id.  But that is only because the injunctions included in the plans 
have been permanent rather than provisional. 
569 Cf. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[4][b][ii], at 1129-109 to 1129-110 (15th ed. rev. 
2004) (explaining that the courts are essentially construing the cramdown “fair and equitable” 
standard to require a heightened showing of feasibility when they find invalid reorganization plans 
that “unfairly or unreasonably” shift the risk of plan failure from junior to senior creditors). 




Asbestos reorganizations are generally enormous cases of staggering 
complexity.  In the quest for a speedy resolution to such cases, courts and 
litigants have understandably looked for legal shortcuts.  The extraordinary 
circumstances in asbestos insolvencies do not, however, justify disregarding 
fundamental protections set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.  Nonetheless, that is 
precisely what has happened in these cases.  Most crucially, asbestos tort 
claimants have been deprived of their rights guaranteed by the best interests of 
creditors test.  I hope that this Article will prompt courts and parties to adopt a 
new approach in asbestos bankruptcies, one that assures that § 524(g) 
supplemental injunctions and other non-debtor releases are granted only after a 
full consideration of the statutory limits on this form of relief. 
